Theology beyond reason: an interdisciplinary study of the fantastic in British literature by Dove, Bryan T.
 
 
 
 
 
Dove, Bryan T. (2010) Theology beyond reason: an interdisciplinary 
study of the fantastic in British literature. PhD thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/2292/
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
Theology Beyond Reason: An Interdisciplinary Study of the Fantastic in 
British Literature 
 
 
Bryan T. Dove 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 
Literature, Theology and the Arts in the Department of Theology and Religious 
Studies, 15 March 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Bryan Dove 2010   2 
 
Abstract 
This dissertation is an interdisciplinary investigation of a hermeneutical possibility for 
engaging in theological discourse after the Cartesian epistemological shift.  By 
identifying and tracing the way in which the fantastic has been used in British 
literature as a response to the Enlightenment, I will demonstrate the potential of 
employing a fantasy hermeneutic for theological discussion. The argument will 
consider how this literature constituted the first creative response to and critique of 
the Enlightenment and how it served as imaginative space for the practice of theology 
in terms of rational and existential crisis focusing specifically on the work of John 
Milton and George MacDonald.  Furthermore, it will establish the liturgical operation 
of fantasy literature and the fantastic nature of liturgy and their hermeneutical 
consequences as well as the epistemological foundations of fantasy from Hume 
through Newman.  Lastly it will read Iris Murdoch as an unlikely inheritor of the 
British fantastic tradition and as an argument for the liberating effect of fantasy on 
theological conversations.  This dissertation constitutes a challenge to the 
epistemological hierarchies of the Enlightenment which stifle human expression and 
self-understanding as well as  cultural perspective on beliefs as rigid, sedentary and 
constitutive of identity.  The literary fantastic provides a mechanism for exploring all 
aspects of human experience and consciousness and the development of 
understanding and belief. 
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The title of this work is Theology Beyond Reason, so perhaps the best way to 
begin it is by explaining just what is meant by a theology beyond reason.  Indeed, a 
small degree of ambiguity is intended here, for if one says colloquially or 
conversationally that something is “beyond reason,” the implication of the speaker’s 
attitude is typically one of incredulity.  So if a person is inclined to read the phrase in 
this, or at least to perceive its ambiguity, then this idiomatic function is illustrative of 
the fact that for many persons theological discourse begins with incredulity or, in 
better cases, a very enthusiastic hermeneutic of suspicion.  However, neither the 
purpose nor the tone of this thesis will regard theological discourse as something to be 
incredulous towards.  Indeed, it will argue that theological discourse, when 
channelled through an appropriate hermeneutical framework, bears potential both 
intellectually and culturally.  It will argue from a Post-Cartesian epistemological 
situation by literary means towards a theological end.  The argument is that fantasy is 
one vehicle which can escape the epistemological hierarchies of Post-Enlightenment 
philosophy in order to take part in theological discourse.  This trend will be traced 
through British literature from John Milton to Iris Murdoch in order to establish the 
precedence, possibility and promise of the fantastic as a literary/hermeneutical tool 
for engagement in a theology which goes beyond reason. 
  To speak, then, of “theology beyond reason” is to speak of a tradition in 
theological literature and discourse in which the theologies (or words about God) are 
allowed to extend further than the reason’s ability to support them.  For Christian 
theology this tradition extends all the way back to the Bible itself and its many works 
of fantasy and apocalyptic which describe God in ways that can only be processed by 
the imagination.  From the Hebrew Bible one can certainly read books like Daniel in   7 
this way; in Daniel the world of dreams invades and confounds the world of the 
waking.  The dreams were not like mundane experience, but overflowing with the 
fantastic.  The God which Job encounters is also certainly a God beyond reason.  
Job’s constant plea is that either he could speak and make his case before God or that 
someone could intervene and mediate between the two.  When God’s character 
appears his response is to state, in fantastic terms, that Job does not have the requisite 
knowledge or mental faculties for discussing such things: “Who is this that darkens 
my counsel with words without knowledge?” (38:2). 
  The New Testament also offers many works which follow this trend, 
examining the God who is beyond reason.  The works traditionally attributed to St. 
Paul, arguably the most philosophically aware of New Testament writers, contain 
frequent challenges to reasoning about God: “Where is the wise man?  Where is the 
scholar?  Where is the philosopher of this age?  Has not God made foolish the 
wisdom of the world?” (1 Co. 1:20).  John the Revelator, exiled on Patmos “because 
of the word of God and the testimony of Jesus,” envisioned a fantastic deliverance 
which, whether eschatological, political, or both, absolutely defied reason and the 
evidence of his circumstance.  Indeed, his situation called for a theology that could 
extend beyond reason in order to reconcile belief in the lordship of Christ with the 
inescapability of his exile. 
  Yet perhaps the greatest works of biblical fantasy are the four gospels 
themselves.  For they centre around events which even today the church must label as 
“mysteries.”  There is the mystery of the virgin birth, the mystery of the incarnation 
and most significantly the mystery of the resurrection.  The resurrection of Christ is 
the seat of all fantasy literature in the western tradition.  This is explicitly not because 
it is somehow false, unreal, fabricated or anything of the sort.  No, what makes the   8 
resurrection supremely fantastic is its irreducibility, its resistance to analysis, its un-
reasonability and the fact that, in light of all of these things, it still rests at the very 
centre of the Christian world view.  Thus it makes the supreme claim of fantasy, the 
claim of ultimate reality. 
 
The Great Fissure 
  Even though it would be many years until the disciplines of theology and 
philosophy were formally separated, Descartes’s “Dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum”  
signalled the epistemological shift which would eventually force theological 
discussion outside of the realm of reason, apart from the philosophical establishment.  
In it one can see how the basic Platonic philosophical model on which theology 
depended becomes secularised, egocentric.  The idea no longer points to anything 
sublime other than the existence of the idea itself.  There was no inherent ontology to 
it along any of the old Platonic or Scholastic structures, just experience and the 
singular, subjective perception of it.  The bridge from human consciousness, to the 
world in which it was thought to be incarnated, to the ultimate Source, or Cause—
God—was crumbling like an igloo in the Saharan sun.   
  One way of reading the relationship between the progressively separate 
disciplines is that for centuries theology did not “take the hint.”  Like a schoolboy tag-
along it continued on its merry way, acting as if it was still doing the very same job as 
philosophy, ignoring the consequences of the Cartesian epistemological shift (one 
which would arguably find its ultimate realisation in Kant).  Even today there is a 
movement in theology to reunite with its ancient philosophical underpinnings.  For 
instance, Louis Dupré minimises the significance of the shift by suggesting that   9 
Descartes’ separation “merely drew conclusions from late medieval, nominalist 
theology which had sharply distinguished the natural order of things, to which 
philosophy belonged, from the supernatural one dealt with in theology” (Cunningham 
1-2).  What this hypothesis ignores, however, is the significance of the subsequent 
increasingly materialist hierarchy which followed Descartes was not present with the 
nominalists.  Even if the nominalists could be said to have significantly separated 
natural from supernatural, Post-Cartesian materialism makes it dysfunctional by 
transforming the separation into an epistemological hierarchy. 
Thus it cannot suffice to look to the past for answers on how theology can and 
must function within the social and intellectual environment of the present.  Any 
critique of modernity and its influence on contemporary thought and life must come 
from the present, not via a bridge built of the brittle material of scorned philosophical 
metaphysics to an ideological past.  This is precisely what John Betz is doing in his 
essay, “The Beauty of the Metaphysical Imagination,” when he says “I wish to argue 
(however anachronistically) for the indispensability of metaphysics to theology” 
(Cunningham 42).  It is, of course, the brazen “however anachronistically” which is 
the problem here.
1  That the present secularism can be deconstructed by its own tools 
does not, it must be said, mean that the world can yet be the thing that Radical 
Orthodox thinkers, for example, wish it to return to.  Surely theology can still have a 
relationship with Philosophy, but in order to achieve the kind that many rosy eyed 
theologians pine for it must exhume the corpse of a Philosophy long since departed.   
                                                 
1 It might be argued that theology is no longer viable enough within the academy to 
be afforded the luxury of being archaic.  The more it remains so, the more it allows 
the force of secularism to objectify it by classifying its nature as either primarily 
historical or anthropological.   10 
  However, it is not my goal to illustrate the way in which some theology has 
effectively assumed the role of a Miss Haversham, nor to deny even the many positive 
criticisms which the schools have in fact produced, but merely to note the occasion 
for the discussion that will follow.  For in the void created by an absent philosophy 
within the discipline of theology, other avenues or means of theological exploration 
may indeed appear.
 2  The subject of this study will therefore reintroduce a former 
partner of theology which the Protestant Reformation and Enlightenment alike drove 
apart; that is, the literary fantastic.   
  Il Sommo Poeta, Dante Alighieri, provides the definitive example of the Pre-
Lutheran, Pre-Enlightenment relationship between these two parties.  His 
masterpiece, The Divine Comedy, is at once purely fantastic and dreamlike as well as 
intensely and seriously theological.  It is this involvement of the theological which 
allows the purely fantastic to gain its teeth as the literary force of the uncanny—for 
through the theology, the fictive threatens reality.  What is the purpose or potential of 
such a slippery, elusive and tantalising work?  By placing metaphysical questions and 
thinking within the context of the fantastic, ridiculous, or surreal one essentially 
combines the rhetorical force of satire or parody with the enduring philosophical 
potency of Platonism.  The purpose is to shock and challenge the assumptions and 
perceptions of the reader both aesthetically and philosophically.  Prickett addresses 
such phenomena saying: 
Finally, in such scenes as these there is the hint (it is no more) of that 
odd metaphysical frisson that links Dante with this minority tradition 
of Victorian children’s writers, and that transforms fantasy from 
simple escapism into something much more enduringly rooted in the 
human psyche.  It is present in Canto III of the Paradisio when Dante 
                                                 
2 This is not, of course, to deny the existence of any relationship between the two, or 
such sub-disciplines as those called “theology and philosophy” but merely to say the 
relationship is nothing like what it was in, say, the Middle Ages.   11 
suddenly discovers that the faces he thought were either reflections or 
figments of his own mind were, in fact, more real and alive than he 
could easily comprehend.  (Fantasy 283) 
  Not only do such moments of “odd metaphysical frisson” link various 
incarnations of the fantastic to the prototype of theological fantasy as Prickett claims, 
but they also hint at the connection that fantasy as a literary genre has with theology 
as a discipline.  For in the era of the pre-modern mentality, such duplicitous moments 
were not in fact rationally or existentially subversive, but rather that which was to be 
expected under such a Platonic cognitive and philosophical system.  It was expected 
that there should be odd moments of connection between dream and waking, natural 
and supernatural, for at that time the supernatural seemed to be everywhere and this 
particular situation was one which could best be communicated through myth.  The 
fact is that it cannot simply be put down to a sorry lack of scientific knowledge which 
being filled with mythic propositions instead.  Indeed, such a proposition entirely 
misses the point of how myths functioned in ancient human cultures. 
One of the most common misunderstandings of myth is to see it as a 
primitive form of theory, the purpose of which is to account for facts 
of nature which—with the development of more systematic and 
objective knowledge—we have subsequently learned to explain in 
more satisfying theoretical ways […]  The objection to this view is that 
in the world in which myth and mythic consciousness predominate 
there do not yet exist any objective “facts,” or therefore any need for 
theories to account for such facts […] Myth is a form of integrated 
perceptual awareness which unites “fact” and “explanation” […]  
(Falck 117)   
In Pre-Enlightenment literature, modern designations of the “real” and its separation 
of sacred and secular, scientific and religious would be viewed as false dichotomies.  
Myths were not solutions to unsolved existential problems, they were the very vehicle 
for experience itself.  Thus, when Betz writes that “Without metaphysics, theology   12 
becomes ‘mere mythology’,” he misses the point of mythology altogether by calling it 
“mere” and opposing it to metaphysical reality (42). 
  Yet because of this, Dante’s Divine Comedy might not actually be considered 
as a fantasy in the traditional sense of the genre, for all of the events of his narrative, 
though dreamlike in their discourse, were regarded in the original environment in 
which they were written as wonderful, supernatural and obviously fictive but 
nevertheless communicated on the same terms which medieval Christianity described 
as the reality of the afterlife.  Eric Rabkin argues this point about fantasy from the 
opposite perspective, that is, a concept which at one point was conceived fancifully 
but at some later date gains naturalistic plausibility. 
It is perfectly conceivable, if not today than a century hence, that 
normative, shared reality … may well include the view that plants can 
talk.  But in that future century, Through the Looking Glass will still be 
a fantasy.  When Alice says “I wish you could talk!” the implied 
author behind the text is reminding us today that flowers are 
preconceived as mute; in future times, that same line may merely 
remind readers that in 1872, when the book was published, people 
once saw plants as mute.  Those future readers willing to suspend 
disbelief in mute plants will be rewarded by a delightful fantasy.  
Those who aren’t willing to follow the signs in the text will throw 
down the book in distaste.  Unless one participates sympathetically in 
the ground rules of a narrative world, no occurrence in that world can 
make sense—or even nonsense. (4) 
Dante’s work was not fantastic, then, although it could be today if one was deliberate 
in ignoring its particular sitz im leben, but simply a fictive exposition of church 
dogma. Yet this distinction begs a question which must be at the very centre of this 
project:  what is fantasy?   
 
   13 
A Short Survey of the Fantastic in Literature 
In order to identify fantasy’s identity today and in the particular context of this 
thesis, one must first look towards how the word has been used in history.  A 
significant portion of Prickett’s work on Victorian Fantasy is dedicated to the 
etymology of the word and its relatives like “fancy,” and “phantasm.”  In its original 
use, fantasy could describe an insubstantial dream, whim or vision.  More to the point, 
however, it was the faculty with which the mind could visualise the immaterial or 
picture that which words could not themselves encapsulate.  Yet in all of its usages, 
fantasy was seen not as something which could be done so much as something which 
happens—as to the Revelator on Patmos, “At once I was in the Spirit, and there 
before me was the throne of heaven” (Rev. 4:2).  According to Prickett’s etymology, 
however, fantasy experiences a change in meaning  to match the change in common 
philosophy during and after the Enlightenment.   
With the Enlightenment came both the retreat of the numinous and the 
evolution of words which might relate to it.  It was at this point that fantasy came to 
meet its newer, darker nature and meaning, stigmatised by its relation to that which 
was ultimately disgusting to the Enlightened mind—the unexplainable and unreal 
(Prickett, Fantasy 6).  Suddenly, “fantasy” became synonymous with superstition, 
moral corruption and vanity.  In nineteenth century it was not at all uncommon for 
Puritans to denounce all fiction in this manner.  Such literature was dangerous to both 
intellect and to the moral being.  In today’s usage the word still conveys ideas of the 
insubstantial, the trivial, the infantile and so forth.  Essentially, what happened to the 
word “fantasy” and its usage in English is representative of what happened to the 
societies it was couched in.  As theology struggled to evolve in a  way which could 
allow its cohabitation with Post-Enlightenment philosophy through the Reformation,   14 
“fantasy” became a symbol of all the superstition which was supposed to be purged 
from religious life.  Protestants attacked the “magic” of the Catholic Eucharist and 
magic itself became the realm of fantasy.  
  Luther’s sola scriptura gave rise to a tradition which, at its most extreme, 
forced non-biblical and non-exegetical literary exercise towards the margins.  Sola 
scriptura establishes a hermeneutical precedent which was massively important to 
those who came after and were affected by it.  There was no place for Dante in such a 
world, no place for fantasy which reached beyond the proper and sober groundings of 
scripture.  Of course, fantasies were still permitted mostly in a  secular context, but 
these still held tenuous positions in society.  The world was not yet “de-mystified” by 
the time of Shakespeare and Marlowe who played teasingly with supernatural 
elements.  When they played with witches, ghosts and spirits it gave their audience a 
true fright.  To them, all of these things were still a part of the realm of the possible 
and their representation on stage, while entertaining in its farce, could be shockingly 
fearsome as well.  There was a certain offense in portraying these beings, in making 
them real with the magic of the stage.  The offense was not against style, manners and 
good taste but against something much deeper.  For this reason such playwrights of 
the supernatural were obliged to give apologies at the end of such revelry such as in A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream (1594): 
    If we shadows have offended, 
    Think but this, and all is mended, 
    That you have but slumber'd here 
    While these visions did appear. 
    And this weak and idle theme, 
    No more yielding but a dream (5.1.412-417) 
Apologies in this vein occur throughout Shakespeare especially and his Renaissance 
contemporaries.  The playwright is Prospero, using his “rough magic” to stir a up a   15 
great display, manipulating his subjects to his own ends. 
Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress is perhaps the last latently theological 
fantasy before the great fissure brought about by Descartes.  Strangely, Bunyan was 
also different from his predecessors like Dante in that he was more conscious about 
what he was doing in terms of creating a fantasy or fable.  That is, the very nature of 
creating a fantasy had changed to the degree that fantasy was definitely now situated 
outside of “the real.”  In a world in which Evangelicals staunchly and vehemently 
condemned all fiction because of its “unreality,” Bunyan proved a notable exception.  
His work was translated along with the Bible by missionaries and is still one of the 
most translated works ever written in English.  Indeed, since its original printing in 
1678, it has never been out of print (Bunyan xiii).  Because of the work’s widespread 
popularity, some would see it as the archetypical theological fantasy.  The problem 
with this is that Bunyan adhered strictly to the constraints of allegory in his work, a 
move that is ignored if not rebuked in the styles of other major theologically 
motivated fantasists: Milton, Coleridge, MacDonald, Tolkien, Charles Williams and 
even Lewis.  Bunyan intended his work to be interpreted on the strictest terms with 
reference to his own rigidly formal theological framework.  Such an intent is 
expressed in the conclusion to Part I in which he states: 
    Now, Reader, I have told my dream to thee; 
    See if thou canst interpret it to me, 
    Or to thyself, or neighbour; but take heed 
    Of misinterpreting; for that, instead 
    Of doing good, will but thyself abuse: 
    By misinterpreting, evil ensues. […] 
    Put by the curtains, look within my veil, 
    Turn up my metaphors, and do not fail, 
    There, if thou seekest them, such things to find, 
    As will be helpful to an honest mind. (175)   16 
What is truly remarkable in The Pilgrim’s Progress is the guilt that Bunyan 
express in the writing of it (in contrast to other fantasists).  It is as though he strives 
for the same repentance as Prospero in renouncing his magic.  In his apology which 
introduces the first part of the piece, Bunyan writes of his work: 
    This book is of such a dialect 
    As may the minds of listless men affect: 
    It seems a novelty, and yet contains 
    Nothing but sound and honest gospel strains. (24) 
For Bunyan, the matter seems to be essentially one in which the end justifies 
unwholesome means.  He describes his purpose in this way: “Wouldst thou see a truth 
within a fable? […] Then read my fancies, they will stick like burrs/And may be, to 
the helpless, comforters” (24). 
It is not unlikely that Bunyan saw similarities between himself and the author 
of Revelation, situated as he was in a prison amidst religious persecution.  It is not 
shocking, then, that his purpose of “comfort” resembles that of the Revelator who 
states “I, John, your brother and companion in the suffering and kingdom and patient 
endurance that are ours in Jesus, was on the island of Patmos because of the word of 
God and the testimony of Jesus.”
3  Although Bunyan himself never claims such 
divine disclosure, the association is natural.  Like the Revelator, his material is 
entirely astonishing, almost whimsical and certainly dreamlike.  Yet, along with his 
biblical counterpart, Bunyan quietly asserts that his fantasies are built on the very 
solid foundations of divinely constituted reality and that it is the toils and temptations 
of life which are, certainly, always the things that seem most real and pressing to 
mankind: 
                                                 
3 Rev. 1:9   17 
    Hobgoblin nor foul fiend  
    Can daunt his spirit: 
    He knows he at the end 
    Shall life inherit. 
    Then, fancies, fly away! 
    He’ll fear not what men say; 
    He’ll labour night and day 
    To be a pilgrim. (303-304) 
In this case “fancies” are what have kept previous pilgrims from achieving their goals.  
But such “fancies” are not here being trifled with.  Bunyan is not exhorting against 
idle daydreaming.  Rather, it is with the very “hobgoblins” and “foul fiends” of honest 
life which he equates fancy.  The principle is of course a theological one, stating that 
everything which faces a man in terms of temptation constitutes a fundamental lie, a 
fancy.  Just as in Eden the serpent offers the first couple a lie, a fantasy which seizes 
their own imaginations—“Eat a piece of fruit and become as God!”  All of the very 
real things which a reader might encounter, such as government mediated persecution 
in Bunyan’s immediate case, are trivialised as fancy even though they were the very 
things which at the time seemed most real and most urgent.  Instead, Bunyan points to 
those things eschatological and eternal as the stuff of sober reality and “hobgoblins” 
like imprisonment become paltry, trifling things. 
  In this way, by his work’s Platonic opposition to perceived reality, Bunyan 
sets himself at least partly within the vein of fantasy literature which this dissertation 
will study.
 4  It also shares in common with the other literature under study the 
characteristic of being a piece of fantastic fiction which not only recycles and re-
clothes in new metaphor standard religious themes, but actually engages in 
theological endeavour in its own right because of the unique properties of its form.  
However, it fails to reach the standard of its peers which will constitute the main body 
                                                 
4 “The fantastic does more than extend experience; the fantastic contradicts 
perspectives” (Rabkin 4).   18 
of this research in that it lacks a certain quality of multiplicity which challenges its 
readers and places them “in the dock.”  Fantasy of the highest theological order relies 
on a certain ambiguity in order to unsettle its readers and draw them into a more 
vulnerable, malleable position. This conceit relies, as it will later be seen, on a certain 
degree of surprise.  Cavaliero opines “It is because supernaturalism is a rogue element 
in the house of fiction that it can act as a shatterer of idols” (238).   
In stark contrast to his contemporary’s blunt allegory, John Milton’s Paradise 
Lost defies easy, simple interpretation.  It moves beyond the bounds of Christian 
orthodoxy in order to “justifie the wayes of God to men”
 (I, 26).  Of course, the 
argument against Milton has been that this is not his prerogative—perhaps why Blake 
wrote that “he was a true Poet and of the Devil’s party without knowing it.”
5  The 
trademark of Milton’s masterpiece, as it is concerned with this project and fantasy, is 
that it lends itself to multiple readings in terms not only of its theological significance, 
but social and political as well.  Paradise Lost is certainly no allegory but rather a 
poetic, political and theological meditation by means of fantastic devices.  It is this 
quality that leads the unashamedly blasphemous Milton (blasphemous not only in his 
poetic enterprise but also, of course, in terms of his more tangible Arianism) to have 
an even greater influence on his successors than Bunyan’s more straightforward 
approach.  Where Bunyan relies on clarity of symbolism to produce the effect he 
desired, Milton employs a much more sophisticated labyrinth of ambiguity wherein 
no matter how long the reader wanders, the minotaur of self-evaluation must be faced 
in the end.   
  Milton, in his typical grandeur, provides an ample transition between periods 
through his development of the character Satan which is a prototype of the Byronic 
                                                 
5 Blake, William.  “The Marriage of Heaven and Hell.”   19 
hero of later Romanticism.  Milton inspired the Romantics like perhaps no other 
author.  It is his use of the fantastic which flavours and moulds the Romantic idea of 
imagination as found especially in Coleridge.  Yet, before one leaps into the 
tumultuous period of the later English Romantics, it suits the purposes of this study to 
dwell momentarily on what was happening in the late 18
th century with the birth of 
the Gothic novel.  Gothic, of course, is not precisely fantasy.  However, Gothic 
remains significant here by doing some of the same things as fantasy in terms of its 
employment of the supernatural. 
  Though some would quibble with this distinction, Horace Walpole’s The 
Castle of Otranto (1764) is likely the best starting point when talking about the 
Gothic novel.  Walpole’s work provides an interesting stop on our journey for several 
reasons.  Firstly it is interesting in that, although the originator of the genre, it is not a 
thoroughly Gothic novel.  In its dreamlike quality, supernatural plot and with its 
spiritually charged overtones it is entirely possible that Walpole could be read in the 
tradition of Milton, Dante and Bunyan.  Of the three, however, he is most like 
Bunyan.  This is true not because he shares the same sanctimony of Bunyan (quite the 
opposite, actually!), but because he similarly perceives the “lowly” nature of his 
fantasy, although he clearly thinks enough, or little enough, of it to have it published 
in the first place.   
  If it is possible to read Walpole as an eccentric, one must admit that he was at 
least a very self-conscious eccentric.  This can be seen, of course, in the fact that he 
first published the tale under the premise of a translation of a work “found in the 
library of an ancient catholic family in the north of England,” and under the 
pseudonym of William Marshall (3). Once the piece was revealed under such 
pretences to a mild but positive reaction, Walpole decided to release a second edition   20 
in which he exposes his own farce.  Although such a move would eventually cause a 
significant backlash against his immediate respectability, it also provided a chance for 
Walpole to describe what he was really trying to do with the text.  To a certain extent, 
it was simply an exercise in Walpole allowing his imagination to run wild.  Writing 
about himself in the preface of the second edition he states:   
Desirous of leaving the powers of fancy at liberty to expatiate through 
the boundless realms of invention, and thence of creating more 
interesting situations, he wished to conduct the mortal agents of his 
drama according to the rules of probability; in short, to make them 
think, speak and act, as it might be supposed mere men and women 
would do in extraordinary positions.  (7-8) 
  But Walpole also claimed to wish to illuminate by these means as well.  
Speaking in terms strictly referring to the outrageous conduct of domestics in his 
narrative (but more widely emblematic of the moral of his fable amongst its ridiculous 
trappings) he writes, “In my humble opinion, the contrast between the sublime of the 
one, and the naiveté of the other, sets the pathetic of the former in a stronger light” 
(8).  This revelation is important in the history of fantasy especially as it would 
develop later in writers like Lewis Carroll.  That something important could be 
wrapped in “buffoonery” is an idea which originated with Bunyan, grew with 
Walpole and finally climaxed with the “Nonsense” writers Lear and Carroll (with a 
significant recurrence in Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake).  What is more than this, 
Walpole’s claim to a deeper seriousness also brought about his confession of the other 
crucial link his work provides across the gap of the Enlightenment in the tradition of 
fantasy writing.  For Walpole claimed that Shakespeare was the very inspiration for 
his project and the means by which he undertook it.  In the second edition’s preface 
he writes, “The great master of nature, Shakespeare, was the model I copied” (8).  His 
work’s relation to Shakespeare in terms of allusions and inspiration are not the stuff   21 
of uttermost significance in this case, however.  It is his work’s very dramatic nature, 
as opposed to true novelistic style, which is the most instructive aspect of Walpole’s 
work.   
  Walpole wrote not as a Brontë, or Austen, or even Radcliffe.  He wrote with 
prose that resembled a play more than a novel, all of the character’s thoughts being 
spoken aloud and their actions the only communicators of intent or emotion.  Michael 
Gamer noted this especially in his essay introducing Walpole’s classic, pointing out 
the author’s previous literary record as an acclaimed playwright and theatre enthusiast 
and the novel’s five chapter structure as an expression of the traditional five act 
tragedy (xxxi).  The important part of this is that Walpole’s text has, or at least is 
supposed to have, the same effect on the reader as the stage has on the theatre 
audience.  An essential aspect in theatre, especially in this period with its very limited 
props and costuming, was that the audience suspend disbelief for the duration of the 
performance.  How else is Shakespeare’s clown to play a character, Wall, and thus 
say in A Midsummer Night’s Dream: 
    In this same interlude it doth befall 
    That I, one Snout by name, present a wall; 
    And such a wall, as I would have you think, 
    That had in it a crannied hole or chink.  (5.1.153-156) 
  What this theatrical quality of Walpole’s work does is to establish an 
important precedent for the reading of fantasy literature in a society which no longer 
recognises anything fantastic.  In addition to the revival of Milton led especially by 
Blake, Walpole contributes the missing element for the developing Romantic 
understanding of the literary imagination.  In a way, his work reintroduces 
Shakespeare and the art of serious fantasy.  This is the critical requirement for a 
hermeneutic of fantasy and it is also the point at which theology and fantasy begin to   22 
share something in common.  Fantasy, in a way much more pronounced than in other 
fictive literary forms, must always begin with the willing suspension of disbelief.  
Lucy Armitt expounds this principle saying: 
The reader is expected to agree with the ideological premise instilled 
within the narrative and very little in the way of narrative pleasure is 
available as an alternative if we fail.  We may resist the framework, but 
in the process we are far more likely to reject the entire text out of 
hand than be prepared to radically interact with it. (29) 
Armitt’s remark is useful because it helps to bridge the hermeneutical gap between 
Romanticism with the birth of the Coleridgean suspension of disbelief and 
Postmodernity with its own seemingly antithetical hermeneutics of suspicion.  The 
claim being made here is not one about objectivity and meaning, but that the best and 
most interesting readings of fantasy will come through appreciation and respect for 
the terms and structure of each individual text.  This thesis will make the case that the 
same follows for “reading” theology, building on a postmodern version of the willing 
suspension of disbelief and moving towards a more creative temporary 
literary/liturgical belief or, in essence, “make believe.”  It was the decomposition of 
Platonism in Enlightenment philosophy throughout the 18
th century that led to the 
erosion of Christian theology and its relationship to philosophy, its place within the 
academy and its social significance in the 19
th century.  On a similar trajectory, 
fantastic literature was forced to the underbelly of what was considered “acceptable” 
literature at the time.  It was in this situation, godless and mundane, that theology and 
fantasy, with their common situation and goals, rediscovered one another.   
The man responsible for this renewed recognition and rebirth is the master 
Scottish fantasist, George MacDonald (1824-1905).  In MacDonald everything 
experiences reversals worthy of even the most exemplary of reversal narratives, the   23 
canonical gospels.  The pagan fairy becomes a pious angel, the mundane becomes 
sublime, the ridiculous becomes normative and the foolish becomes wise.  The 
impetus for this trend in MacDonald’s work is that for him, not unlike Blake, these 
dualities are actually more like singularities in a way that can be said to be nothing 
other than radical.  MacDonald went so far as to quip in his Mary Marston (1881) that 
“All pains, indeed, and all sorrows, all demons, yea,  and all sins themselves, under 
the suffering care of the highest minister, are but the ministers of truth and 
righteousness” (qtd. in Hein 113).  Rolland Hein begins to explain this by claiming 
that George MacDonald had “a strong conviction that a transcendent reality is so 
closely related to the world of the immediate human experience that it is also 
immanent in it” (113).  Cavaliero echoes this by declaring that in MacDonald “the 
everyday is shot through with the numinous” (95). 
Of course, MacDonald’s fantasy and his theology related to each other in other 
much more complicated (and significant) ways than the mechanistic, but to unpack 
these at this point would be allowing the cart to get ahead of the horse.  What is most 
important to note presently is the impact that MacDonald had on the subsequent 
development of what might be loosely labelled “theological fantasy.”  For he had 
transformed the entire genre into something new, exciting and inspiring. 
With his peer and friend Charles Kingsley (1819-1875) he blazed a path that 
would be followed quite famously by the likes of C.S. Lewis, J.R.R. Tolkien, Charles 
Williams and others. But perhaps it was the massive popularity of these later 
followers that sounded the death knell for his particular and special type of fantasy.  
For after these prodigies of the early twentieth century passed, none have been able to 
truly take up MacDonald’s legacy.  Upon closer inspection, even the Inklings will be 
found as poor heirs to the project which MacDonald pursued.  However, it cannot be   24 
said that theological fantasy disappeared entirely after MacDonald, nor even that it 
necessarily parted ways with theology as it had done in the distant past.  Yet it was 
cheapened, simplified, packaged and sullied.  Today, the Fantasy market comprises a 
significant portion of new book printing and sales.  One would be hard-pressed, still, 
to find any of it that lived up to the high literary ideals of MacDonald’s work—mostly 
recycled metaphors on cheap, recycled paper. 
  In light of these developments, what can be then said of the massive impact 
and popularity of the recently completed series from authors Philip Pullman and J.K. 
Rowling and their standing in a genre which could be said to be dying or perhaps 
already dead?  Even more to the point, what is the significance of the theology in their 
work as it relates to the history of both theology and fantasy?  In the edition of Time 
published July 27, 2007, Lev Grossman writes “If you want to know who dies in 
Harry Potter, the answer is easy: God.”  Yet a cursory reading of Rowling’s work 
within the context of a liturgical tradition begun in MacDonald  indicates that nothing 
could be less true of the books. The question that faces contemporary fantasy as a 
genre is one about death.  What has died: God, theology in fantasy, or fantasy itself? 
  This is, of course, the briefest of histories of the interactions between fantasy 
and theology.  It is by no means comprehensive, but rather illustrative of the concerns 
which this project seeks to address.  The goal of this research is essentially 
theological.  To be more specific, it is searching for a way forward in theology that is 
neither caught up in the philosophy of the past nor clinging to the “death of God” 
metaphor which is long past its expiration date.
6  To this end, the study of fantasy 
literature has been introduced as a potential ally for theology or prototypical form 
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which theology might indeed employ to escape the morass of its sometimes dismal 
present.  The study shall focus on and around authors for whom fantasy provided an 
answer and an outlet when their theologising became impossible.   
 
Narrowing in on the Fantastic 
Before any more can be said of this project, it is absolutely necessary to 
become very clear and intentional about what I am referring to as “fantasy.”  This has 
already been alluded to in the form of Stephen Prickett’s etymology of the word from 
which I argued it is very important to keep and remember the very first usage of the 
word as the power to “visualize the immaterial or picture that which words cannot 
themselves encapsulate.”  Fantasy is in this way linked to what is called the 
“imagination” by the Romantics (and not its cognate relative, “fancy”), it is a literary 
representation of the human ability to employ lateral reasoning, or imagine in the 
Kantian sense of that world.  Thus it exists to challenge and transcend the bonds of 
the material: 
Fantasy represents a basic mode of human knowing; its polar opposite 
is Reality.  Reality is that collection of perspectives and expectations 
that we learn in order to  survive in the here and now.  But the here and 
now becomes tomorrow; a child grows, a culture develops, a person 
dreams.  In every area of human thought, civilization has evolved a 
functioning reality, but the universe has suffered no reality to maintain 
itself unchanged.  The glory of man is that he is not bounded to reality.  
Man travels in fantastic worlds.  (Rabkin 227) 
 
Fantasy, then, is not a function of anti-realist dogma.  Rather, it serves to explore 
those facets of reality and experience which, although present and able to be 
perceived, are intangible.  Apter echoes Rabkin’s sentiment stating, “fantasy also 
serves as a means of escaping from habitual assumptions and expectations, but the   26 
purpose of this escape is to show how awful, how limiting and imprisoning, the 
human world is […]  Fantasy provides a point of vantage from which we are shown 
the gaps in our knowledge” (6-7).  As a literary mechanism, fantasy challenges the 
hierarchy of empirical knowledge, itself an immaterial Platonic type, over and above 
anything which it deems, rather magically,
7 as unsubstantial.  More simply, fantasy is 
a trope in literature used to challenge a reader’s assumptions.  It is not the eradication 
or elimination of empirical knowledge which fantasy seeks, but rather the enrichment 
of that perspective.  It is not common sense, or science, or rationality which is its 
target and enemy, but the totalising myth of their singularity and supremacy: 
[…] fantasy also serves as a means of escaping from habitual 
assumptions and expectations, but the purpose of this escape is to show 
how awful, how limiting and imprisoning, the human world is […]  
Fantasy provides a point of vantage from which we are shown the gaps 
in our knowledge.  (Matthews 6-7)  
It is this definition of fantasy, not Fantasy as a literary genre, which will provide the 
scope of this thesis.  Defining fantasy in this way allows one to get to the heart of 
what the fantastic in literature is actually doing rather than obsessing about the rules 
of the genre.  It also means, in the scope of this study, that one is free to pursue the 
fantastic in unexpected directions. 
Fantastic Potential 
The real power of the fantastic is to inspire wonder.  This wonder, then, can 
liberate both mind and soul and elevate all of existence and experience to something 
which it could not otherwise be.  The fantastic, by its very definition, extends beyond 
the possible.  The many times oppressive and reductive Darwinian psychology is 
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thrown off and the human is allowed to bask in the magnificence of the possibility of 
meaning and transcendence, in its own humanity and indeed the humanities 
themselves.  Critics of religion belonging to the school known as New Atheism often 
paint religions as the enemy of science and therefore of humanity itself.  Of course, 
the characterisation is patently false as it is not science, once the daughter of theology, 
but scientism—the true religion of the New Atheists and perhaps much of popular 
culture—and its hierarchy which fantasy seeks to subvert.  Conor Cunningham argues 
in his essay “Trying My Very Best to Believe Darwin” that this scientism is the 
superstitious mythologisation of Darwinism based on the rash ontologisation of its 
theory (100-140).  In truth, this scientism has no basis for allying and identifying 
itself with humanism, or humanity.  Its reductionist approach to humanity’s very 
existence let alone its consciousness is an insult and de facto dismissal of things 
which have been central to its sense of identity and purpose.  Humanity’s 
consciousness has ontological import celebrated in both religion and humanism (if it 
is not itself a religion) which is greater than scientism’s ability to dismiss it, as David 
Chalmers rightly points out when he says “you cannot have your materialist cake and 
eat your consciousness too” (168). 
  In this way fantasy is a defender of the very basic assumptions of the arts, 
namely the one stating that humanity’s existence and its consciousness constitute 
something ontologically greater than their material function.  This thesis will argue is 
that fantasy presents a critique of Enlightenment reason and materialism as well as a 
literary mechanism which can be instrumental in allowing theology to regain cultural 
significance.  The question which drives it is “How might one ‘do’ theology in an 
environment which categorically disallows the possibility of a God?”  For it seems 
that Postmodernism, to the extent which it ever really existed outside of Modernism   28 
or continues to exist today, seemed a selective sort of ideology.  That is, in culture it 
was easily adopted whenever a person or group wished to trivialise the claims of an 
“other” and yet scandalously abandoned in secular discussions of theology.  Here pure 
reason, scientific reason, still reigned supreme (in many cases for both religious and 
secular thinkers alike).  Postmodernism, if anything, represents the greatest 
experiment in cultural double-think.   That which was meant to throw off the last 
vestiges of Enlightenment reasoning did so by that very tool and picked it up again 
whenever it appeared to be of use.  Ontologically, this hegemony affected popular 
thought in ways which can only be described as fascist and totalitarian.  Cunningham 
writes of its relationship to theology, “Here we have a perfect example of this 
pernicious effect [of the fear of religion on intellectual life]:  if a phenomenon does 
not meet the sole elected scientific criteria, it simply does not exist” (106). 
  So while Postmodern (specifically continental) philosophy very much 
indicates the possibility of philosophical engagement with theological or metaphysical 
questions, this has not yet been truly realised on a cultural level because of the 
polemics against religion as that which is anti-humanist and anti-rational.  Therefore I 
propose an avenue through which theology can re-engage itself with wider culture 
which is not based on a philosophical argument largely inaccessible (by nature or 
choice) to the public but which is in keeping with the very foundations of theology as 
a discipline which rooted in narrative and (fantastic) literature.  For specifically and 
profoundly in fantastic literature one allows oneself to consider perceptions of reality 
and points of view which are not simply strange or different, but constitutionally 
other.  This is literary a environment which draws to the absolute forefront the 
interplay of the suspension of disbelief and the subsequent “make believe” which is 
necessary for any discussion or consideration of theology for both believer and   29 
nonbeliever.  It is this process which can take creative theology forward even in a 
world in which either God does not exist or everything about him is already known.  
The fantastic is not for a theology without reason, it is for a theology beyond reason. 
The argument will consider first John Milton whose failure to be able to 
produce a reasonable, yet orthodox theology lead him to experiment with his theology 
within the fantastic poetic boundaries of his epic Paradise Lost and its subsequent 
interpretation by Blake and the Romantics.  In Milton we will perceive the first real 
critique of what the Enlightenment would become, as well a remarkably creative 
attempt at writing theology.  Across Blake and Coleridge’s bridge of Romanticism we 
will arrive at the Victorian fantasists, primarily George  MacDonald, but also 
considering the likes of Charles Kingsley and Dickens, who employed fantasy as a 
tool for developing a theology which could adequately deal with (or give way to) the 
pressing, troublesome paradox of death in the nineteenth century.  From MacDonald 
there flows a tradition of fantasy which both remembers and celebrates the Christian 
archetype of the Passion as in the ars moriendi and functions as a literary liturgy 
through time from the Victorians, to the Inklings, up through the present in writers 
like J.K. Rowling.  This chapter will examine how fantasy literature, as a tradition, 
functions liturgically but also how liturgy functions as a fantasy and the consequences 
of this relationship for our reading of both.  Of course, the dangerous (and therefore 
powerful) part of both liturgy and fantasy is their connection to the real and the 
possibility that that which was once simply an enactment of a form could produce 
radical change in the participant.  The consequent chapter will confront this danger by 
examining the epistemological foundations of belief and its relationship to what is 
called “knowledge” in sceptical believers like David Hume and Søren Kierkegaard, to 
the confident and dogmatic Cardinal Newman.  Lastly I will search for an appropriate   30 
heir to the tradition of the fantastic in literature, offering Iris Murdoch as an example 
of the enduring potential which fantasy has for doing theology.  
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Instruct me, for thou know’st; thou from the first 
Was present, and with mighty wings outspread 
Dove-like sat’st brooding on the vast abyss 
And mad’st it pregnant: What in me is dark 
Illumine […] 
 
Paradise Lost  
 
 
  When one recalls, in very recent history, the astonishing and rather ludicrous 
reaction of some conservative elements of Christianity to the phenomenon of the 
Harry Potter series by burning, banning and generally condemning the books, it is 
difficult to imagine a time in which the relationship between faith and fantasy was 
actually fruitful.  To be sure, the Christian literary meta-canon has long since included 
genre classics like The Divine Comedy and The Pilgrim’s Progress, and from the 
modern era there are of course the Narnia books and the Lord of the Rings trilogy.  
But these standards, I have suggested, fall somewhat short of the more radical and 
dangerous thing which I am calling the fantastic in literature.  Yet, in Milton’s 
Paradise Lost (1667) one has both a work which explicitly and emphatically fits the 
form of fantasy and which originated the fruitful relationship between theology and 
literature by way of critiquing Enlightenment reasoning.   
It is, for obvious reasons, improper to speak of either fantasy as a category of 
modern literature or fantasy as a function of literature which actively subverts 
modernity before the dawn of modernity itself.  Yet, even though it is written in the 
later seventeenth century, Paradise Lost is, according to some readers, the first truly   33 
modern work (Altizer 34).  What is more, this Paradise Lost is remarkably fit to serve 
as a monument of its unique moment in time, testifying to the factors which 
precipitated the divorce of theology and philosophy, the loss of what can only be 
deemed as “Edenic” systematic theologies and the ultimate failure of theology to 
adapt to the erosion of its epistemological foundations.  So then, it is to this epic poem 
and its controversial author that one must turn in order to sort out the genesis of the 
twisted, tangled, yet fundamentally productive relationship between fantasy and 
theology. 
  One might argue that Paradise Lost is not fantastic at all.  In fact, it is not 
Fantasy in terms of genre.  The essential reason for this is because, while imaginative, 
Milton’s epic was seen at its outset as a work which contemplated things which were 
actually real, they existed definitely, even if not within individual or mutual 
experience.  That is, even if no one had ever seen the creation of the world, or Satan’s 
fall from heaven, it was still entirely possible to accept the reality of such a narrative. 
The strong and necessary connection between common experience and reality was not 
yet firmly in place in Milton’s time.  Leo Damrosch makes this point saying that the 
uniqueness of eighteenth century literature was that it “insisted on the primacy of 
reality—of lived experience as shared by a culture—in a way that separates them [the 
late eighteenth century authors] from the Renaissance before and the Romantics after” 
(3).  There is no magic in Paradise Lost, no other world.  Milton’s epic, in the 
seventeenth century, was at the same time a poem which described something real 
and one which was entirely fantastic in that Milton was creating, through imagination, 
a narrative which is anything but explicit in the biblical record he drew from.  But, I 
will argue, the fantastic nature of Paradise Lost goes even beyond this, for it also 
represents Milton’s attempt to escape the constraints which his philosophy and reason   34 
placed on his ability to produce theology.  In it, as well as in its explanatory sequel 
Paradise Regained (1671), Milton throws off the chains of reason for the very 
purpose of examining human reason itself and its devilish hold over the mind. 
 
Descartes and the Destabilisation of Reality 
The distinction  between things which are real and utterly removed from 
experience and the ultimate reality of shared (then later individual) experience
  is very 
much a part of the crumbling edifice of pre-Cartesian philosophy which Milton 
explores in Paradise Lost.  That is, after Descartes, it became increasingly difficult to 
attest to a reality outside of one’s own experience, which itself was in doubt.  Of 
course, the evolution of this idea was gradual.  At its onset, reality was accepted by 
proxy.  That is, even if I have never seen an elephant, if I meet enough people who 
have seen an elephant, I can accept that elephants exist.  What Hume and the rest of 
the later British epistemological tradition did was to accelerate this “evolution,” or the 
realisation of Cartesian subjectivity by first calling into question this proximate 
experience and, by degrees, experience itself.
8  For the internality of cogito ergo sum 
is actually much more radical than was initially recognised by the Enlightenment.  
Damrosch says of that age: 
They lived in an age of epistemological crisis or destabilization, but 
they were still close enough to a tradition of stable ontology—a ‘real’ 
reality that was supposed to be independent of human minds and 
grounded in the order of the universe—to try to salvage the coherence 
and reassurance of that older view. (4) 
So, in fact, the internality of Descartes’s scepticism was greater even than his own, or 
the later Enlightenment’s, ability to maintain it.  Descartes would ultimately fall into a 
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mess of contradictions and delusions concerning the existence which he imagined to 
be justified by an internal dialectical dialogue supported by deductive reasoning.  
Watson remarks: 
Cartesian metaphysics as a complete system breaks down because of 
Descartes’ inability to establish epistemological certainty; because of 
the logical incoherence of his ontological dualism; and finally, because 
just as his physics failed to fit the facts of experience and experiment, 
so also did his theology fail to conform with Christian hopes and 
dogma.  In the end, reason fails Descartes.  (ix, emphasis added) 
Philosophically, Descartes is placed at the climax of the Scholastic tradition and at the 
genesis of the rationalist tradition.  If it is true that “In the end, reason fails 
Descartes,” it will be seen that Milton experiences the same, but unlike Descartes this 
failure of reason was not the final word for Milton. 
  One of the aspects of Paradise Lost which makes it unique as literature and as 
an artefact within the history of ideas is that it presents an early and imaginative 
realisation of the implications of Descartes and the emerging Enlightenment.  
Whereas before Descartes dialectical reasoning (built on the Socratic tradition) was 
the accepted way to truth, after him it becomes ultimately rational and self-referential 
(and therefore ultimately subject to the fallibility of the individual).  Thus, for 
Descartes, God existed because Descartes reasoned that he did.  Yet, Milton sees, this 
is not a triumph because internalised forms of reasons are actually no better than the 
formal external, or “objective” ones.  In his theological explorations, Milton is truly, 
as in the words of Mathew Arnold, “wandering between two worlds, one dead, the 
other powerless to be born.”
9  Reasoning God in the way of Aquinas had been made 
impossible by Descartes, but Descartes’ own innovations had effectively made 
reasoning the existence and nature of God even more difficult. The solution to this 
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tension, for Milton, had to be a poetic, imaginative and fantastic one.  The solution 
was in seeking theology beyond reason.  
 
The Problem of Milton’s Theology 
  It could be argued that Milton’s success in Paradise Lost is equal and 
attributable to his failure in Christian Doctrine.  Yet it is doubtful whether, from 
Milton’s own perspective, the failure in question was his own or that of theology 
itself.  Milton’s struggle in Christian Doctrine is as evident in its mood and tone as it 
is in its fragmentary nature.  In it, Milton struggles to find a reasonable way of 
speaking about, or explaining God.  Time after time he falls into contradiction, 
heterodoxy or heresy from Arianism to polygamy, but he notes the ineptness of his 
attempt internally as well as by the implicit self-criticism of never finishing or 
publishing the text.  The problem of his effort is acknowledged within it; Milton 
writes “No one […] can form correct ideas about God, guided by nature and reason 
alone, without the word or message of God” (CPW
10 VI, p. 132). 
  It is this “word or message of God” which becomes central in Paradise Lost.  
For Milton’s God was one of great verbal (and biblical)
11 power.  Georgia 
Christopher explains, “In Paradise Lost Milton returns to the aesthetic announced in 
the Nativity Ode, in which God’s word as explicit doctrine governs the world of the 
poem” (59).  Unlike Satan, Milton’s God does not seek to twist and change with his 
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who says, “Is not Milton a sublimer poet than Homer or Virgil?  Are not his 
Personages more sublimely clothed?  And do you not know, that there is not perhaps 
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rhetoric, rather, it is actual reality that flows from his lips; “Before the heavens thou 
wert, and at the voice/Of God, as with a mantle didst invest/The rising world of 
waters dark and deep/Won from the void formless infinite” (III, 9-12).  His words are 
not beautiful in their composition as perhaps Satan’s are, but are themselves beauty:  
“Thus while God spake, ambrosial fragrance filled/All heaven” (III,  135-136).  Most 
significantly for Milton’s earthly couple, God’s word (logoj) is his son, the salvation 
of fallen creatures: 
    Son of my bosom, Son who art alone 
    My word, my wisdom, and effectual might, 
    All hast thou spoken as my thoughts are, all 
    As my eternal purpose hast decreed: 
    Man shall not quite be lost, but saved who will, 
    Yet not of will in him, but grace in me 
    Freely vouchsafed” (III, 169-175). 
Christopher expounds the theological significance of this emphasis on the voice, or 
word of God saying: 
Traditionally, Scripture was assumed to adhere to the analogy of faith; 
that is, it was assumed to be in accord with the classic creeds of the 
Church.  With Luther, the analogy of faith became more specifically an 
analogy of the word—an analogy of the verbal promise of redemption, 
or what Milton was to call the “analogy of Evangelick doctrine.”  
Recent studies of Milton’s poetry have tended to blur the hermeneutic 
between the Reformation and  Catholic tradition (4). 
It is the Reformation break which allows Milton to write his epic, but is also the very 
mechanism which partly dooms his project in Christian Doctrine.  For the new verbal 
analogy allowed for a dynamic means for theology—discourse on God—which was 
not previously available in a time when theology was dominated by the analogy of 
faith.  Yet, the replacement of Church tradition and authority with the dictum sola 
scriptura also radically constricted this discourse by setting all new texts in 
competition with the biblical standard, one which was interpreted exclusively via a   38 
Scholastic hermeneutic.  So not only did theology have to be biblical, that is, in 
keeping with the systems of divinity deemed to be expressly communicated by 
biblical material, but it had to be reasonable as well. 
  For Milton this arrangement was more than problematic, it was entirely 
dysfunctional. In Milton’s mind, theology had a problem which its medium could not 
fix.  The language of reason (prose, by extension) could not communicate a 
meaningful theologia because God could not be reasoned.  Every time Milton tried to 
reason God, he fell into Arianism.
12  So, perhaps, Milton failed as a theologian or 
alternatively theology failed Milton.  For paradox, which lies at the heart of the 
Christian gospel, is a function of literature, not logic.  What is clear is that the 
question which he posed in Christian Doctrine is essentially the same as the one he 
brought to Paradise Lost: “if all things are of God, and if matter is both good and 
incorruptible in its essence, and if that incorruptibility remains so long as free agents 
do not break the connection that sustains it, why and how should any of them come to 
rebel or even think that they could?” (Fish xxiv).  Milton’s shift in medium from 
theological tract to poetry is significant for more than one reason; it replaces 
deduction with creation, system with story and reason with poetic authority.  Most 
importantly, it signals a change in perspective for the author and hermeneutics for 
reader.   
In writing theology, in the tradition of Descartes or even Aquinas, the “I” (or 
ego) is central in its ability to navigate reality and from its experiences become 
conscious of divine nature.  In contrast to this approach, consider the epic narrator’s 
voice in Paradise Lost, safely assumed to be more or less in accordance with the 
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author’s,
 13 which from the beginning assumes a position of radical humility in 
relation to his subject matter.  This is, of course, the voice which pleads “what is dark 
in me/Illumine, what is low raise and support” and declares that if his “great 
argument” should bear any authority, it will be because of the inspiration of the 
heavenly muse which he deems the “Spirit” (I, 17; 22-26).  Christopher considers this 
very point at length: 
At the beginning of psychic life stands God’s word, not as an 
Augustinian faculty or light of Reason, but as a word having the 
specifically literary character that it does in Reformation commentary.  
Milton thereby suggests that man possesses a sensus divinitatis, an 
innate knowledge of God impressed upon him by divine speech during 
the earliest hours in the Garden.  His Adam differs in this respect from 
Thomistic man, whose knowledge of God is predicated upon his sense 
experience and for whom the natural world is an important avenue to 
God […]  Reformation man, by contrast, is equipped from the outset 
with an innate [a priori] knowledge of God that facilitates his 
independence from nature [and reason] when it later becomes 
unreliable.  This assumption goes to the heart of Milton’s biblical faith 
and underlies his larger poetic strategies.  (147-148) 
The a priori knowledge of God, or sensus divinitatis, which is based on the 
verbal declaration of God from the beginning as it is realised in the Son, is greater 
than Thomistic reason because it cannot “fall.”  What Scholastic reason, then, seeks to 
achieve in its greatest moment is what Milton’s “muse” already claims to be: 
communion with God.  Because it is a moment of kenotic inspiration, which actually 
moves beyond simple  a priori knowledge, it also defies hermeneutical difficulties 
because it itself is irreducible and its expression, i.e. Milton’s actual poem, claims no 
authority outside whatever might leak through of that pure, original sensus divinitatis.  
A distinction here is necessary as well.  Even though this thesis will seek to interpret 
                                                 
13 According to Fish “Milton assumes a predisposition in favour of the epic voice 
rather than a modern eagerness to put that voice on trial” (46).  If this is true, a rough 
correlation may be drawn between the author and the voice he chooses to employ as 
authoritative.   40 
Paradise Lost as a critical response to the radical evolution of dialectical reasoning 
into what eventually becomes the Enlightenment, it is important to recognise that 
Milton’s objection to reason is not against reason itself, but its hierarchical and 
privileged position in discourse on God.  Fish reminds us that 
Reason can become ‘carnal’ reason if its reach is extended to include 
the mysteries of divinity and the points of faith.  If the light of reason 
coincides with the word of God, well and good; if not, reason must 
retire, and not fall into the presumption of denying or questioning what 
it cannot explain.  (242) 
Thus, reason is only useful insofar as it functions within its capacity and does not 
attempt to reach beyond its borders and rise above its origin, “denying or questioning 
what it cannot explain.”  Christopher also supports such a distinction: 
The Reformers, by no means the irrationalists that they have 
sometimes been painted, considered Reason to be the highest human 
power, and they referred to it in their commentary as a synecdoche for, 
and after the apex of, the flesh.  (150) 
One should remember, however, the ultimate distrust that the Reformers and 
historical church generally have held towards ‘the flesh.’  Reason might have been the 
apex of the flesh to the Reformers, but flesh was also a lowly thing which needs the 
cooperation and grace of God to sanctify and elevate.  However, what Milton is not 
interested in what he can do, but what God can do.
14  Christopher, again, is useful on 
this point: 
“If one attempts to read Paradise Lost while keeping in mind Milton’s stated  
intention to be a doctrinal ‘power beside the pulpit,’ then any ‘literary’ 
epiphany that may arise during the course of reading […] would be 
                                                 
14 It is interesting, in light of this, that Milton expends such massive amounts of poetic 
energy on creating a powerful image of Satan, which will be seen in his own mind 
and by his own designs ultimately amounts to nothing, while God is allowed to speak 
‘for himself”—that is, his words and actions are derived from what Milton saw to be 
purely revelatory, i.e. biblical sources.   41 
understood as the work of the Holy Spirit, as the viva vox Christi breaking 
through the text” (16). 
Thus, from the very beginning, and as will be seen further, throughout the 
poem, Milton’s epic voice rebuffs, or at least radically problematises the criticisms of 
those such as Andrew Marvell who deemed his project would “ruin the sacred 
truths.”
15  Marvell himself quickly recants saying “Yet as I read, soon growing less 
severe/I liked his project” and “things divine thou treat’st of in such state/As them 
preserves, and thee, inviolate.”  But what causes this immediate soothing of Marvell’s 
suspicions?  Was it some great, overt and stirring orthodoxy that won him over?  Was 
it, like Coleridge, the sublimity of his biblical imagery?  According to Marvell’s own 
words, it was both the beauty of Milton’s effort and its manner which ‘preserves’ 
divinity and keeps its author in a state ‘inviolate.’  
 
Fantastic Transgression in Paradise Lost 
Yet how was this accomplished?  How did Milton undertake such a potentially 
explosive project and yet persevere with reputation gilded rather than tarnished?  
Paradise Lost is at times, for many readers across its history, an intensely offensive 
work.  Victoria Silver remarks that it “[has] been offending someone or other for 
more than three hundred years” (4).  For Milton, poetry functions like the later fantasy 
literature of the nineteenth century.  That is, its premise is one which removes the 
author from criticism inherent to his argument and undertaking.  It gives license to ask 
and answer questions in ways which would be, in a more conservative medium, 
inappropriate or even transgressive.  Just as with Shakespeare’s fools, who often were 
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the mouthpieces of the writer’s sharpest satire and most profound wisdom, no offense 
is taken because no real guilt can be incurred while one is not speaking seriously. 
Derrida’s deconstruction of Austin’s distinction between serious and non-serious 
speech acts
16 is foreshadowed by the sanctity with which Milton approached his 
‘merely’ poetic enterprise, a trend which was institutionalised by his successors in 
Victorian fantasy.  What is interesting, though, is the way in which this seemingly 
untenable arrangement fits so nicely into the hermeneutical mysticism prevalent in 
seventeenth century Protestantism and Milton in particular.  Christopher explains: 
Formerly considered, the Reformers’ Bible was a referential Möbius 
strip; it was a word about the word about the Word.  What kept 
religious experience from being a verbal shell game was the belief that 
when comprehension of the Promise occurs, ‘God really speaks to me’ 
and that one’s status was thereby subjectively and metaphysically 
changed. (15-16) 
Thus, when Milton invoked the “muse” of the Holy Spirit, he recognised the 
ridiculousness of the act itself (the bold syncretism of the most important pagan and 
Christian figures) and the rhetorical ability of this device to disarm potential 
opponents.  At the same time, he was entirely serious in beseeching the help of 
heaven, hoping that somehow his intrinsically deficient poetry would accomplish a 
divine purpose. 
Even the voice of Dr. Johnson, usually the stalwart opposition to religious 
poetry, is redundant to Milton’s own internal criticism to the same end.   In his Life of 
Waller, Dr. Johnson famously condemns what he calls “poetical devotion”. 
From poetry the reader justly expects, and from good poetry always 
obtains, the enlargement of his comprehension and elevation of his 
fancy; but this is rarely to be hoped by Christians from metrical 
devotion.  Whatever is great, desirable or tremendous, is comprised in 
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the name of the Supreme Being.  Omnipotence cannot be exalted; 
Infinity cannot be amplified; Perfection cannot be improved. (Lives 
202) 
Yet none of Dr. Johnson’s criticisms can go further than what Milton already 
established in his epic.  For in Paradise Lost, the very constraints of poetry itself are 
recognised and utilised towards Milton’s end, one that ultimately depreciates 
humanity’s ability to grasp God (through poetry or any other means) and upholds the 
ultimacy of the transcendent.   
The speech Milton places in the mouth of his Satan as well as the language 
and imagery used to describe him are grandiose to say the least.  Satan represents the 
towering heights achievable at the very limit of Milton’s poetical skill.  One takes a 
great risk in choosing any particular example of the sheer grandeur of Milton’s 
language in relation to his hellish subjects.  Nonetheless, some subject must be chosen 
for examination.  One particularly grand passage is the majestic description of the 
demonic rebel army in Book I: 
    The imperial ensign, which full high advanced 
    Shone like a meteor streaming to the wind 
    With gems and golden lustre rich emblazed, 
    Seraphic arms and trophies: all the while  
Sonorous metal blowing martial sounds: 
At which the universal host upsent 
A shout that tore hell’s concave, and beyond 
Frighted the reign of Chaos and old Night. 
All in a moment through the gloom were seen 
Ten thousand banners rise into the air 
With orient colours waving: with them rose 
A forest huge of spears: and thronging helms 
Appeared, and serried shields in thick array 
Of depth immeasurable. (I.536-549) 
In a piece brimming with the finest examples of  grand poetic verse, this small portion 
is representative.  What is important to remember is that this sort of grandeur is 
constantly being undermined by its context in reference to demonic spirits as well as   44 
Milton’s epic voice which constantly marks the subjects out as rebels, blasphemers 
and all other manner of disqualifiers.  Compared to this, God’s speech and that of his 
son seem quite ordinary and bland.  They exhibit no rhetorical or poetic genius, but 
speak solely with the authority of their persons; for attractiveness, their benefit is the 
power of redemption itself.   
Milton’s devices do exactly what poetry is supposed to do; they excite the 
imagination and engender belief of a certain kind.  However, in Paradise Lost, these 
devices are used towards a subtle and surreptitious end which will ultimately allow 
for Milton to shift the focus of criticism from himself as poet and author to the reader 
himself.  Stanley Fish explains the careful process and its effect on the reader: 
One begins simultaneously by admitting the effectiveness of Satan’s 
rhetoric and discounting it because it is Satan’s, but at some point a 
reader trained to analyse as he reads will allow admiration for  
technical skill to push aside the imperative of Christian watchfulness.  
To be sure, this is not a sin.  But from a disinterested appreciation of 
technique one moves easily to a grudging admiration for the technician 
and then to a guarded sympathy and finally, perhaps, to assent. (12) 
Fish suggests that the tension between the epic voice and the set of assumed values 
for the characters (God is good, Satan is bad) is not in fact a mistake or an attempt to 
subvert orthodox Christianity but indeed an attempt to reconstruct the event of the 
Fall between text and reader instead of Satan and man.  In comparing the reader to 
Adam and Eve he states: 
For the reader, the poem is a ‘life situation’ analogous to the situation 
of the happy couple in Paradise.  The ‘dazzling simplicity’ of the 
poem’s great moral is the counterpart of the dazzlingly simple 
prohibition, and the obligation of the parties in the two situations is to 
defend the starkness of the moral choice against sophistications which 
seem to make disobedience attractive (‘Here grows the Cure of all, this 
Fruit Divine’) or necessary (‘What seem’d remidiless’).  (208)   45 
So it is, then, that every time the reader, simply by opening himself to the beauty and 
rhetorical force of Satan’s character, falls into the camp of the Devil and his company.  
He demonstrates just the sort of behaviour which Milton sought to rebuke, “the 
weakness all men evince in the face of eloquence” (Fish 9). 
  Of course, it remains popular to claim that the evidence of Satan’s great 
character actually overthrows the authority of the epic voice as well as the authority 
of God himself, being that even his very goodness is in doubt.
17  Yet this position 
displays more than a little modern prejudice as well as just the sort of epistemological 
faults which Milton seeks to question.  The only difference between the antiquarian 
and modern reader, Fish claims, is that the antiquarian would have come to realise his 
error whereas the modern is quite ready to make out that Milton is, as Blake deemed 
him, “of the Devil’s party without knowing it.”  Fish declares: 
The insistence on the superiority of showing as opposed to telling is, as 
Wayne Booth has shown, a modern one, and particularly unfortunate 
in this case since it ignores the historical reality of the genre […]  
Milton assumes a predisposition in favour of the epic voice rather than 
a modern eagerness to put that voice on trial; he expects his reader to 
worry about the clash, to place it in a context that would resolve a 
troublesome contradiction and allow him to reunite with an authority 
who is a natural ally against the difficulties of the poem. (46-47) 
The same principles apply, of course, to the voice of God which is just as frank, anti-
logical and authoritative.  Again, Fish stipulates “Ideally, the reader should respond to 
the ‘naked proof’ of God’s word, but the fallen intellect being what it is, a more 
emotive stimulus is required” (74).  Milton calls one to believe and obey, not to feel 
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and to reason;
18 but this is a stumbling block to many, as it should be and as it was 
designed to be. 
  Still an argument remains against Fish’s reading of Milton and the one from 
which I am generally operating, and a strong one at that.  For if the text speaks “for 
itself” in a way which seems more attractive than  the theoretical intentions of a dead 
author (which are ultimately unknowable anyway), surely the former negates the 
latter!  William Kerrigan’s The Sacred Complex (1983) makes this his primary 
argument against Fish, and Rumrich joins him in this vein.  Fish remarks on this 
criticism saying: 
Kerrigan’s complaint is that in my Paradise Lost real opposition is 
impossible, or to put it into the vocabulary of some recent theory, 
difference is always and already subordinate to the order of the same 
and is finally illusory […]  Kerrigan identifies what is probably the 
main criticism directed at Surprised by Sin:  it describes and attempts 
to extend into the life of its readers a stifling authoritarianism. (xii) 
Yet both of these critics unfortunately mistake authoritarianism in a reading for the 
authoritarianism of a reading.  Of course, Milton himself makes no claim to authority 
but his epic voice relies on the inspiration of the “Spirit” in order to gain its veracity.  
In the end, it is not as if Fish assumes that his reading is the only reading of Paradise 
Lost or even that Milton would have thought so.  Milton preaches, but he does not 
assume that all who hear him will repent.  It remains the case that “We shall learn 
Milton’s lessons only if we enter the poem on his terms”, or as Pope prescribes in his 
An Essay on Criticism (1711):  “A perfect judge will read each work of wit/With the 
same spirit that its author writ” (Fish 46, Lewis 1).  Of course, one will never be sure 
the degree to which he successfully dialogues with an author in this way.  However, it 
is the Paradise Lost of history which is important to the study, the poem which at the 
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same time proclaimed and wrought and demolished the advent of modernity in 
literature.  Therefore, Fish’s study retains great value as even Rumrich admits: “Fish’s 
seminal study […] is still basic to our contemporary understanding of Milton’s works 
[…] No one has successfully refuted Fish’s main argument, not on its own terms” (2-
3). 
   
“Of the Devil” 
So then, in view of all of this, what could it mean to say that Milton is “of the 
Devil’s party”?  One might reasonably assume that Blake meant this not as a criticism 
but as a great praise, for to him Milton was the archetype, the “true poet”.  The 
question is, what was and remains so offensive about Milton which sets pious critics 
like Marvell and Johnson on edge, even if to win them over later?  What in the text is 
quite so frightening and dangerous, why so attractive to radical theologians like Tom 
Altizer?  Why do Blake and Shelley give him such controversial devotion?  Does 
Milton, for instance, step beyond his means as a poet (or a theologian) by 
interrogating God and the sacred (biblical) tradition, inventing answers of his own?  
Has he, in essence, attempted to steal fire from the gods?  Has he, like Mary Shelley’s 
Dr. Frankenstein, assumed the divine prerogative?   Is this why Milton is in league 
with the Devil?  On this question Blake sounds a triumphant “no” and Shelley is 
blithely silent.
19  
All the same, it is because of Blake and Shelley that the Romantics are 
wrongly labelled as the era in which the Satanist reading became institutionalised.  
Far from it, Blake’s and Shelley’s readings both were unique and exceptional.  One 
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commentator remarks that “the Satanist position that has been so often traced to the 
Romantic criticism is causally, not casually, related to the neglect of Milton’s 
Romantic critics” (Witterich  5).  Of his pious admirers in the Romantic period, 
Coleridge is perhaps the most significant.  He was full of praise and religious 
admiration, if not also sheer horror at moments, for Milton’s poetry, specifically 
Paradise Lost.  Coleridge writes “Is not Milton a sublimer poet than Homer or Virgil?  
Are not his Personages more sublimely clothed?  And do you not know, that there is 
not perhaps one page in Milton’s Paradise Lost, in which he has not borrowed 
imagery from the Scriptures?” (157).  Even the 1823 publication of the heretical 
Christian Doctrine could not entirely shake the poet’s hold on the hearts and 
imaginations of his nineteenth century readers.  Kelley notes: 
the reaction of England, now slipping imperceptibly into Victorianism, 
[to Christian Doctrine] was both sharp and varied.  The sale of 
Paradise Lost diminished; and for the great poet, some of the orthodox 
expressed the sadness of men who grieve the departure of a dearly 
beloved, yet lost and apostate, leader. (4) 
Most critics were able to shake the shock of the treatise by alternatively attributing it 
pseudepigraphy or to an earlier composition date than Paradise Lost, leaving the 
possibility that Milton’s views were reformed to orthodoxy by the writing of the epic 
(4).  In support of this thesis, all of Milton’s seventeenth century biographers note that 
he composed his ‘System of Divinity’ before Paradise Lost, anywhere from 1639 to 
1655 while Kelley estimates anywhere between 1658 and 1660 (9-10, 25).  This, of 
course, would be in keeping with the notion that Paradise Lost was actually written in 
response to the failure of Christian Doctrine. 
  A more relevant commentator on the subject then, at least because of his pre-
stated prejudice against “poetical devotion,” is Dr. Johnson, mentioned in brief above.   49 
Surely he, if anyone, would agree with Andrew Marvell’s first impressions that 
Milton’s project would “ruin the sacred truths.”  Dr. Johnson’s point on the subject is 
that poetry cannot describe that which is higher or nobler than itself. Milton himself, 
in a way, makes this point implicitly in Paradise Regained when the Son rebukes 
Satan for imploring him to partake in Classical poetry:   
    Or, if I would delight my private hours 
    With music or with poem, where so soon 
    As in our native language can I find 
    That solace?  All our Law and Story strewed 
    With hymns, our Psalms with artful terms inscribed, 
    Our Hebrew songs and harps, in Babylon 
    That pleased so well our victor’s ear, declare 
    That rather Greece from us these arts derived— 
    Ill imitated while they loudest sing 
    The vices of their deities, and their own, 
    In fable, hymn, or song, so personating 
    Their gods ridiculous, and themselves past shame (IV, 331-342). 
Milton’s argument here, in the Son’s voice, is not summoned for the sake of its oddly 
ethnocentric tone!  It was not because the Hebrews were so much better at poetry than 
the Greeks that the Son gives them preference, but rather because their poetry is 
derived directly from heaven.  Again, the supremacy of God’s word is seen to trump 
all other powers.  Poetry, then, is not something which reaches up from man to God, 
but downward from God to man.  Therefore only the most directly transcendent 
poetry is truly poetical, poetry which hearkens from (not to) the Scriptures. 
Dr. Johnson must have in fact recognised the congruence between his own and 
Milton’s theory of poetry, for the stern eighteenth Century critic was full of praise for 
Paradise Lost.  Perhaps his most outstanding compliment is that “Before the greatness 
of Milton’s poem all other greatness shrinks away” (Poets, “Milton” 212).  Johnson 
continues in his artistic, and, more distinctly, moral praise saying:   50 
He had accustomed his imagination to unrestricted indulgence, and his 
conceptions therefore were extensive.  The characteristick quality of 
this poem is sublimity. He sometimes descends to the elegant, but his 
element is the great […]  In Milton every lines breathes sanctity of 
thought and purity of manners, except when the train of narration the 
introduction of the rebellious; and even they are compelled to 
acknowledge their subjection to God in such a manner as excites 
reverence and confirms piety.  (Poets, “Milton” 230, 238) 
Certainly Dr. Johnson, the most venerable of Milton’s critics, should show a measure 
of disdain were there really a case for Milton’s poetic transgression.  But, in reality, 
Dr. Johnson could only make minor criticisms of Milton’s enterprise in the midst of 
his much grander praise of the Puritan poet. 
  For all of his pious support through the centuries, there is still a resilient strand 
within Milton studies since Blake, usually a minority, which for one reason or another 
wishes to revive the Satanist reading.  C.S. Lewis, in his preface to the work, even 
goes so far as to claim that that reading was for a long time dominant, insisting that 
his friend Charles Williams’s lectures on the work represented nothing less than “the 
recovery of a true critical tradition after more than a hundred years of laborious 
misunderstanding.”  Lewis, in his characteristically dramatic tone, goes on to say 
“Apparently, the door of the prison was really unlocked all the time; but it was only 
you [Williams] who thought of trying the handle.  Now we can all come out” (v-vi).  
It is likely here that Lewis fell into the error here which Kelly illuminated when he 
said “more than a hundred years,” that of assuming that all of the Romantics were of 
Blake’s opinion.  However it is in fact quite likely that the Prof. Saurat, with whom 
Lewis seems determined to dialogue, represented a majority opinion at the time.  This 
is the opinion, of course, which regards the theological content of Milton’s poem as 
“rubbish” and concentrates instead on the aesthetic value of its Satanic imagery 
(Lewis, Preface 65).  Lewis himself noted the loathing with which he received the   51 
prospect of Charles Williams’ Puritan reading of Comus, which Lewis retrospectively 
admits he resented doubly because it “placed its importance where the poet placed it” 
(v). 
  Of course Lewis’ work on the poem was vital in the displacement of the 
Satanist readings of the time and instrumental to the later development of Fish’s 
reading.  He confronts Saurat by saying: 
We must therefore turn a deaf ear on Professor Saurat when he invites 
us ‘to study what there is of lasting originality in Milton’s thought and 
especially to disentangle from theological rubbish the permanent and 
human interest’.  This is like asking us to study Hamlet after the 
‘rubbish’ of the revenge code has been removed, or centipedes when 
free of their irrelevant legs, or Gothic architecture without all the 
pointed arches.  Milton’s thought, when purged of its theology, does 
not exist.  Our plan must be very different—to plunge right into the 
‘rubbish’, to see the world as if we believed it, and then, while we still 
hold that position in our imagination, to see what sort of a poem 
results. (75) 
But subsequent to Saurat and Lewis, the latter of whom published his preface in 1942, 
the Satanist position would be reformed and this time on theological grounds.  In 
1961 William Empson published his highly critical volume, Milton’s God.  Empson 
had learned the lesson taught by Lewis so that he admitted that “the subject cannot be 
viewed in a purely aesthetic manner” (9).  However, Empson has still failed to learn 
all the lessons of the former and thus reduces his work to an exercise in the 
enumeration of foregone conclusions. 
  Empson admits from the beginning “I think the traditional God of Christianity 
very wicked, and have done since I was at school, where all my little playmates 
thought the same” (10).  What is important is not that Empson detests what he 
imagines to be the Christian God, but that he will set aside neither this detestation nor 
indeed his particular image of God in order to experience Milton’s God.  For Empson,   52 
there was never any possibility other than that the God of Milton’s epic is horrible, 
and this is the epitome of critical sloth.  Furthermore, Empson suffers a crucial lack of 
decisiveness over just which sort of Satanism he should espouse.  He is locked 
between what he must think to be two desirable readings, both of which, ironically, he 
attributes to Shelley.  Thus it becomes important to recognise that Empson describes 
his theme or motto as being ‘Back to Shelley’ (17).  This is especially ironic being 
that Empson had just previously unleashed a scathing criticism of the group which he 
labels “neo-Christians” or “young Christians” for wishful, retrospective thinking.  But 
this is just an unassuming nook within the great room of backwardness and confusion 
Empson suffers on the topic.  Initially, he espouses a more or less standard response 
that Paradise Lost is brilliant because it forces moral questions and ambiguities onto 
its readers.  He states 
That this searching goes on in Paradise Lost, I submit, is the chief 
source of its fascination and poignancy […]  I thus tend to accept the 
details of interpretation which various recent critics have used to prove 
the poem bad, and then try to show that they make it good […]  the 
poem is not good in spite of but especially because of its moral 
confusions.  (11, 13) 
Empson uses Shelley in support of this by citing material from the preface to his 
Prometheus Unbound which states “Milton has so far violated the popular creed (if 
this shall be judged a violation) as to have alleged no superiority of moral virtue to his 
God over his Devil.  And this bold neglect of direct moral purpose is the most 
decisive proof of Milton’s genius” (qtd. in Empson 16).  Yet this position which 
exults the ultimacy of ambiguous morality is confused by the other view Empson 
holds which exults the absolute evilness of Milton’s God.  Empson declares: 
Hence I find that the attackers [those early twentieth Century critics 
who reject Paradise Lost as “bad” simply because makes God appear 
to be bad] would find their minds at rest if they took one step further   53 
and adopted the manly and appreciative attitude of Blake and Shelley, 
who said that the reason why the poem is so good is that it makes God 
so bad.  (13) 
What Empson is interested in ultimately, despite his primary nods towards the poetic 
desirability of moral ambiguity, is the judging of the Christian God.  In this he is 
unlike Shelley in the most dramatic sense.  Where Shelley refused to make moral 
statements, Empson stands on the presumably high ground of his humanist principles.   
Rumrich says, somewhat disparagingly, of Empson: 
I do not endorse Empson’s ultimate position—that Milton struggled 
sublimely to justify the inexcusably evil Christian God but failed 
because the Christian God is evil from his foundations.  I am not 
morally certain enough to feel confident in such a claim, whereas 
Empson came to write his book already convinced that the Christian 
deity was a relic of Neolithic cruelty. (xii) 
The point Rumrich raises here is a valid one, that the foundation Empson’s moral 
condemnations are even more elusive that the metaphysical roots of Christian belief.  
Empson’s implicit response to such criticism is that the pedestal he preaches from is 
in fact one of necessity.  Empson states “[Man] ought to be free to question whether 
his God is wicked.”  This statement brings forth the question which must be at the 
very centre of any discussion of Milton’s moral standing in Paradise Lost: is man 
within his rights to question or criticise God?  With Milton there is the additional 
question of whether or not it is permissible to do this by creating a character, “God,” 
which can be questioned and prodded when essentially Milton himself is the God of 
his poem and not the character which he so names.  Dennis Danielson addresses this 
point with excellent precision:   54 
To undertake a theodicy at all presupposes that we have some right or 
ability
20 to arrive at judgments concerning God’s nature and character.  
Yet no religious theodicist may ever forget that the God being ‘judged’ 
is himself the Author and Judge of all Things. Without the first 
assumption, an attempt to explain God’s ways to human beings would 
be ridiculous.  Without the second, it would be blasphemous. (115) 
What Danielson prescribes here is that criticism of God should take place within a 
perspective of faith. This is a literary,  logical or imaginative faith, not religious faith.  
To grant these things about “God”—that he is, for instance, “the Author and Judge of 
all Things”—is essential to analyze that very figure and not simply a character of 
one’s own invention.  This is, of course, one of the major ways in which Empson 
failed by reading Milton’s poem and substituting his own evil God every time he read 
of Milton’s God and then marvelling at the fact that Milton’s God and his own looked 
remarkably similar.  On this hermeneutical issue, more will be said in following.  But 
it is appropriate at present to remain with this question of criticising God.  For here 
one discovers Milton’s radical congruence with his biblical precedent: not Genesis, 
but Job. 
 
Milton’s Use of Job in Paradise Lost: The Difficulty of Faith 
  Lewis’s preface to Paradise Lost makes the claim that each poem has two 
parents: one is form, the other is content.  If this is the case, what texts might be the 
parents of Paradise Lost?  On the formal side it is undoubtedly the works of Homer or 
Virgil whose contributions to the eventual production of the epic have been 
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“right and ability,” for the right to do something and the ability to do the same are 
both ontologically and morally different.  The difficulty is dissolved, however, by his 
distinction between the “ridiculous” and the “blasphemous”.  The first is simply non-
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expounded extensively.
21  Yet what can be said to influence the content of Paradise 
Lost for all of it themes, questions, devices and emphases, more than the Book of Job?  
While the events which take place are written as a subplot to the narrative of Genesis, 
the focus of justifying God’s ways to men is certainly much more like Job.  Once one 
opens his mind to the comparison, the dialogue or confluence between Job and 
Paradise Lost is as extensive as it is readily apparent.  Lewis, for instance, found it 
“novel” that Milton classified Job as a primary epic, although admitting its influence 
on Paradise Regained (Preface, 4).  How amazing, then, is it that Job has had so little 
attention with regards to its influence on Paradise Lost? 
  The beginning of similarity between the two “epics” is the fact that both 
purport to be, or are popularly read as, theodicies while they are actually something 
different.  In Job, it is the faith of the protagonist.  In Paradise Lost it is the faith of 
the reader.  With Job, at least, this should be quite clear.  The reader is, in fact, never 
made to think of the book as a theodicy but rather he knows from the very first and 
second chapters that the drama he witnesses is in actuality all about Job’s faith and 
not about God’s righteousness in relation to evil.  Paradise Lost is slightly more 
mischievous in attaining this goal because it states its aim to “justify the ways of God 
to man.”  Fish has been instrumental thus far in demonstrating that this is in fact 
simply a guise so that the reader will be unaware that the actual object of the poem is 
himself.   
  Both pieces do, however, address the question of criticising God as a means to 
their end.  If Job and Paradise Lost are about faith, then they are specifically about 
faith when faith is  difficult.  In Job, it is made difficult because Job’s experiences do 
not seem to  “add up,” as it were, to the sum of things which Job knows or believes.  
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Job, like Milton himself, was locked in a struggle with God because “God,” as he 
knew him, had stopped making sense.  Yet he is unwilling to sacrifice either what he 
believes, that God is just and merciful, or what he knows, that he has not done 
anything to deserve the suffering which he is experiencing.  On the other hand, faith is 
difficult in Paradise Lost because Satan’s lack of faith is so compelling rhetorically 
and poetically.  In both, it is the central conceit of questioning or bringing complaint 
before God which drives the action in terms of what is being said about this faith.  
The Book of Job is quite up front in demonstrating that this act is reasonable, not 
transgressive, saying “In all this, Job did not sin by charging God with wrongdoing” 
(1:22).  Job goes on to rave and rail against the God who he believes afflicts him and 
does not answer his inquiries. 
    Only grant me these two things, O God, 
    and then I will not hide from you: 
    Withdraw your hand far from me 
    and stop frightening me with your terrors. 
    Then summon me and I will answer, 
    or let me speak, and you reply […] 
    Why do you hide your face 
    and consider me your enemy? (13:20-22, 24) 
Even yet, Job is allowed to say these things with relative impunity.  Whereas God 
demands sacrifice from Job’s first three companions for their words (42:7-9), Job is 
not made to do the same.  Again, Job is allowed the most nihilistic complaints against 
life and God; he is allowed to teeter right on the brink of radical, absolute despair: 
    Why did I not perish at birth 
    and die as I came from the womb? 
    Why were there knees to receive me 
    and breasts that I might be nursed? […] 
    Or why was I not hidden in the ground like a stillborn child, 
    like an infant who never saw the light of day? […] 
    I have no peace, no quietness; 
    I have no rest, but only turmoil […] 
    Like a slave longing for the evening shadows,   57 
    or a hired man waiting eagerly for his wages, 
    so I have been allotted months of futility, 
    and nights of misery have been assigned to me […] 
    When I think my bed will comfort me 
    and my couch will ease my complaint 
    even then you frighten me with dreams 
    and terrify me with visions 
    so that I prefer strangling and death, 
    rather than this body of mine. 
    I despise my life […] (3:11-12, 26; 7:2-3, 13-16a) 
The type and degree of complaint here has few peers in literature, but one perhaps is 
to be found in the speech of  Satan and his companions in the opening of Paradise 
Lost.  They too remark their “dire change” (I, 624), remain unrepentant (I, 96), 
embrace inevitable misery (I, 141-142) and resolved themselves to the abyss saying: 
    Farewell, happy fields 
    Where joy forever dwells: hail horrors, hail 
    Infernal world, and thou profoundest hell 
    Receive thy new possessor: one who brings 
    A mind not to be changed by place or time. 
    The mind is its own place, and in itself 
    Can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven. (I, 249-255) 
What, then, separates these two characters, Job and Satan?  Judging from the raw 
material of their speeches against God, not much.  But generally, and with more 
clarity as both works progress, there are significant differences between the two 
which radically alter their posture before God as well as the nature of their actions.  
  Firstly, one must recognise and not overlook the fact that Job’s misery was not 
related to his own deeds but Satan’s was.  Whereas Job’s ire is based on the fact that, 
despite his friends’ foolhardy counsel, he was experiencing affliction despite his 
thorough righteousness, Satan’s suffering is of his own creation.  Therefore, it is right 
that Job question the source and meaning of his suffering whereas Satan has little 
room for wonder or complaint (which is to say he has none at all).  Moreover, the   58 
little hope that Job retains for himself is a righteous one born out of his faith in God’s 
ultimately just nature.  Job declares: 
    He is not a man like me that I might answer him, 
    That we might confront each other in court. 
    If only there were someone to arbitrate between us, 
    To lay his hand upon us both, 
    Someone to remove God’s rod from me, 
    So that his terror would frighten me no more. 
    Then I would speak up without fear of him, 
    But as it now stands with me, I cannot. (9:32-35) 
Job continues later saying “Though he slay me, yet will I hope in him” (13:15) and 
    Even now my witness is in heaven;  
my advocate is on high. 
    My intercessor is my friend  
as my eyes pour out tears to God; 
    on behalf of man he pleads with God  
as a man pleads for his friend […] 
I know that my Redeemer lives, 
and that in the end he will stand upon the earth. 
And after my skin has been destroyed, 
yet in my flesh I will see God; 
I myself will see him 
 my own eyes—I and not another. 
How my heart yearns within me! (16:19-21; 19:25-27) 
Job does not understand the origin, nature or purpose of his suffering.  He believes in 
a God who is ultimately both just and merciful yet this belief seems so unreasonable 
in light of his own circumstances that he is baffled by it.  Yet Job’s strength rests in 
his sense and knowledge that there must be something more to the situation than that 
which he conceives.  What he yearns for is a way of communicating with God, that by 
some arbitrator each might be fully known to the other.   
Satan’s hope, in contrast, is only to console himself by seeking vengeance: 
    [Let us] Consult how we may henceforth most offend 
    Our enemy, our own loss how repair, 
    How overcome this dire calamity,   59 
    What reinforcement we may gain from hope, 
    If not what resolution from despair. (I, 187-191) 
Whereas Job’s reaction betrays a man deeply rooted in his faithful relationship with 
God, even when all evidences seem against him he still retains a string of faith, Satan, 
conversely, demonstrates that his only concern is himself; he is his own god. 
  This leads to the most important distinction between Job and Satan:  Job 
maintains an orthodox perspective on moral authority while Satan chooses to be his 
own moral authority.  This is the way in which Satan’s position in the Miltonic epic 
becomes ultimately and terminally untenable.  What is striking is that the same can be 
said of the Satanist position, which criticises the wickedness of Milton’s God but on 
grounds entirely unclear.  Not only is Empson’s position one of indulgence, it is also 
one which mimics the primary flaw in Satan which Milton endeavours to reveal in his 
readers as well, that of wrongfully assuming the moral authority to judge between 
God and Satan.  Lewis, in contrast, states that “mere Christianity”—presumably the 
most basic beliefs and through structures (i.e. worldview) expected to be held in the 
mind of most of Milton’s seventeenth century readers—“commits every Christian to 
believing that the Devil is (in the long run) an ass”  (95).  These two sets of 
assumptions have dictated the development of both the Satanist and the anti-Satanist 
readings of Paradise Lost.  Fish singles out the moment of Adam’s fall in Book IX as 
the natural and intentional point at which the flaw of the Satanist position becomes 
apparent: 
This is the terminal point of the reader’s education, the trial to which 
he will be adequate only if he has succeeded in recovering the vision 
Adam now proceeds to shatter.  The specific act he is asked to perform 
is literary […] he decides between the philosophical and moral 
alternatives mirrored in the interpretive possibilities (Adam is right, 
Adam is wrong) […] In short, if the reader has applied himself 
assiduously to the lessons the poem would teach him, and so effected   60 
the purging of his intellectual ray, the superficial appeal of Adam’s 
gesture will be neutralized by his understanding of what it means. 
(271-272) 
As the reader recognises that Adam is ultimately wrong in his “gesture,” he must also 
recognise that Satan, too, is wrong and that he himself, inasmuch as he has fallen into 
admiration for the Devil and assented to his reasoning, has incurred the same guilt. 
Thus it becomes even more apparent that Fish’s thesis, that the reader is indeed the 
subject of Milton’s epic, is legitimate.  One’s internal nature, the content of his belief 
and the quality of his character, will determine whether one falls on the side of Satan 
or the Son.
22  Lewis sides with the God of Paradise Lost because he is a Christian.  
Empson, on the other hand, despises Milton’s God just as he despises the God of 
Christianity.  Neither are able to judge Milton’s work without being themselves 
judged. 
  This conclusive literary moment which Milton has designed for his readers is 
one of profound introspection.  The reader looks into the depths of himself to find 
what has gone wrong along the way, to discover how it came to be that he was enticed 
into the Devil’s camp.  This moment is strikingly identifiable with the experience of 
Job and his companions as they recollect on Job’s experiences and suffering.  Their 
reasoning together, their dialectic, rests on a shared set of assumptions.  The main 
assumption is that God blesses the righteous and punishes the wicked.  Job has 
experienced immense suffering, therefore his friends Eliphaz, Bildad and Zophar 
conclude that Job has been wicked.  Job, knowing with a surety that his friends did 
not have that he was in fact blameless, could only reach the conclusion that God had 
transgressed his own nature by wrongfully persecuting Job.  Yet these parties charge 
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Paradise Lost, it will be seen that such a state in rebuked in the strongest terms in the 
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into their conclusions without making a tedious but crucial distinction between events 
which God causes and events which God simply permits.   
Only Elihu, the youngest (and because of this the least wise, or the least 
reasonable), recognises the true failure of this dialectic.  He becomes indignant at Job 
for placing his own righteousness before God and even angrier with the friends for 
being unable to point out Job’s true error (ch. 34-37).  Elihu is not better at reasoning 
than his companions, and it is because of this that he is able to avoid their ultimate 
error.  Whereas the reasoning of Job and his friends was dependent on the accuracy of 
their assumptions, the totality of their knowledge on the subject, and their ability to 
make distinctions, Elihu relied only on the most essential authority of his faith—that 
God is supremely righteous.  Job feels the full force of this argument when his own 
rhetorical effluence is halted by the appearance of the Lord who turns the tables of 
questioning to Job: “Who is this that darkens my counsel with words without 
knowledge?” (38:1).  He does not question the way in which Job has reached his 
conclusion that he had been wronged, but rather the authority by which Job presumed 
to question Himself, God: 
The Lord said to Job: 
“Will the one who contends with the Almighty correct him? 
Let him who accuses God answer him!” 
Then Job answered the Lord: 
“I am unworthy—how can I reply to you? 
I put my hand over my mouth.” (40:1-4) 
In the conclusion of the narrative, God is much harder on Job’s friends than he is on 
Job.  In a way which is profoundly humble for the Creator, he seems to be angrier that 
they accused Job of wrongdoing than he is at Job for accusing him of wrongdoing.  
What is significant is that the only one of the entire group who escapes the drama 
unscathed and without criticism is Elihu.  He is different from all the others in that he   62 
never subverted his most essential belief concerning God to his own or anyone else’s 
presumed ability to reason.  Job had a faith which went beyond reason, but Elihu had 
a theology beyond reason. 
   
Reason in the Dock  
The biblical critique of the use of reason in Job is more implicit than explicit, 
although it is clear enough when the reader allows himself to share moments of 
introspection with the protagonist.  However, Milton’s critique of reason is more 
overt.  In both Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained, Satan employs his powerful 
rhetoric in combination with stiff blows of logic which are meant to disarm his 
hearers (characters or readers).  Or rather, Satan’s eloquence tricks the rational faculty 
of his readers into the service of his diabolical wishes.  Hume famously warns of this 
consequence saying “Eloquence, when at its highest pitch, leaves little room for 
reason or reflection, but addressing itself entirely to the fancy or the affections, 
captivates the willing hearers, and subdues their understanding” (Enquiry 79).  But, of 
course, what Satan seeks is not just to “subdue” reason, but to feed it with false 
assumptions and fanciful pretences.  Adam warns Eve of how this might happen in a 
moment of most ominous foreshadowing declaring: 
    But God left free the will, for what obeys 
    Reason, is free, and reason he made right, 
    But bid her well beware, and still erect, 
    Lest by some fair-appearing good surprised  
    She dictate false, and misinform the will 
    To do what God expressly hath forbid. (IX, 351-356) 
Of course the peril of which Adam speaks is not simply a failure of reason, but an 
impious declaration of moral autonomy which would subvert the authority of God’s   63 
divine command to the lower power of reason.  The same formula is devoutly 
delivered by Eve when she at last realises that the tree which the serpent is 
encouraging her to eat from is the same as the one placed under prohibition by God’s 
decree. 
    But of this tree we may not taste nor touch; 
    God so commanded, and left that command 
    Sole daughter of his voice; the rest, we live 
Law to our selves, our reason is our law. (IX, 650-654, emphasis          
added) 
Here one can see that the prohibition was not the whole of the divine institution, but 
the whole ordering which placed his authority above all human or earthly 
authorities—reason being one of those.  Thus, the Fall in Miltonic terms is not only 
the transgression of a command, but the usurpation of divine authority. 
  Yet Eve was wooed by the serpent’s flattery and his rhetorical, aesthetic and, 
some would add, sexual beauty, so that “Into the heart of Eve his words made way” 
(IX, 550).  The subtle seduction is what opens the door to Eve’s great failure in both 
reason and, more significantly, piety.  The reliance on the evidence of experience 
misleads and misinforms her reason when she concludes that the serpent is the same 
as those she is familiar with in the garden.  “Thee, serpent, subtlest beast of all the 
field/I knew, but not with human voice endued” (IX, 560-561).  She has failed, like 
Hume who said that “A wise man […] proportions his belief to the evidence,” 
because the mass of evidence about the serpent did indicate him to be the same as his 
peers (Enquiry 73).  In fact, there was only one thing about him that was different, 
being his speech.  Therefore, proportional evidence indicated to Eve that there must 
be another way of accounting for the serpent’s speech other than the possibility that   64 
he was altogether different from the other serpents such that speech was a part of his 
nature.   
  Satan, of course, in his guile, had just the right narrative to account for the 
difference between himself and the other serpents.  For, according to his tale, the 
change was attributable to a particular fruit he had eaten.  Of course, the reader knows 
this yarn to be an outright lie.  But Eve should have been wary as well as the tale held 
no scientific sway as the serpent made her believe.  For, how did the serpent know 
that it was the particular fruit that wrought in him the change?  Had he tested the 
effects of other fruits and of particular fruits on other serpents and animals?  Had Eve 
asked, a lie would have surely been the response, but she had further cause to 
disqualify his testimony if indeed reason was her law.  Fish takes exception to this 
reasoning saying “his [Satan’s] conclusion is premature, since there are not enough 
instances to provide data for the formulation of a general rule that could anticipate the 
effect of an analogous action” (250).   
  Had Eve been thorough in her reasoning, she would have caught this flaw and 
have been able to expose the serpent’s deceit.  Thus the serpent’s lie reveals itself in a 
logical flaw, but he has already convinced Eve of his rational ability through speech 
and she, in trust, wonder and awe, allows him to do her reasoning for her.  She is 
mystified by the idea of becoming as intellectually superior to her present state as the 
serpent from his presumed former state.  Herein, reason is touched with a double guilt 
in that it is both the method and object of Eve’s temptation.  Satan addresses the 
forbidden tree as if it were Enlightenment itself:  
    O sacred, wise and wisdom-giving plant, 
    Mother of science, now I feel thy power 
    Within me clear, not only to discern 
    Things in their causes, but to trace the ways   65 
    Of highest agents, deemed however wise. (IX, 180-184) 
As Fish states “With the words ‘discern’ and ‘trace’ Satan proceeds to initiate Eve 
into the mysteries of empirical science” (250).  Eve herself becomes convinced as “in 
her ears the sound/Yet rung of his persuasive words, impregned/With reason, to her 
seeming, and with truth” so that she too comes to call the object of her temptation 
“This intellectual food” (IX, 737-738;  768).  The final assault on Eve’s faithfulness 
would be carried out by the serpent’s reasoning and her affection for it.  He instructs 
Eve to consider the evidence of his own case and experience: 
    Me who have touched and tasted, yet both live, 
    And life more perfect have attained than fate 
    Meant me, by venturing higher than my lot. 
    Shall that be shut to man, which to the beast 
    Is open? […] 
    God therefore cannot hurt ye, and be just; 
    Not just, not God, not feared, then, nor obeyed: 
    Your fear itself of death removes the fear. (IX, 688-692; 700-702)   
Eve repeats and assents to this line of logic in the further lines 764 through 779.  In 
the end, the beauty of reason itself surpasses, for Eve, the divine command so that the 
seemingly logical statement “I have not died, therefore you will not die” is allowed to 
override the authority of the statement “Thou shall not”.  It was reason which she was 
tempted towards, and reason by which she fell. 
  But it is not as though Eve’s sin was indeed simply a deficiency in her ability 
to reason effectively.  Fish contends “The error of substituting the law of reason and 
the law of God is repeated by the reader if he regards Eve’s failure as a failure of 
reason and declines to judge her in accordance with the terms of God’s decree” (254).  
Indeed, it was a failure to obey the pure, spoken command of God which allowed the 
mental and rhetorical process that concluded with the consumption of the fatal fruit.  
Another view is that:   66 
The Reformers’ disjunction between God’s word and Reason is thus 
built into the fabric of Edenic life; and trouble first arises in Paradise, 
not because Eve fails in piety, but because she is not hermeneutically 
astute enough to keep from confusing the regnum rationis and the 
regnum fidei. (Christopher 151)   
But the hermeneutical effort in itself was a breach of the divine order of Eden.  By the 
time that Eve had deigned to judge it with reason, she was already as good as 
degenerate and in league with the one who tempted her.  Georgia B. Christopher 
describes the primary error as such: 
Suffice it to say here that Satan takes the Primal Decree of God (5.600-
615) as if it were human or creaturely speech, whereas Milton’s epic 
assumes that it constitutes all reality.  If we grant this premise, as we 
would easily grant the premise of a fairy tale, the problem of epic 
coherence and balance becomes one of accepting this ‘literary’ point of 
faith. (60) 
Again, for Milton, this pure word or decree from God is absolute and ultimate, 
constituting “all reality.”  What does this mean in terms of hermeneutics for the 
reader?  Should the reader be accepting of the authoritarian God of Milton’s text and 
his minion epic voice?  Should he capitulate to the same sort of “listen and obey” that 
is demanded of the Edenic couple?  
  Emerging in Milton studies especially since the advent and popularisation of 
postmodern literary theory is a third position in addition to the orthodox and Satanist 
schools.  This third family of interpreters value what they see as the moral confusion 
and literary indeterminacy native to Paradise Lost.  This reading falls hermeneutically 
somewhere between a sceptical and rational refusal to imagine or grant any “literary 
point of faith” and the absolute acceptance of the pre-lapsarian Adam and Eve as well 
as apologetic readers such as Lewis for whom the demands of the narrative cost 
nothing at all (that is, it is not difficult for Lewis to grant as a literary point of faith   67 
something which he already assents to).  Of this school, John Rumrich is likely the 
most well known member.  He states 
The victory of Paradise Lost, to the extent that Milton manages it, lies 
instead in helping us to accept the ambiguity, doubt, and indeterminacy 
constitutional of our lives, without succumbing to the fear that our 
existence is meaningless, or worse, malignant. (xii) 
It is Postmodernism itself which has brought this reading to bear, for under no other 
era would literary critics be so jubilant in saying “I do not know” in reference to  a 
reading or opportunity to make a moral judgment.  Danielson echoes Rumrich saying: 
The correct critical reaction to this dispute is not to imagine that it can 
be settled—that either Satanists or Anti-Satanists can be shown to be 
“right” […]  A more reasonable reaction is to realize that the poem is 
insolubly ambivalent, insofar as the reading of Satan’s character is 
concerned. (132) 
Just as its predecessors, this movement has great things to teach students and 
casual readers of Milton alike.  For with it the focus of critical examination deviates 
from the text itself and onto the effect of the text on the reader.  Usefully, one no 
longer need wander between two embattled positions of Milton scholarship and their 
militant residents.  In this way Fish’s revolutionary reading, though now quite old and 
standardised, shows its mettle.  The reader is since then encouraged to think about 
himself as he enters the epic, interpreting its schemes in gestures in terms of his own 
character and experience.  In this way Paradise Lost begins to function rhetorically 
like a sermon with its divisiveness and conviction (for it is still the case that the 
faithful will likely generate orthodox readings, the unfaithful Satanist readings and the 
agnostic indeterminate readings), but also like a fable where the audience is 
encouraged to interpret themselves as somehow a part of or character within the 
narrative mechanism.   68 
  It is reasonable to suggest that Milton would have approved of the 
personalisation of his text—being himself a great preacher—but it is also fair to say 
he would  have been disappointed with the moral blandness and indecision of readers 
like Kerrigan and Rumrich.  Milton himself was in no way unclear as to which side in 
his epic should hold the reader’s ultimate sympathies.  Although in the age of dying 
and dead authors, it is not surprising that this characteristic of Milton as both man and 
poet is often (intentionally?) forgotten.  As if he anticipated such an occurrence, 
Milton reaches out again in Paradise Regained in order to try and exert interpretive 
control of Paradise Lost.  For while Paradise Regained receives less critical acclaim 
than its predecessor, it certainly seems prudent to consider it as a source of 
illumination where the potential ambiguities of Paradise Lost are concerned. 
   
Milton as Fantasy Writer 
Milton is an individual for whom the title of “prophet” is often appropriated.
23  
In its usual sense, to say Milton was a prophet is to say that he spoke with great 
insight towards the moral and political conditions of his time.  But there is, of course, 
another way to use the word prophet and another role for prophets indeed—that of an 
oracle, or seer of the future.  It appears as though Milton was blessed with this quality 
as well, for Paradise Regained emphatically refutes the moral hesitancy of the reader-
centred, morally indeterminate reading of Paradise Lost.  Yet what is important for 
this study is not so much that it confirms Lewis’ suspicions that “the Devil is […] an 
ass,” but that it gives Milton’s most impassioned words against reason—both what it 
had been and what it was becoming.   
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  The attack therein is so robust, blatant and even perhaps cynical or malicious 
that it has quite taken aback those Miltonists who paid little or no attention to the 
theme as it appeared in Paradise Lost.  Swanson and Mulryan, for instance, seek to 
address what is, from their perspective, an interpretive difficulty: 
The problem exemplified by these passages can be briefly stated: why 
did Milton, who had a lifelong devotion to learning, and Greco-Roman 
learning in particular, so contemptuously reject, in the person of the 
Son, Satan’s temptation to learning? (244) 
This is, of course, a very keen point to make about what must seem to be a distressing 
anomaly within the framework of Milton as he is traditionally understood.  But within 
the scope of a reading of Paradise Lost as fantasy, that is, a work which actively 
seeks to displace “normality” and “reason” with the exceptional, absurd and unique, 
Paradise Regained is not unusual at all.  It is, however, useful in cementing a reading 
of Paradise Lost as fantasy.  What is more, this “fantasy” is not only claiming that 
reason is ultimately false, or degenerate, but that it is a temptation towards 
faithlessness and sin in some of its forms.  Satan says to the Son: 
    […] be famous, then, 
    By wisdom as thy empire must extend, 
    So let extend mind o’er all the world, 
    In knowledge, all things in it comprehend; 
    All knowledge is not couched in Moses’ law, 
    The Pentateuch, or what the Prophets wrote; 
    The Gentiles also know, and write, and teach 
    To admiration, led by Nature’s light […] 
    Without their learning, how wilt thou with them, 
    Or they with thee, hold conversation meet? 
    How wilt thou reason with them, how refute 
    Their idolisms, traditions, paradoxes? 
Error by his own arms is best evinced. (Regained IV, 221-228; 231-
235) 
Here again, Satan’s argument is very logical, but also irrelevant.  It would indeed be 
fantastic if the Son of God should need to sit and reason with a Greek thinker in order   70 
to convict him or have any authority over him.  It is even more fantastic that the Son 
should take advice from his adversary on how to fulfil his Father’s wishes.  It would 
be most fantastic, then, if the Son should allow himself to be convinced otherwise by 
the Devil’s logic when he has a testament which is supremely better: the word and 
divine presence of God. 
  It is perhaps for the purposes of irony that after he has just been tempted to 
sagacity the epic narrates “To whom our Saviour sagely thus replied” (IV 285).  But 
to note this is only to give a measure of foreshadowing to the tide of irony which is to 
come in the Son’s rebuttal: 
    Think not but that I know these things; or think 
    I know them not, not therefore am I short 
    Of knowing what I ought: he who receives 
    Light from above, from the Fountain of Light, 
    No other doctrine needs, though granted true; 
    But these are false, or little else but dreams, 
    Conjectures, fancies, built on nothing firm. 
    The first and wisest of them all professed 
    To know this only, that he nothing knew. (IV 286-294) 
Here dialectical reasoning itself is shown to be fancy and the “fancy” of the unseen 
God takes its place.  Of course such a thing seems to be lunacy because so many 
lunatics have said it in order to gain some personal advantage.  But Milton’s Son is 
not standing in Trafalgar Square, nor even the temple mount of twenty centuries past.  
For whatever may or may not be true about the Jesus of Nazareth in history, in Milton 
his word again “constitutes all reality.”  The moment any reader refuses to grant this 
statute of Milton’s epic, he ceases to read it as such.  Whatever the case, this condition 
among readers which causes them not just to problematise their hermeneutical 
relationship to an author, but to eliminate it altogether is a debilitating one when it 
comes to literature like Milton’s Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained.  Reading   71 
Milton’s literature without Milton is less radical, less illuminating and less satisfying.  
But now the focus must return to the question which has been resonating throughout 
this chapter, that is, what is so objectionable about Paradise Lost?   
While there are differing opinions of the theological merit of the epic, these 
rarely have much impact on the critic’s final opinion of it.  For instance, Lewis and 
Dr. Johnson both picked away at some of what they saw to be the more suspect 
portions of Milton’s theology but were still effervescent over the epic as a whole.  
The real explanation for why some see so much intellectual danger and literary peril 
is that it rebelled against reason and reasonability.  It transgressed all of society’s 
most fervent warnings about the dangers of fantasy from Erasmus, to the Puritans and 
all the way through Queen Victoria’s reign to the present.  The real danger of all 
fantasy, and that of Paradise Lost in particular, is that it asks the reader to believe for 
a moment differently than what he otherwise believes.  It opens up radical possibility 
and idealism through the imagination. 
This study will seek to show that although this sort of activity does produce a 
critically perilous potentiality—namely, an indulgent form of fundamentalist wishful 
thinking—awareness of this risk is more than enough to keep that beast in its cage and 
additionally that the benefits of such a specified hermeneutic for literature and 
theology far outweigh this danger at any rate.  By locating Milton within a tradition of 
the literary fantastic, it has been shown how fantasy constituted one of the very first 
artistic and intellectual critiques of the Enlightenment and reason as it had evolved out 
of Scholasticism.  Furthermore, it identifies the long history of fantasy as a critical 
model for the development and practice of theology beyond reason, focusing on its 
ability to destabilise intellectual and epistemological hierarchies in order to bring the 
reader towards a point of critical self-evaluation.     72 
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 “Death Becomes Her” 
Interlopers or uninitiated observers of the Christian cult and tradition often 
find an unambiguous morbidity about the whole body that borders on the surreal.  The 
accusation of a perverse necrophilia stemming from accounts of Eucharistic 
celebrations is an ancient one, although manifestly misinformed on the subject.  An 
apology written by the convert  Marcus Minucius Felix some time in the late second 
to third century records a (fictional) dialogue between a Christian apologist, Octavius 
Januarius, and the pagan Caecilius Natalis which perhaps gives some insight into the 
kind of wild rumours which were being levelled at the new Christian cult at the time:  
Now the story about the initiation of young novices is as much to be 
detested as it is well known. An infant covered over with meal, that it 
may deceive the unwary, is placed before him who is to be stained 
with their rites: this infant is slain by the young pupil, who has been 
urged on as if to harmless blows on the surface of the meal, with dark 
and secret wounds. Thirstily - O horror! they lick up its blood; eagerly 
they divide its limbs. By this victim they are pledged together; with 
this consciousness of wickedness they are covenanted to mutual 
silence. (177-178) 
Even throughout the literature of the Enlightenment, which as such itself eschewed all 
forms of superstition, the forms and symbols of ancient Christian tradition provided 
much fodder for the macabre.   Notable examples include Matthew Lewis’ The Monk 
(1796), Charles Maturin’s Melmoth the Wanderer (1820), or James Hogg’s The 
Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner (1824).
24   
In the contemporary, where familiarity with the essence of Christian belief and 
liturgy is fairly commonplace and less archaic (and therefore less likely to offend 
modern sensibilities) than the forms of it satirised in Gothic literature, Christianity 
still bears about itself a sort of unhealthy preoccupation with death.  The paradigm 
                                                 
24 Of note in Hogg’s work was that it was unique in unveiling the superstitious nature 
of popular Protestant (specifically Reformed) belief in contrast to the majority of his 
literary peers which pictured Protestantism as the cool, rational religion of the 
thinking man and Catholicism as magical and superstitious.   74 
often lends itself to the absurd as in Tina Pippin’s recent vampiric reading of the 
Gospel of John in The Recycled Bible (2006). 
  Yet, the Christian narrative of death and all of its subsequent conversations on 
that subject are anything but dour, rather they epitomise the eschatology of hope the 
movement has had since its most ancient foundations.  Therefore, when one examines 
the Christian literature of death (especially ancient and post-Reformation), one finds 
the religion at its most absurd, paradoxical and unreasonable.  Consider the words of 
St. Paul concerning the death of Christ and its implications: 
For Christ did not send me to baptize, but to preach the gospel—not 
with words of human wisdom, lest the cross of Christ be emptied of its 
power.  For the message of the cross is foolishness to those who are 
perishing, but to us who being saved it is the power of God.  For it is 
written: 
    ‘I will destroy the wisdom of the wise; 
    the intelligence of the intelligent I will frustrate.’ 
Where is the wise man? Where is the scholar?  Where is the 
philosopher of this age?  Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the 
world? […]  Jews demand miraculous signs and Greeks look for 
wisdom, but we preach Christ crucified: a stumbling block 
(skandalon) to Jews and foolishness (mwrían) to Gentiles […]  For 
the foolishness of God is wiser than man’s wisdom […] (1 Co. 1:17-
20, 22-23, 25a)  
For Paul, the paradoxical scandal of Christ’s death and resurrection was the very core 
of his Christian understanding.  Later in the epistle he declares to the Corinthian 
church “For what I received I passed on to you as of first importance: that Christ died 
for our sins according to the Scriptures, that he was buried, that he was raised on the 
third day according to the Scriptures,” (1 Co. 15:3-4). 
The cross, in the exposition of Stanislas Breton, is not only what “united those 
whom an apparent wisdom divides, as if there was an ever concealed affinity between 
the Nothing and the One,” but also the mechanism of ultimate division (3). 
Beneath the Cross, the parting of the waters does more than divide two 
groups.  It invites them to declare themselves ‘for’ or ‘against’ the 
Cross.  But in pronouncing a judgment on the Cross, one judges   75 
oneself and thus makes oneself what one is [BD:  Just as was seen 
earlier in Milton’s Paradise Lost].  Those who see in the Sign of 
Contradiction only misery and insignificance find folly and infirmity.  
The wisdom and power they give themselves determine the limits of 
their prison and the true extent of their fall.  To those who overcome 
the appearance of the world, this ‘Nothing’ motions from the shadows.  
It points beyond wisdom and power, making them wiser and stronger 
by being nothing which it gives. (7) 
Such a declaration which so brazenly (and, perhaps, beautifully) contradicts and 
opposes not only a proverbial incarnation of ‘conventional reason’ but the dominant 
infrastructure of human understanding (at least in what is called the contemporary 
West) has a natural ally in literature—fantasy.  The corpus or canon of Fantasy 
literature is riddled with death narratives which are in form, content and attitude 
harmonious with the Christian death narrative (both the Passion itself, as well as later 
New Testament, especially Pauline, accounts of death).  What is more, it will be seen 
that the way the fantastic literary tradition approaches death is a model for the way in 
which fantasy can itself serve as a medium for working out theological problems 
which are otherwise impossible to approach. 
   
Ars moriendi and the Death Fantasies of George MacDonald 
The preeminent example of this must be the work of George MacDonald, not 
least of which because the acceptance of death, according to Stephen Prickett, is for 
him “an essential factor in any kind of spiritual maturity” (Fantasy 191).   This is, in 
actuality, just the bare beginnings of a much larger edifice which is the thematic effect 
of death in the novels of George MacDonald.  In fact, three of his most prominent 
works themselves can be considered to be extended death narratives; his first and last   76 
fantasy novels, Phantastes (1858) and Lilith (1895), respectively, as well as the 
children’s fantasy At the Back of the North Wind (1871).
25   
Of these three, Prickett maintains that it is Lilith which stands apart as a novel 
which can only be understood as being about, in the most complete sense of that 
word, death.  He states:  
If Phantastes is essentially a Bildungsroman [a German form of 
Romance where the development and self-realization of the 
protagonist is central], Lilith is something for which the English cannot 
even borrow a word from German, for it is such a rare phenomenon 
that there is no such thing in either language.  If it existed, or were we 
to coin such a term, it would be Todsroman: a ‘death-romance’.  
(Fantasy 200) 
While Prickett singles out only Lilith to receive this label of Todsroman, it could be 
argued with good cause that all three novels could reasonably fit such a description.  
For while Phantastes and At the Back of the North Wind are both novels which focus 
on the spiritual development of the protagonist through fantastic experience, the same 
can easily be said of Lilith and, after all, all of the novels do in fact climax and 
conclude with the deaths of the protagonist so that the entire tale can be summarised 
as the story of how the protagonist came to die rightly.  In the case of these three 
novels, Bildungsroman and Todsroman need not be seen as mutually exclusive.  In 
fact, they go somewhat beyond both of these classifications.  For in these three novels 
MacDonald’s protagonists are not simply gaining a generalised liberal education or 
even some sort of self-actualisation.  When we consider them as both Bildungsroman 
and Todsroman it is clear that the bildung, the education or learning, is not abstract 
but very practical and for a purpose.  Therefore they become Ausbildungsroman,
26 the 
                                                 
25 At the Back of the North Wind was first published in a children’s magazine in 1868, 
but was published in book form in 1871. 
26 Ausbildung being the German word for training, or specifically vocational training 
or any education which is meant to prepare one for a specific task.   77 
protagonists receiving an education for the purpose of facing death.  They do more 
than come of age, they prepare to die. 
  The significance of MacDonald’s work on death is manifold.  Not only is it an 
expression of the Christian narrative of death, but the work was written at a time 
when the theology of death was in crisis and viable resolutions to the controversy 
were not forthcoming.  In this theological crisis, similar to the kind of personal crisis 
in Milton’s theological efforts in Christian Doctrine, MacDonald’s fantasies allowed 
him to see the doctrines of the future life and eternal punishment in a new light.  
Lastly, MacDonald’s work would create a precedent for the role and form of death 
within subsequent fantasy literature which would have such an effect as to change (or 
at least contribute to) the social understanding of death as a whole. 
It is not difficult to speak mythologically or imaginatively about death.  
Existentially, it is the radical other; rationally, it is irreducible.  While one can speak 
of how death effects the living or how it functions (its role in the biosphere and its 
results on human society) those things are not the same as being able to determine 
what it is or what it means to humanity—corporate or particular.  Therefore it is not a 
massive claim to state that George MacDonald mythologises death in many of his 
major works, in particular the three which have already been mentioned.  What is 
particularly interesting is that he does this at a time when rational explanations of 
death seemed increasingly irrational amidst the massive childhood mortality rates and 
devastating health conditions of Victorian Britain.  MacDonald’s attempt to 
theologise about death without defaulting into heterodoxy and still recognising the 
grim reality of the formerly stated status quo required him to turn to fantasy. 
George MacDonald, from an early age, was well acquainted with just how 
hard life in Britain could be during the tumultuous Industrial Age.  Spared the filth,   78 
crowding and disease of the nation’s booming cities of the time, MacDonald’s youth 
was nevertheless characterised by hardship from the deceivingly mundane rigors of 
trying to scrape together a living from the family’s farm in Aberdeenshire to the 
premature death of his mother when he was only eight, even the loss of his father’s 
leg.  George had three sisters and five brothers.  Of these, three died before the age of 
fifteen including his brother, James, who died at eight with no official cause of death 
listed (Robb, MacDonald 1-2, 16).  Be this as it may, all of his classmates swore that 
it was due to the severe beatings he received from the local schoolmaster (Phillips 
81).  Of the rest, MacDonald’s younger brother, Alec, died at the age of twenty six 
and the youngest of the brood, John Hill—who was the sibling closest to George 
himself—passed away at the age of 28 by way of the same disease which had taken 
their mother, tuberculosis.  Of MacDonald’s staggering eleven children, four died at 
young ages by tuberculosis which, by the end of his years his son, Greville, explains 
that MacDonald would label “the family attendant” (470).  MacDonald himself had 
poor respiratory health after a haemorrhage in his lungs in 1850 after which he was 
forced to take regular holidays to the Mediterranean albeit at great expense to his 
finances (Robb, MacDonald 15). 
Death, then, was a very real and particularly dominant aspect of George 
MacDonald’s life.  These experiences combined with the hardcore Calvinism of the 
sort practiced in particular by his severe aunt and abusive schoolmaster pushed 
MacDonald to an emotional state which made his theology untenable.  David Robb 
says of his condition, “MacDonald’s affliction must have contributed substantially to 
his sense of being a mere transient pilgrim in this world and of the world itself being 
less than ultimate reality” (MacDonald, 16).  His first exposure to the nastiness of 
urban life in Victorian Britain came when as a young man he went to Aberdeen for   79 
university and experienced the conditions there.  It was also during this time that 
MacDonald was first exposed to the universalism that would later influence his own 
theology so greatly.  Although he had been installed as a Sunday School teacher 
working for the local Congregationalist church, he was removed of his duties, his son 
Greville presumes, because of fears that he and some other young men in the 
congregation had been influenced by ‘Morisonianism’ (Robb, MacDonald 12).
27  He 
was famously removed from his first pulpit in Sussex for what the congregation 
deemed “German ideology”—essentially a form of speculative universalism that he 
had formed as a reaction to both the severe and violent Calvinism of his youth and the 
shadow of death which never ceased to hang over his loved ones.  Robb relates, “By 
the time he took over the Congregational church in Arundel in 1850, he appears to 
have been in the Universalist camp.  I think it safe to assume that it was during his 
undergraduate days at Aberdeen that his rejection of traditional Calvinist doctrines 
began in earnest” (13).  MacDonald’s expulsion from the pulpit was a formative 
experience for him, placing him thoroughly on the margins of any sort of religious 
establishment of the time. 
While the entire world, especially in its theological circles, seemed to be 
steaming forward on track with the industrial project of demythologisation,
28 
MacDonald trekked steadily in the opposite direction waving happily at those who 
passed him by along the way.  What MacDonald was looking for was a space.  This 
space was to allow him free reign of his imagination such that at least in Fairy Land, 
if not in his church, he could find resolution to the tensions which weighed on his 
heart and mind.  In this space, free from both dogma and oppressive disbelief, 
                                                 
27 ‘Morisonianism’ being after a local Independent universalist preacher, Rev. James 
Morison. 
28 E.g. Das leben Jesu (1836) by David Strauss.   80 
MacDonald was free to pursue something more than the exchange of points in lively 
debate as many of his friends were interested in doing and instead a lively and 
imaginative spirituality itself.  It must be understood that for MacDonald this fantastic 
literary project is not about self defence or justification, nor simply vain curiosity, but 
a serious desire for a potent spiritual way of living that sticks to author and reader 
alike long after the pages of a book are closed.  It is a project which is about life itself 
and exploring the areas of experience which are continually being pushed to the 
margins by an ever-modernising world.  Whereas modernity has pushed death to the 
margins of its social consciousness, relegating it to specialised hospices and pensioner 
care facilities, death was imbedded in the existence of MacDonald and his 
contemporaries.  
  The Christian doctrine of death has not been, to be completely accurate, 
entirely univocal throughout the Church’s history.  Austra Reinis explains in her 
work, Reforming the Art of Dying, exactly how this came to be: 
The ritual of preparing for death was one of the focal points of late 
medieval death culture.  While early Christians appear to have 
approached death joyfully, with confidence in their eternal salvation, 
over time this attitude was replaced with one of penitence and fear in 
anticipation of divine judgment […]  It was believed that one’s eternal 
fate was decided at the moment of death by one’s victory over the 
deathbed demons.  All of life came to be seen as preparation for this 
final struggle. (2) 
With this emphasis on the ultimate struggle of the deathbed, the medieval death cult 
became quite elaborate (and though it changed, the elaborateness of death ritual 
carried on through the Victorian era), with an entire liturgy devoted to it.  The key 
was to administer the Eucharist and make final confession and penitence before 
facing the great, final mortal temptation.  No matter what one had triumphed over 
previously in his life, no matter his failings and weaknesses, everything was   81 
subsumed in that final moment where one either clung to his faith and his baptism or 
otherwise succumbed to fear and unfaith.   
  Because of the centrality of the sacraments in the death ritual, the presence of 
a priest at death was essential.  However, while the Catholic faith of the time 
encompassed all of Europe’s classes, having a priest by one’s bedside through the 
final hours was only practical in reality for the upper classes.  The presence of plague 
in Europe brought this reality to the fore as the Black Death brought with it the 
demise of anywhere from a quarter to roughly half of Europe’s population (Strayer 
257-267).  With a plague of this scale, even the wealthy were sometimes being denied 
priestly visitation during their deaths.  The Church finally saw the need to loosen its 
grip on the liturgy of death and authorised a succession of handbooks which 
instructed laypersons on how to minister to the dying.  The pamphlets were known as 
the ars moriendi—the art of dying well (Reinis 3). 
  Consequently, the ars moriendi always included contemplation of Christ’s 
passion.  It was thought that by modelling one’s own death as closely after Christ’s as 
possible, salvation would become that much surer.  Reinis explains 
Devotion to the passion of the Christ is one of the most prominent 
themes in late medieval theology of piety.  According to the medieval 
theologians who wrote on the subject, the purpose of meditating on the 
passion was twofold: to experience compassion (compassio) with 
Christ’s sufferings and be moved to imitate (imitatio) the passion in 
one’s own life […]    Besides assisting the dying person in overcoming 
the temptations of the devil and the judgment of God, contemplation of 
the passion of Christ also teaches the dying person the right manner of 
dying.  (35-39) 
In this way the ars moriendi becomes one and the same with the ars memoria.  It is 
through remembering the archetypical Christian death that the Christian disciple is 
able to model and fashion his own death in a righteous manner.  This principle was 
fulfilled, perhaps, to its truest form in Luther, who “sought to teach (docere) that the   82 
three deathbed sacraments […] signify that Christ’s victory is also the Christian’s 
victory” (Reinis 47).  Not only is the believer becoming like Christ through death, but 
he is himself in Christ at death, therefore the two deaths are the same, they are one. 
  All of this is relevant to the discussion of the three Todsroman or 
Ausbildungsroman of George MacDonald, for they themselves serve as a 
contemplation, a memoria as well as an ars moriendi, of Christ’s death and his 
declaration that “If anyone would follow me he must deny himself and take up his 
cross and follow me” (Mt. 16:24).  His characters, Mr. Vane, Anodos and Diamond 
all find their crosses and to a varying degree actually model in themselves Christ’s 
Passion.   
   
Death, Baptism and the Passion in Phantastes 
Nowhere is this trend of Passion remembrance clearer than in MacDonald’s 
first novelistic effort, Phantastes.  Not only does the protagonist, Anodos, himself 
eventually experiences a death which is itself very much a type of the Passion, but 
there are several passages and experiences which could be read as types of baptism—
baptism itself being a typological re-enactment of the Passion. One such of these is so 
remarkable that it is worth quoting at length: 
I stood on the shore of a wintry sea, with a wintry sun just a few feet 
above its horizon-edge.  It was bare, and waste, and gray. Hundreds of 
hopeless waves rushed constantly shorewards, falling exhausted upon a 
beach of great loose stones, that seemed to stretch miles and miles in 
both directions.  There was nothing for the eye but mingling shades of 
gray; nothing for the ear but the rush of the coming, the roar of the 
breaking, and the moan of the retreating wave […] A cold, death-like 
wind swept across the shore, seeming to issue from a pale mouth of 
cloud upon the horizon.  Sign of life was nowhere visible.  I wandered 
over the stones, up and down the beach, a human imbodiment of the   83 
nature around me […] a few dead stars began to gleam in the east; the 
sound of the waves grew louder and yet more despairing.  A dark 
curtain of cloud was lifted up, and a pale blue rent shone between its 
foot and the edge of the sea, out from which rushed an icy storm of 
frozen wind, that tore the waters into spray as it passed, and flung the 
billows in raving heaps upon the desolate shore.  I could bear it no 
longer. 
‘I will not be tortured to death,’ I cried; ‘I will meet it half-way.   The 
life within me is yet enough to bear me up to the face of Death, and 
then I die unconquered’ […] I reached the end of the low promontory, 
which, in the fall of the waves, rose a good many feet above the 
surface, and, in their rise, was covered with their waters.  I stood one 
moment and gazed into the heaving abyss beneath me; then plunged 
headlong into the mounting wave below.  A blessing, like the kiss of a 
mother, seemed to alight on my soul; a calm, deeper than that which 
accompanies a hope deferred, bathed my spirit.  I sank far in the 
waters, and sought not to return.  I felt as if once more the great arms 
of the beech-tree were around me, soothing me after the miseries I had 
passed through, and telling me, like a little sick child, that I should be 
better to-morrow.  The waters of themselves lifted me, as with loving 
arms, to the surface.  I breathed again, but did not unclose my eyes. 
[…] Soon I fell asleep, overcome with fatigue and delight […] I was 
almost glad I had sinned—thus I passed through this wondrous 
twilight. (Phantastes and Lilith
29 127-129) 
There are several thing to note about this passage and it baptismal imagery.  Firstly is 
the oppressively wild and dangerous nature of the environment surrounding Anodos.  
This is nothing like the serene and sanctimonious baptisteries one might find in a 
church building or cathedral in MacDonald’s time, nor is it even like to the placid 
scene of Christ’s baptism at the Jordan.
30  There on the Jordan, there is no peril, yet 
this scene which confronts Anodos is nature at its most deadly and untamed.  Anodos 
cannot think of this event as a pleasant dip in the sea, the scene is bleak, tragic and 
inhospitable.  Rather, he consigns himself to death saying “I will meet it half-way.” 
                                                 
29 Hereafter referred to as P&L. 
30 One thinks specifically of Pasolini’s film Il vangelo secondo Matteo (1964) where 
Jesus kneels before a gently murmuring brook while the Baptist luxuriously, and 
slightly erotically, bathes Jesus’ hair with water poured from his own hand.   84 
  All of the power is gone from Anodos in this situation, the onset of death 
seems to be absolutely inevitable.  “I will not be tortured to death,” he declares before 
plunging into the water.  This, then, is in keeping with the spirit of baptism—one 
cannot baptise himself, he must meet another half-way and be baptised.  While it is 
Anodos who takes the plunge, it is the water which must lift him up, for in the icy 
depths he relinquishes his will to a much greater power than his own: “The waters of 
themselves lifted me, as with loving arms, to the surface.” 
  What is noteworthy about the scene is that while Anodos experiences a 
“death” here, he is not dead afterwards but alive as in keeping with the normative 
theology of baptism.  Even though he dives into an abyss, there he finds something 
quite different to the despair which seemed to clutch him while he stoops at the top of 
the precipice: “I felt as if once more the great arms of the beech-tree were around me, 
soothing me after the miseries I had passed through”.  Uniquely in MacDonald, 
Anodos is not pictured as passing from life unto life through death as in usual 
baptismal imagery, but from being dead to being alive through death.  Anodos finds 
himself in the midst of a ‘bare waste’ with nothing to see but ‘mingling shades of 
gray’ and nothing to hear but the crashing of waves.  He is swept up by a ‘cold, death-
like wind’ and all he can say for himself is that he was ‘a human embodiment of the 
nature around [him]’.  Anodos does not succumb to death so that he might live again, 
he succumbs to death almost as an act of obedience and miraculously finds himself 
alive as if for the first time so that he could be ‘almost glad that [he] had sinned’ and 
thusly pass through ‘this wondrous twilight.’  It is important to note that the twilight 
which Anodos experiences here is not dusk, but dawn.  For Anodos faces eastwards 
towards the sea and sees the dim sun just a few inches from the horizon.  He floats off 
not into night, but morning and day.   85 
  What gives this act of simple compliance and capitulation real symbolic 
potency is its appropriation and fulfilment of a greater narrative, perhaps 
metanarrative, which typologically empowers and enfranchises it as a literary conceit.  
For MacDonald, it is not death itself which liberates but death in Christ.  Christ’s 
death, for him, is the archetype which is able to empower all deaths.  In Paul, whom 
MacDonald must have had very much in mind, “The last enemy to be destroyed is 
death” so that it may be transformed in the same way that Christ’s own death was 
transformed (1 Co. 15:26).  Paul explains “The body that is sown is perishable, it is 
raised imperishable; it is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory; it is sown in 
weakness, it is raised in power; it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body” 
(1 Co. 15:42b-44).  This must be done, of course, because “flesh and blood cannot 
inherit the kingdom of God” (1 Co. 15:50).   
  The transition Paul notes from material to spiritual is possible because the 
disciple of Christ has already done this on an interior, metaphysical level.  Paul 
explains this in his Roman epistle saying: 
Or don’t you know that all of us who were baptized into Christ Jesus 
were baptized into his death?  We were therefore buried with him 
through baptism into death in order that, just as Christ was raised from 
the dead through the glory of the Father, we too may live a new life.  If 
we have been united with him like this in his death, we will certainly 
also be united with him in his resurrection.  (Ro. 6:3-5) 
The message of these excerpts is clear: through sharing typologically and spiritually 
in the death of Christ in baptism, one is also resurrected with him in spirit and the 
“body of sin” (6:6) has already died so that when the material body dies it will be as if 
it is nothing more than a seed planted in the ground, waiting for the glorious warmth 
of Spring to awake, transformed.     86 
Of course, Anodos does not view his experience as an actual baptism, for what 
he experiences is a typological form of baptism, not an allegorical equivalent of 
baptism.  Yet even in the biblical record it is “not the removal of dirt from the body 
but the pledge of a good conscience toward God” which constitutes the convert’s 
obligation to the efficacy of the baptismal liturgy.  With Anodos’s forsaking of life 
and self in his agreement to meet death “half-way,”  he embodies the actual 
repentance and contrition which gives baptism its significance for converts.  What he 
is repenting from is just the attitude that his life is in his own hands and that he is able 
to master himself alone against death.  His fall into the sea was just that, a letting 
go—“I sank far into the waters, and sought not to return.”  While he might not have 
known it, this pivotal act, the renewed state of mind and spirit, would mean that when 
Anodos did face death it would not be his end, but only a transition or awakening. 
Indeed, sequentially speaking, the death of Anodos comes shortly after his 
“baptism,” so as to suggest that the experience is indeed meant to prepare him for his 
last deed.  After Anodos’ baptism he is taken to a magical island inhabited solely by 
an old woman in a cottage—a type of Avalon, perhaps.  The old woman comforts and 
sings to Anodos as he faces a series of trials and visions there.  One of the visions is 
named “Dismay” and finds him trapped alone in the tomb of his ancestors.  There he 
confronts death itself, but as a different man than the one who previously had 
surrendered himself to the sea.  For this is just the sort of trial that Anodos had 
consistently failed in Fairy Land.  He explains his experience as such: 
Everything I touched belonged to the dead.  My hands fell on the cold 
effigy of a knight who lay with his legs crossed and his sword broken 
beside him.  He lay in his noble rest, and I lived on in ignoble strife.  I 
felt for the left hand and a certain finger; I found there the ring I knew: 
he was one of my own ancestors.  I was in the chapel over the burial-
vault of my race.  I called aloud: “If any of the dead are moving here,   87 
let them take pity upon me, for I, alas! am still alive; and let some dead 
woman comfort me, for I am a stranger in the land of the dead, and see 
no light.”  A warm kiss alighted on my lips through the dark.  And I 
said, “The dead kiss well; I will not be afraid.”  And a great hand was 
reached out of the dark, and grasped mine for a moment, mightily and 
tenderly.  I said to myself: “The veil between, though very dark, is 
very thin.” (P&L 142) 
Although it would seem that Anodos had already overcome death when he fell into 
the sea, or had been helped to do so, here is another scene in which he must face the 
same opponent.  While this might seem to be a conundrum, it is clearly a dilemma 
which also plagued the first century church.  That is, if Paul instructs his readers to 
remember their baptisms and live in sin no longer, since baptism indeed was death to 
sin (Ro. 6:2), then this means that the baptism itself is de facto not the last word on 
death (and how could it be when a material death still clearly loomed?).  Rather, it is 
yet another paradox relating to the “Kingdom of God.”  Just as Jesus’ sayings on the 
kingdom reveal it as something which is here, about to arrive and still coming,
31 the 
believer begins the resurrection life at conversion must still confront the stumbling 
blocks of sin and death in a way that can only be described as paradoxical.  For even 
Christ, while defeating death in his Resurrection, “must reign until he has put all his 
enemies under his feet.  The last enemy to be destroyed is death” (1 Co. 15:25-26). 
  The only way to confront this paradox is by faith, which is what Anodos 
himself is learning.  It is one thing to consign oneself to death, it is an entirely 
separate thing to believe that death is not the end, but the beginning.  That is what 
Anodos must confront in his ancestor’s chapel and it is also what Martha was tested 
with in John 11.  When  she confronts Jesus for not saving her brother, Lazarus, who 
had died, he responds to her by saying “Your brother will rise again” (v.23).  What 
follows is one of the most remarkable dialogues in the canonical Gospels: 
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Martha answered, “I know he will rise again in the resurrection at the 
last day.” 
Jesus said to her, “I am the resurrection and the life.  He who believes 
in me will live, even though he dies; and whoever lives and believes in 
me will never die.  Do you believe this?” 
“Yes, Lord,” she told him, “I believe that you are the Christ, the Son of 
God, who was to come into the world.” (v. 24-27) 
The cryptic truth of Jesus’ declaration, while accepted for its face value, seems to be 
yet beyond Martha.  What she does not understand is that Jesus’ resurrection is both 
material and spiritual, present and future—or, rather, that the truth of it confounds 
both categories.  For, when Jesus approaches Lazarus’ grave Martha remonstrates 
him, “But, Lord, by this time there is a bad odour, for he has been there four days” (v. 
39).  Jesus’ response to this is potent; “Did I not tell you that if you believed, you 
would see the glory of God?” (v. 40).  Clearly, by this point at least, she does believe 
for before her eyes Lazarus is resurrected and walks again while proclaiming the 
glory of God to many who did not believe (Jn. 12:10). 
  While Martha was able to cope with the cognitive weight of acknowledging 
the proclamations of Jesus to be true, but the oppression of the despair of death was 
yet to be surmounted.  She could assent but not accept.  Still, any doubts that she 
might have had were washed away by actual communion with her formerly dead 
brother.  In the same way, Anodos is again comforted by his communion with the 
dead.  For what he finds there is not the depression of decay and stagnation, the usual 
imagery associated with death, but an interaction with the very experience of vitality.  
The most intimate moment Anodos experiences in Fairy Land, arguably, is this 
“warm kiss” which comes to him from the dark.  The context is everything here, for 
while the comfort of the beech tree and the woman in the four square cottage might 
seem to be measurably more—for they were visibly present and held him and talked   89 
to him—even these great comforts cannot compete with the power and significance of 
a warm kiss from the dead, out of the darkness, when no light was to be seen.  It is 
always the hope that comes from nowhere which is the strongest; deepest despair is 
where Anodos finds the firmest strength.  Anodos here realises that the dead inhabit a 
world entirely of their own, for they do not cease to exist but rather co-exist in a 
world in which the “veil between is, though very dark, very thin.” 
  One thing more must be noted by the comfort Anodos finds at the chapel of 
his ancestors.  This is, he only finds something when he seeks it.  He passes over the 
possibility of nonexistence after death and reaches out to the possibility that 
something of the deepest tales and myths might after all be true, for he calls out to 
what he imagines must be the most traditional sort of ghosts,  still residing in and 
about their last resting place.  He speaks as though praying to the dead.  After he has 
done this, then only does he receive his comfort, and it is this comfort which sees him 
back to the old woman’s cottage.  Before she sends him on his way she gives him a 
prophecy that no matter what should come of him, she knows something that should 
give him peace about it, that it should turn out well in the end, another boon for one 
who will soon face his greatest test yet. 
When Anodos leaves the cottage he begins the last chapter of his existence in 
Fairy Land.  He is soon reunited with an knight errant whom he has encountered 
twice and whose spiritual guidance he has likewise twice ignored along with the 
woman he loves, now sworn to the knight.  Before his Ausbildung, or training, which 
has been seen episodically through confrontations with death, Anodos would have 
greeted this turn with spite and contempt.  Now, however, he says simply “If I cannot 
be noble myself, I will yet be servant to his nobleness” (P&L 173).  It is the   90 
ausbildung of death which allows Anodos to make such a kenotic decision, his own 
self has become inconsequential and his perspective remedied and anchored in 
“nobleness.”  The knight is now interpreted by Anodos Christologically as well, for 
Anodos says of him “I will serve him, and give him all worship, seeing in him the 
imbodiment of what I would fain become” (173).  While these might be exaggerated 
terms, they are at least instructive of the gist of what MacDonald is now implying of 
his protagonist, he has at last occupied happily the role of the faithful disciple.  
Anodos reflects “I felt that, after all, mine would be no lost life, if I might wait on him 
to the world’s end, although no smile but his should greet me, and no one but him 
should say ‘Well done! he was a good servant!’ at last” (173).  So thoroughly does 
MacDonald draw upon both biblical type and language here that it is almost 
impossible for the initiated reader not to draw lines comparison towards the Jesus of 
Christian discipleship, even if these comparisons themselves are fleeting. 
After these statements of devotion, the only adventure which Anodos recalls is 
one which would bring this symbolism crashing to the floor, while elevating Anodos 
himself.
32  The party is confronted with a scene of  worship being directed towards a 
mysterious figure on a throne.  The knight is mesmerised by the spectacle and 
becomes convinced that it must be a true prophet whom the crowd adore.  Anodos, on 
the contrary, suspects something insidious behind it all but is unable to convince his 
master of it.  Unable to allow his master to be deceived, Anodos charges at the 
mysterious figure and tears it from the throne.  Yet, from the recess underneath the 
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dais which Anodos has now opened leaps a giant beast “like a wolf, but twice its size” 
which attacks him (176).  Anodos knows that he only has a short time before the 
priests who are around him drawing their swords will cut him down, so he locks his 
hands around the beast’s throat knowing that in death he will still accomplish his 
purpose.  Anodos recollects feeling the crushing blow from the priest’s weapon and 
then “A faintness came over me, and my consciousness departed” (177).  This was 
Anodos’s final death, the great battle as described by the ars moriendi, the moment 
that his entire journey in Fairy Land had been preparing him for. 
Yet this state would not be a permanent one, for next he realises himself and 
his surroundings once more: 
I was dead, and right content.  I lay in my coffin, with my hands folded 
in peace.  The knight, and the lady I loved, wept over me.  Her tears 
fell on my face […] 
“He has died well,” said the lady. 
My spirit rejoiced.  They left me to my repose.  I felt as if a cool hand 
had been laid upon my heart, and had stilled it […] The hot fever of 
life had gone by, and I breathed the clear mountain-air of the land of 
Death.  I had never dreamed of such blessedness.  It was not that I had 
in any way ceased to be what I had been.  The very fact that anything 
can die, implies the existence of something that cannot die; which must 
either take to itself another form, as when the seed that is sown dies, 
and arises again; or, in conscious existence, may, perhaps, continue to 
lead a purely spiritual life […] I lay thus for a time, and lived as it were 
an unradiating existence; my soul a motionless lake, that received all 
things and gave nothing back; satisfied in still contemplation, and 
spiritual consciousness. (177-178) 
Anodos continues, amazingly, to describe how he was taken to his grave and laid into 
it.  He recalls having the whole earth for his body, that he grew into a giant, beautiful 
primrose which the lady picked, kissed, and held to her chest.  “It was the first kiss 
she had ever given me,” he croons (179).  In this experience Anodos concludes his 
education in Fairy Land, having learned that “it is by loving, not by being loved, that   92 
one can come nearest the soul of another […] This is possible in the realms of lofty 
Death” (179). 
  After this, Anodos’s time in Fairy Land is complete, having “set out to find 
[his] Ideal” and returning “rejoicing that [he] had lost [his] Shadow” and “Sinking 
from such a state of ideal bliss, into the world of shadows which again closed around 
and infolded me” (182, 180).  He faced life again in the mortal world again, but this 
time somewhat instructed (as Lazarus might have done, having once been dead 
himself and returned to life).  For he has already defeated the enemy whose sting is 
greatest, even if he must face another or many more deaths; he has already overcome 
despair.  His tale concludes with this reflection: 
When the thought of the blessedness I experienced, after my death in 
Fairy Land, is too high for me to lay hold upon it and hope in it, I often 
think of the wise woman in the cottage, and of her solemn assurance 
that she knew something too good to be told.  When I am oppressed by 
any sorrow or real perplexity, I often feel as if I had only left her 
cottage for a time, and would soon return out of the vision, into it 
again.  Sometimes, on such occasions, I find myself, unconsciously 
almost, looking about for the mystic mark of red, with the vague hope 
of entering her door, and being comforted by her wise tenderness.  I 
then console myself by saying: “I have come through the door of 
Dismay; and the way back from the world into which that has led me, 
is through my tomb.  Upon that the red sign lies, and I shall find it one 
day, and be glad,” […] 
Yet I know that good is coming to me—that good is always coming; 
though few have at all times the simplicity and the courage to believe 
it.  What we call evil, is the only and best shape, which, for the person 
and his condition at the time, could be assumed by the best good. (182) 
 
What, then, MacDonald leaves his readers with is a sort of astonishing multivalence 
of fantasy and symbolism.  For Anodos has entered a fantasy, been translated from 
that fantasy to the truer realisation of that fantasy through his death, and now has 
come back to reality but sees it only as a realm of shadows which he longs to depart   93 
from again and return to the world of fantasy.  It is not a case where, upon returning 
to reality, the protagonist realises that the former experience was, by tautological 
necessity, unreal.  On the contrary, Anodos still believes firmly in the promise of that 
land and plans to return there, through his tomb.  While he doubts, he no longer 
dismays, and turns his face towards his grave with both confidence and hope in the 
promise which he was given by the beech tree and the old woman in the cottage. 
  This kind of belief in an experience as numinous and fleeting as Anodos’ time 
in Fairy Land is shocking in its vitality and demeanour.  In this way, the reader 
becomes Anodos by experiencing in form the same transformations and journeys 
between fantasy and waking reality which the protagonist endured.  The goal of a 
design in which the waking reality does not invalidate the fantasy, but in which the 
fantasy itself becomes stronger, more potent and virile than the ‘reality’ is so that the 
reader might bear the same conviction which the protagonist has arrived at, that one 
day he will be taken back to that glorious land of fantasy and that moment will be 
both his death and his birth.  But to see the full effect of this mechanism in 
MacDonald, especially as it relates to his poetic and theological position on death, it 
is necessary to first consider the two remaining works which have been previously 
mentioned, Lilith and At the Back of the North Wind. 
 
Reading the Gilded Book in Lilith 
  Lilith is a novel which, as has been previously mentioned, focuses so entirely 
on the subject of death (both theologically and as a narrative device) that it caused 
Stephen Prickett to devise a new term to refer to its seemingly anomalistic position in 
relation to normal conventions of genre: Todsroman.  It is, in fact, the story of how   94 
the protagonist, the aptly named Mr. Vane, must come to terms with his own death.  
Vane travels into another world from his own
33 where he is met by someone who will 
serve as his guide through this land and its tasks. 
  In order to set our examination of the adventure of Mr. Vane off on the right 
footing, the first thing we must note is the mode and nature of this transport itself.  
The original method by which Vane enters this other world is by the symbolically 
overloaded device of a mirror.  Of course, MacDonald was sure to have borrowed this 
device from the ever popular volume of his close friend, Lewis Carroll’s Through the 
Looking Glass (1872).  The recounting of the rich history of the mirror as a symbol 
must be abandoned here, for it is a tale too long to be told.  However, one can quite 
easily gain a notion of what MacDonald was ‘up to’ in the use of such a device not 
only by remembering its direct literary precedent, Dodgson’s second Alice novel, but 
also through a brief consideration of what mirrors do.  Mirrors are fundamentally 
tools of reflection, which makes them a powerful symbolic tool of introspection.  In 
this aspect they are often pictured as being terribly powerful, drawing the viewer 
seductively into the world of reflection to the neglect of the real.  One of the oldest 
examples of this must be the myth of Narcissus and Echo in Ovid’s Metamorphoses, 
but the theme runs strongly across many ages.  With the Victorian exploration of the 
subconscious, at least symbolically if not systematically, the mirror was at the 
forefront of many artistic expressions.  The year after Lilith was published, Sir Frank 
Dicksee painted his work “The Mirror” (1896).  Yet, perhaps the most important 
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aspect of the mirror is that it does not ever show the world as it is, but is always 
backwards and flawed in some sense and from a particular perspective. 
  MacDonald’s device in Lilith, then, is actually not a magical mirror but simply 
a mirror which acts more perfectly than all others.  Whereas a normal mirror would 
reflect a less perfect image of the world than could be seen with the naked eye, this 
mirror actually shows a world more accurately than could be perceived with normal 
human faculties.  Some of the symbolism latent in the mirror itself is particularly 
informative.  The one outstanding characteristic of the piece is its frame, “on top of 
which stood a black eagle with outstretched wings, in its beak a golden chain, from 
whose end hung a black ball” (P&L 192).  Interestingly, this symbol was used in early 
American furniture as a symbol of victory over (British) oppression.  New York’s 
Gracie Mansion, formerly the mayor’s residence, to this day bears several good 
examples of this (Gariti).  Is this mirror, then, a gateway to liberty? 
Mr. Raven describes his transport as a going through a door, but iterates that 
“the more doors you go out of, the farther you get in!” (P&L 194).  But while Vane’s 
situation seems to have changed quite drastically, he actually goes nowhere in a 
spatial sense.  For everything in his present world has a correspondence with 
something in the last.  Mr. Raven, who would also turn out to be a sexton and Adam, 
was at the same time the librarian from his father’s house.  His chimney in the 
previous world might turn up as a tall oak tree in the next.  When he asks Mr. Raven 
where he is he is told “That is impossible.  You know nothing about whereness.  The 
only way to come to know where you are is to begin to make yourself at home” (195).  
Thus he is not given a logical or philosophical solution to his query, but rather, invited 
to reinterpret his own narrative here, in another setting.  To make his home in this   96 
ostensible fantasy would be a typological interpretation of his own self within this 
new narrative. 
  In this way Vane’s problem becomes not just an existential one, but an 
ontological one.  He reflects “Could it be that I was dead […] and did not know it?”  
(P&L 196).  Soon, however, he finds that the question of his being is not unique to his 
new surroundings.  Rather, he reopens the Cartesian problem and, wisely, offers no 
answer: “what is there to secure me against my own brain?  Can I tell what it is even 
now generating?—what thought it may present me the next moment, the next month, 
or a year away?  What is behind my think?  Am I there at all?—Who, what am I?” 
(198).  In this way it can be seen from the beginning of Vane’s tale that his journey is 
not at all spatial and hardly even dimensional.  A better way of interpreting it is as a 
gradual stripping away of illusion.  The changes in scenery are hardly the most 
significant in the hero’s transition, it is his growing understanding of himself and his 
relation towards “other” which is most telling of the kind of change he is enduring.  
Perhaps the most telling revelation of this comes in part of his discourse with Mr. 
Raven. 
“What right have you to treat me so, Mr. Raven?” I said with deep 
offence.  “Am I, or am I not, a free agent?” 
“A man is as free as he chooses to make himself, never an atom freer,” 
answered the raven. 
“You have no right to make me do things against my will!” 
“When you have a will, you will find that no one can.” 
“You wrong me in the very essence of my individuality!” I persisted. 
“If you were an individual I could not, therefore now I do not.  You are 
but beginning to become an individual […]  Perhaps it may comfort 
you,” said the raven, “to be told that you have not yet left your house, 
neither has your house left you.  At the same time it cannot contain 
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“I do not understand you,” I replied.  “Where am I?” 
“In the region of the seven dimensions […]” (202) 
Thus, by citing seven dimensions Mr. Raven squashes the notion that they have gone 
anywhere and replaces it with the realisation that there is more to existence than that 
which seemed apparent to Mr. Vane.  Previously there were three dimensions, now 
there are seven.  An interesting observation is to be made about his transition and how 
he dealt with it.  While he asked all number of questions about who he was and where 
he was and if he was dead, Mr. Vane never asks a ‘why’ for what has happened to 
him.  The answer seems clear to one who has read the novel to conclusion, or 
alternatively paid close attention to Mr. Raven’s words.  Mr. Vane is embarking on a 
journey of personal development just like all of MacDonald’s protagonists, but in this 
case it is the development of personhood and selfness which must be achieved.  This 
could not happen without Mr. Vane questioning the very essence of his existence and 
this he would not do without being forced to question everything else along with it. 
  But there is another site of confluence between this altered state of perception 
(to call it a ‘world’ after having made such distinctions as above seems all too casual) 
and the mundane.  This is, while wandering in his ancestor’s library, who was a “great 
reader […] not of such books only as were wholesome for men to read, but of strange, 
forbidden, and evil books,” Mr. Vane comes upon a book which is only half present 
which he calls the “mutilated volume” (P&L 190).  It is the gilding on this book 
which leads him to his father’s manuscripts which recount meeting Mr. Raven and his 
experiences with the ‘other world’ as well as the revelation that “A book is a door in, 
and therefore a door out” (221).  While the mode of figurative transport remains to be 
the old oblong mirror, it appears that books, or at least one book in particular, also 
occupies some continuum between the two states.  This is exactly how it appears to   98 
Mr. Vane, at one point, when Mr. Raven produces the volume not in its ‘mutilated’ 
form but as a whole.  “Where was the other half of it?” he asks.  “Sticking through 
into my library,” Raven replies (319).  At last, Mr. Vane arrives at the heart of the 
matter: 
“But,” I returned, hard to persuade where I could not understand, “how 
is it then that, when you please, you take from that same door a whole 
book where I saw and felt only a part of one?  The other part, you have 
just told me, stuck through into your library: when you put it again on 
the shelf, will it not again stick through into that?  Must not then the 
two places, in which parts of the same volume can at the same moment 
exist, lie close together?  Or can one part of the book be in space, or 
somewhere, and the other out of space, or nowhere?” 
“I am sorry I cannot explain the thing to you,” he answered; “but there 
is no provision in you for understanding it […]  At the same time you 
are constantly experiencing things which you not only do not, but 
cannot understand […]  You accept them, not because you understand 
them, but because you must accept them: they are there, and have 
unavoidable relations with you!  The fact is, no man understands 
anything; when he knows he does not understand, that is his first 
tottering step—not toward understanding, but toward the capability of 
one day understanding […] Neither I nor any man can here help you to 
understand; but I may, perhaps, help you a little to believe!” (326-327) 
The mystery of the book is an outstanding and unresolved one.  Prickett serves as an 
example of how it is all too easy to dispose of the symbolic complexity of the gilded 
book.  In his mind “The symbolic significance is obvious: the work of art, in this case 
Lilith itself, reveals to us our own world in a new light” (181).  But the book does not 
function as the mirror does.  On the contrary, it contains the story of Lilith, indeed 
Death herself in this case, but it is not a reflection back on “our own world.”  Instead 
it is a proclamation, a word of power in the form of Lilith’s word of condemnation 
against herself.  When it is read out it both exposes and subdues her and her magic.  
Who knows what else it might contain or do?   99 
  To say that the two-halved volume is indeed Lilith is, arguably, true.  But it is 
not the truest thing that could be said of it.  For Lilith, the novel, does contain a word 
against Lilith herself and is, in the sense of its metaphorical and fantastic qualities, in 
two worlds.  But Lilith in this case is only a type of that book.  MacDonald surely 
does not think that his own volume will keep death at bay and condemn it, but there is 
one book which could and it is with this volume that Lilith significantly shares its 
nature as being “half in, half out.”  The archetypical volume which the gilded one of 
Mr. Raven’s is the Bible, which is, in the revelatory sense, half in this world and half 
in another.  The practical significance of this is that to make sense of the half that is in 
one’s own world or state, he must procure the other half which lies elsewhere.  So 
then, while it seems that there is a textual love triangle by which the reader is 
encouraged to interpret Lilith in terms of the gilded book and the gilded book in terms 
of Lilith and then the same relationships extending to the Bible.  It would not seem to 
be such a massive step to think, then, that Mr. Raven might speak for the author when 
he says “Neither I nor any other man can here help you to understand; but I may, 
perhaps, help you a little to believe!” 
  Thus, in Lilith one finds a repetition of the same sort of structure that was in 
place in Phantastes.  That is, a fantasy in which the vision not only replaces the 
“reality” in a temporary setting, but subverts it entirely.  It is not just once, after all, 
that Vane travels from his house into the other land but many times.  He does not 
dream himself there, for he goes in a mechanical fashion as his waking self.  This is 
MacDonald’s conceit for drawing his readers inexorably into the lessons he teaches 
his characters—his readers are always in this way invited to become characters.  In 
this he is not original, only in the sense of crafting such an experience through fiction.  
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lives—not literary ones, but biblical ones.  It was this relationship that played “a 
crucial factor in the influence of typology on Victorian literature and the arts” 
(Landow 50).  But, as Landow continues to explain, the crucial element in all of this 
was that “both the symbolising element and what it represents–type and antitype—are 
real” (51).  Thus one could become a ‘Christ’ because Christ actually existed and did 
all the things the Gospels say he did.  But at the end of the nineteenth century, when 
such an assertion was never more in doubt due to the advent of higher criticism, even 
biblical typology and its significance for religious readers was waning.  Thus, if 
MacDonald was to encourage a similar model of typological enactment on his 
readers, he had to make sure that the type was going to be seen as somehow “real.” 
The Bible, of course, had not been written off by all.  In addition to an 
everlasting remnant of scholars who refused to capitulate to every stipulation of 
higher criticism, there was still widespread acceptance of the Bible’s veracity 
(whatever that meant to those who accepted it) among the laity.  What MacDonald 
needed to do was to establish a function in his novels for people who were not 
accustomed to such belief, or who would only ever invest such literary belief towards 
texts within a particular canon.  What he needed, of course, was a goodly sized 
portion of the Coleridgean suspension of disbelief.  One must remember, however, 
that this phrase had not been born into any sort of standard hermeneutic practice at the 
time and indeed Coleridge himself admits that it is his task as the poet to inspire such 
a position.  Indeed, Tolkein contends that fantasy writing, or “Faerie” as he calls it, 
should have enough internal coherence and aesthetic beauty as to engender actual 
faith:   
Children are capable, of course, of literary belief, when the story-
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called ‘willing suspension of disbelief’.  But this does not seem to me a 
good description of what happens.  What really happens is that the 
story-maker proves a successful ‘sub-creator’.  He makes a Secondary 
World which your mind can enter.  Inside it, what he relates is ‘true’: it 
accords with the laws of that world.  You therefore believe it, while 
you are, as it were, inside.  The moment disbelief arises, the spell is 
broken, the magic, or rather art, has failed.  You are then out in the 
Primary World again, looking at the little abortive Secondary World 
from outside.  If you are obliged, by kindliness or circumstance, to 
stay, then disbelief must be suspended (or stifled), other wise listening 
and looking would become intolerable.  But the suspension of disbelief 
is a substitute for a genuine thing, a subterfuge we use when 
condescending to games or make-believe, or when trying (more or less 
willingly) to find what virtue we can in the work of an art that has for 
us failed.  (Tree 17) 
Yet Tolkien’s dictums come to very little in the end in the case of MacDonald’s 
writing.  For, in his time, all fiction was to the more puritanical of Evangelical society 
“the devil’s invention” and fantasy itself was drawn out for even more criticism by 
wider society as “unrealistic” and indulgent (Landow 18).  In this way, suspension of 
disbelief must become a hermeneutical prerequisite in order that interior coherence 
and aesthetic beauty can have the opportunity of engendering much more by way of 
belief.  MacDonald himself strives for both in his own work and reveals that these are 
methods of conveying something much greater, which is “Truth” itself. 
The mind of man is the product of live Law; it thinks by law, it dwells 
in the midst of law, it gathers from law its growth; with law, therefore, 
can it alone work to any result. Inharmonious, unconsorting ideas will 
come to a man, but if he try to use one of such, his work will grow 
dull, and he will drop it from mere lack of interest. Law is the soil in 
which alone beauty will grow; beauty is the only stuff in which Truth 
can be clothed; and you may, if you will, call Imagination the tailor 
that cuts her garments to fit her, and Fancy his journeyman that puts 
the pieces of them together, or perhaps at most embroiders their 
button-holes. Obeying law, the maker works like his creator; not 
obeying law, he is such a fool as heaps a pile of stones and calls it a 
church. (Orts 207) 
It is in respect to this idea of “Law” that MacDonald has, quite intentionally, the 
biggest of problems.  For it is one thing to create an imaginary world and say things   102 
about it as he does in The Princess and the Goblin (1872) and several other of his 
children’s fantasies.  However, just as the reader is shocked in the conclusion of 
Phantastes by the realisation that Anodos does not consider his time in Fairy Land to 
be a dream, ruse or vision or somehow separate metaphysically from ‘the real’ but 
actually fact and experience, he finds again in Lilith a continuing pattern in which the 
imagined world will not let the “real” one be.  
  Because of this, the relationship between the fantasy of the narrative and the 
pillars of “Law’ and “Truth” must necessarily be more complex and robust than the 
typical fantasy.  In Lilith, “the reader is the main protagonist, not through 
identification but simply through interaction with the fantastic itself” (Armitt 32).  
Thus, the reader joins Mr. Vane’s struggle against death, which is in fact a struggle to 
believe something which he cannot, rationally, be sure of about it.  Vane himself 
struggles against his actual experiences and acceptance of what Mr. Raven says.  He 
even must labour against the ethereal moon, which he finds haunting, but which Mr. 
Raven has asked to look over him while he wanders in dangerous ignorance. 
“That moon is affecting my brain,” I said as I resumed my journey.  
“What life can be here but the phantasmic—the stuff of which dreams 
are made?  I am indeed walking in a vain show!” 
Thus I strove to keep my heart above the waters of fear, nor knew that 
she whom I distrusted was indeed my defence from the realities I took 
for phantoms […]  (P&L 229) 
Eventually Mr. Vane becomes too involved with his actual experiences to ruminate on 
whether or not they are real.  He accepts them because they engage him and he must 
deal with them first or nothing else.  With him, the reader is pulled into the episodic 
nature of the narrative, forgetting for a moment the wider difficulties of the 
narrative’s relation to “reality” just as Mr. Vane forgets what he is there to do which   103 
is, mainly, to die.  Mr. Vane must learn, blow by torturing blow, that ignoring Mr. 
Raven’s instructions to die first and the “do” in the same way that the reader must 
capitulate to the novel first and then learn its lessons and experience its beauty. 
  What Mr. Vane experiences is a breakdown of his will on quasi religious 
terms (one chapter itself is entitled “I Repent”).  But, philosophically, what Mr. Vane 
encounters is even greater than this, for reason shies away entirely from death and 
what may or may not exist beyond it.  Instinct and experience would indicate that it is 
to be avoided at all costs, while Mr. Raven’s wisdom states the contrary; dying is that 
which must be done first.  For, in his basement-catacombs “None of those you see are 
in truth quite dead yet, and some have but just begun to come alive, long before they 
came to us; and when such are indeed dead, that instant they will wake and leave us” 
(P&L 216).  The reader has no easier task in coming to believe this contrarian 
statement than Mr. Vane.  In the end, for Vane (and even for Death-Lilith herself) it is 
the overwhelming futility and horror of the consequences of ignoring Mr. Raven’s 
advice in trying to “do” before he has “slept” that finally brings Vane to his deathbed.  
What it ever is that might make the reader actually come to “literary” or any other sort 
of belief in such a perplexing and paradoxical arrangement is a question to be 
addressed below in subsequent chapters.  But for now it is enough to look, finally, at 
how Mr. Vane actually experiences this death or sleeping, its relationship to biblical 
typology, its sheer beauty as an idea as well as its place in Victorian theological 
debate and its role as a catalyst for further fantasy works on the subject. 
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Dying to Get it Right: Death as Spiritual Progress in Lilith 
In Lilith, the structure of death itself is a cruel and mocking mirror to death as 
it is seen in the ‘real world.’  The Lady of Sorrow declares “Verily, thou shalt die, but 
not as thou thinkest.  Thou shalt die out of death into life” (P&L 378).  In this way, 
the death in Lilith takes on much of the same baptismal imagery employed in 
Phantastes.  Yet, it is clear that this is not only a spiritual death, but a physical one at 
the same moment which very much frightens Mr. Vane.  His death, then, is more like 
to that of the prototypical Passion crucifixion than the more purely liturgical baptism.  
It is here that MacDonald’s symbols become their most undiluted.  For Anodos is 
given a final task and therein a final temptation, he journeys to the house of death 
where he is given a meal of bread and wine to help him sleep, and then walks down to 
the basement to lie in death beside his parents and his lover, Lona.  He is told by Mr. 
Raven, who by this point is referred to simply as Adam, “Every creature must one 
night yield himself and lie down: he was made for liberty, and must not be left a 
slave!” (399).  Despite the typology’s tendency towards allegorisation, MacDonald’s 
form in which the protagonist journeys to death through temptation towards death and 
is comforted by dead friends and relatives before at last facing death alone is one 
which becomes standard in subsequent fantasy literature. 
  But MacDonald does not leave a simplified allegory to resolve his readers’ 
interpretive dilemma as they struggle along with his protagonist to believe.  For after 
Mr. Vane sleeps, he dreams that he wakes and dreams and wakes again.  This is the 
truly innovative aspect of MacDonald’s perspective on death in Lilith, Mr. Vane must   105 
continue to die until that death becomes a perfect death, but nothing in terms of 
improvement can be achieved without first dying.  In the midst of one of these cycles, 
Adam appears before him again and is queried thusly: 
“Alas!  when I but dream how am I to know it?  The dream best 
dreamed is likest to the waking truth!” 
“When you are quite dead, you will dream no false dream.  The soul 
that is true can generate nothing that is not true, neither can the false 
enter it.” 
But sir,” I faltered, “How am I to distinguish betwixt the true and false 
when both alike seem real? 
“Do you not understand? […] You cannot perfectly distinguish 
between the true and false while you are not quite dead; neither indeed 
will you when you are quite dead—that is, quite alive, for then the 
false will never present itself […]  
“Father,” I said, “forgive me, but how am I to know surely that this 
also is not a part of the lovely dream in which I am now walking with 
thyself?” 
“Thou doubtest because thou lovest the truth.  Some would willingly 
believe life but a phantasm, if only it might for ever afford them a 
world of pleasant dreams: thou art not of such!  Be content for a while 
not to know surely.” (P&L 403-404) 
Here MacDonald ‘muddies the waters’ by endeavouring to respond to the Cartesian 
question (as well as Descartes’ failure to answer it sufficiently and the subsequent 
fracture of theology from philosophy) in a way which is entirely more akin to Hume 
than what one would expect of a Victorian evangelical preacher.  Even more is the 
narrative’s empirical foundation thrown into doubt when all of the sudden, after at last 
reaching the Zion-like city, being received by angels and told “welcome home” and 
gazing even upon the River of Life and the throne of the Ancient of Days, Mr. Vane 
finds himself alone and again in his very mundane library with the cover of a book 
closing behind him—the door to the fantasy land shut at last.   106 
  Yet, like Anodos, Mr. Vane does not dispense with the experience altogether.  
Rather, he ultimately deconstructs his experience only to find hope and belief in that 
which he believes is true and one day will know to be true.  The emphasis here is not 
on the idea that the truth or reality is unknowable, but that man is unknowing.  Mr. 
Vane dialogues with himself on the matter: 
Can it be that that last waking also was in the dream? that I am still in 
the chamber of death, asleep and dreaming, not yet ripe enough to 
wake? Or can it be that I did not go to sleep outright and heartily, and 
so have come awake too soon?  If that waking was itself but a dream, 
surely it was a dream of a better waking yet to come
34, and I have not 
been the sport of a false vision!  Such a dream must have yet lovelier 
truth at the heart of its dreaming! 
In moments of doubt I cry, “Could God Himself create such lovely 
things as I dreamed?” 
“Whence then came thy dream?” answers Hope […]  “Whence came 
the fantasia? and whence the life that danced thereto?” […] 
Man dreams and desires; God broods and wills and quickens.  When a 
Man dreams his own dream, he is the sport of his dream; when 
Another gives it to him, that Other is able to fulfil it […]  But when I 
wake at last into that life which, as a mother her child, carries this life 
in its bosom, I shall know that I wake and shall doubt no more. 
I wait; asleep or awake, I wait. 
Novalis says, “Our life is no dream, but it should and will perhaps 
become one.” (P&L 419-420) 
What, then, is the great moral of MacDonald’s last and perhaps greatest effort in 
fantasy?  What has the protagonist learned and the reader with him?  Both have 
learned, hopefully, the supremely fragile nature of human knowledge and experience.  
                                                 
34 For this the reader might find the heart to forgive MacDonald for the tediousness of 
his symbolism in drawing straight from the, as it were, textbook of Christian 
eschatological imagery in his construction of Mr. Vane’s “last waking”.  For this 
would seem to indicate that MacDonald’s own view of such imagery is a rather dim 
one, always acknowledging first and foremost that it is but a dream, a chaotic vision 
and cannot be compared to the actual grandeur of that which is to come.  In this way, 
MacDonald escapes the bonds of the ugliest sort of creative fundamentalism.   107 
Just as Mr. Vane is unable to categorise his own present experience by the end of the 
novel, the reader is similarly haunted by an inability to use reason’s scalpel to draw a 
line between reality and fantasy in Lilith.  For, by the novel’s conclusion (if it might 
even be called that, for the last chapter is even titled “The Endless Ending”), the 
definition of these two has not simply been blurred but absolutely eradicated. 
  Yet it is clear, also, that MacDonald’s effort is not simply deconstructive.  
Rather, its goal is entirely constructive in that it seeks to clear away the rubble of 
‘knowing’ (ever an increasingly dilapidated ruin since Descartes, though signs 
seemed to point to the opposite) to make room for the bulwark of radical hope which 
is so infectious as to even breed the germs of belief and faith.  It is this overwhelming 
joy of hope from an old and dying man which both amazes and repulses critics like 
Prickett but also inspires and transform cynics as callous and wizened as C.S. Lewis 
describes himself to have been before this very joy planted its seed in him.  But what 
was the impact of MacDonald’s work?  How did it relate to the situations and 
concerns of his day?   
   
MacDonald in Context 
In order to answer these questions it is perhaps necessary to ask yet another 
question whose solution will be easy enough and which will provide an entry point 
for discussion of the efficacy of MacDonald’s fantasy experimentation.  The question 
to ask is this: why did MacDonald write so extensively and with such great focus on 
death?  MacDonald was actually only one of a wide range of Victorians preoccupied 
with the matter of death on both a social and theological level.  Geoffrey Rowell 
describes the situation:   108 
Of all the articles of accepted Christian orthodoxy that troubled the 
conscious of Victorian churchmen, none caused more anxiety than the 
everlasting punishment of the wicked.  The flames of hell illuminated 
vividly the tensions of an age in which men felt that old certainties 
were being eroded by new knowledge, and in which an optimistic faith 
in progress co-existed uneasily with forebodings of the consequences 
of an increasingly rapid social change.  A Bible whose Divine 
authority had been accepted rather than argued about was battered by 
the blasts of Germanic criticism and scientific theory, and the 
particular pattern of Christian orthodoxy which it had been assumed to 
uphold no longer carried full conviction […] the hell to which the 
wicked were consigned, far from being the declaration of God’s 
omnipotent righteousness and justice, became a stumbling block for 
Christian believers and a weapon of attack for secularists.  Yet the 
need for hell as a moral sanction […] meant that it could not simply be 
quietly discarded […]  (vii) 
Additional to and compounding the theological dilemma of Christian doctrines on 
death were the deplorable urban living conditions of the Victorian age which led to 
pestilence, decay and frequent childhood mortality.  For instance, the early nineteenth 
century recorded in Britain infant mortality rates between twenty and thirty percent 
(Millward and Bell 699).  The issue was so concerning that it drew attention from the 
most prominent members of society, not just in the form of evangelical social reforms 
but also in literature, especially fantasy literature.  Certainly Dickens’s classic of 
1843, A Christmas Carol, toiled against the rampant injustice of the poverty which 
was slaying so many children before they ever even reached adolescence.  In this 
fantasy, it is clear that the mechanism provides not just for the life of one Tiny Tim, 
but even more so for Mr. Ebenezer Scrooge. 
  Dickens’ classic theme continued to be developed with Charles Kingsley’s 
The Water Babies, finished in 1863, being perhaps the most notable beneficiary of the 
tradition.  Kingsley’s work concerns the life of a boy name Tom who, at the tale’s 
beginning, is under the cruel tutelage of a foul-mouthed drunkard of a chimney-
sweep.  Now, in The Water Babies one is told that “your soul makes your body, just   109 
as a snail makes his shell” and Mr. Grimes, as his name coyly implies, is a very dirty 
man both in and outwardly (60).  Indeed, his whole business was dirty, for not only 
was there no end to dirt and soot that the chimney-sweep must expose himself to and 
wallow in.  But the impression during that time in England was that to be a chimney-
sweep was to be a petty criminal by another name.  Indeed, the novel begins with 
Tom and Mr. Grimes receiving new work from the Duke of Wellington “for his old 
chimney-sweep was gone to prison, and the chimneys wanted sweeping” (5).  It is in 
his house, then, that Tom sees himself in a mirror and “for the first time in his life, 
found out that he was dirty; and burst into tears with shame and anger” (21).  Under 
Mr. Grimes’ insidious tutelage, Tom had become a very wicked boy—and now he 
knew it! 
  Eventually Tom ran away from the house and his cruel master to find a 
cottage in a sequestered valley in which resided a caring but severe old schoolmarm.  
She received him despite her qualms about having chimney-sweeps in her household, 
gave him milk to drink and laid him down to sleep.  But Tom was too hot and restless 
to sleep, he could not stop thinking of the babbling brook outside the cottage and how 
much he would like to dive in, take a drink and wash himself off.  He wandered in a 
half-sleep to the water’s edge murmuring “I must be clean, I must be clean” and got in 
(Kingsley 42).  This, then, is where Tom’s real adventure begins for he is transformed 
into a little river sprite, or ‘water baby’ as Kingsley dictated, and went on to pursue a 
journey of moral transformation.  Of course, when his lesson is finally learned to its 
fullest and he is at last made ‘clean’ Tom becomes ‘big’ again and goes on to be a 
man of science while never forgetting his lessons learned.     110 
  In Kingsley, death and death’s cold river are treated as just two more 
environments for curious exploration.  Tom is taken with fever and doesn’t know 
when he enters the river that he is actually entering into death, because it seems to be 
teeming with life.  This interpretation of death is moulded to the evolving self-
perception and indeed world view which emphasised a spirit of knowledge and 
learning.  The whole world seemed to be being stripped of its mystery and its 
churches along with it.  Kingsley places death directly within these terms of existence, 
challenging that death is in fact the last frontier of human exploration.  Yet, like any 
other frontier, it could only be explored by going there.  This is why he teasingly and 
coyly instructs that “this is a fairytale, and all fun and pretence; and that you are not to 
believe one word of it, even if it is true” (54).   
  Of course it is unlikely that Kingsley was quite so serious in his self-criticism, 
as is revealed by the irony of not believing something despite it being true.  Yet he 
interestingly couches his narrative in these terms to arouse the scientific spirit of 
exploration.  Of course, what Tom learns about is not his surroundings so much as 
himself.  This, then, is the sort of knowledge which, to change the world, changes a 
man. What is truly notable about Kingsley’s work is the pains it takes to view the evil 
of social injustice and childhood death while at the same time upholding the potential 
hope and mercy that the death itself might offer.  For it is in this death alone that Tom 
can find a better life, indeed life itself.  By picturing this death in terms of a baptism 
where afterwards one re-enters the same world he has just previously departed, 
Kingsley states that it is death which must instruct all men towards moral growth 
whether the death be real or liturgical.   111 
  The theological idea that Kingsley toys with here is a form of universalism.  It 
was certainly an idea which was gaining its spurs within the wider theological and 
ecclesial debate throughout the nineteenth century, but what is significant is that 
Kingsley imbeds his argument in narrative, not dialectic.  One finds the same in the 
fantasy works of George MacDonald and with an even greater similarity in his At the 
Back of the North Wind.  This work, like Kingsley’s classic, attempts to reconcile 
childhood mortality with the crushing weight of the standard Calvinist doctrines of 
original sin and the eternal punishment of the damned.  The hero of the tale is a young 
boy with the curious name of Diamond who, at first appearance seems to be a very 
good and well-behaved boy, indeed.  Of course, from the Reformed perspective with 
which MacDonald continually struggled, general goodness and sanctification are 
unequal with the latter being the requirement of salvation.  So, though it seems highly 
unlikely in terms of narrative possibility, Diamond, the good little boy, is in all kinds 
or spiritual and mortal peril from the narrative’s outset.  What is clear to the reader 
approaching the text having already read it once is fairly unpredictable to the first 
time reader of Diamond’s tale; that is, MacDonald has meant from the very beginning 
that Diamond should die.  Thus, his task was to show how, for Diamond, death would 
not be at all a bad thing. 
  To this end, Diamond experiences a number of encounters with an 
anthropomorphised, fairy-like figure of the North Wind who comes and blows on his 
head at night to summon him.  The North Wind carries Diamond along with her as 
she goes about her work, which is easily deduced as that of the harbinger of death, or 
Death herself, while all the time reforming Diamond through theological object 
lessons.  The first lesson, of course, is that she is not to be feared or reviled even if 
she appears to do things both fearful and reviling.  She instructs Diamond:   112 
If you see me with my face all black, don’t be frightened.  If you see 
me flapping wings like a bat’s, as big as the whole sky, don’t be 
frightened.  If you hear me raging ten times worse than Mrs. Bill, the 
blacksmith’s wife—even if you see me looking in at people’s windows 
like Mrs. Eve Dropper, the gardener’s wife—you must believe that I 
am doing my work. (Wind 14) 
This work, consequently, is always to be interpreted as both good and necessary for 
its objects.  Diamond observes her take the form of a raging wolf to scare off a nurse 
who was being abusive to an infant.  Diamond then enquires why he should see the 
North Wind in one form and others see her in another: 
“Why should you see things,” returned the North Wind, “that you 
would not understand or know what to do with?  Good people see good 
things; bad people, bad things.” 
“Then you are a bad thing?” 
“No.  For you see me, Diamond, dear,” said the girl, and she looked 
down at him, and Diamond saw the loving eyes of the great lady 
beaming from the depths of her falling hair. 
“I had to make myself look like a bad thing before she could see me.  
If I had put on any other shape than a wolf’s she would not have seen 
me, for that is what is growing to be her own shape inside of her.” 
(Wind 37) 
Within the context of a fairy tale, the North Wind’s philosophy makes good sense.  
Fairy tales are meant to have such strict distinctions between good people and bad and 
no one ever feels sorry when bad things inevitably happen to the bad characters.  Yet 
remember, for a moment, what MacDonald is addressing here.  He is talking about the 
ferocity of Death and its consequences which he casually dismisses by indicating that 
good people should have nothing to fear from death.  Yet it must be said that the pain 
of bereavement many times does not signify anything at all, it is just a sad 
consequence of existence and human interconnectedness.  Within the context of the 
fairy tale the principle works because it comes from the voice of the North Wind—
even if it does not seem to make sense the reader is conditioned to recognise that   113 
much of what the North Wind says does not make sense, but only because those she 
speaks to do not have the capacity to understand.  But would this tactic work from a 
pulpit?   
Compare this to poor Mr. Vane who experiences a veritable purgatory as he is 
forced to die time and time again just to make himself into a person who can appease 
divine righteousness.  He makes his decision against Mr. Raven’s advice on numerous 
occasions, but is somehow always led back to where he started.  As a narrative it is 
able to work if the reader is ready to assume that, as Mr. Raven says, it will all work 
out for good in the end and Mr. Vane will be immeasurably better for it.  Yet when 
this same sentiment appears in MacDonald outside of his fantasy, it is much more 
insidious: 
A multitude of teaching men have taught their fellows that Jesus came 
to bear our punishment and save us from hell.  They have represented a 
result as the object of his mission—the said result nowise to be desired 
by true man save as consequent on the gain of his object.  The mission 
of Jesus was from the same source and with the same object as the 
punishment of our sins.  He came to work along with our punishment.  
He came to side with it, and set us free from our sins […] For hell is 
God’s and not the devil’s.  Hell is on the side of God and man, to free 
the child of God from the corruption of death. (Sermons 8) 
MacDonald here expounds a deity as wicked as William Empson could ever have 
imagined in Milton.  For this God punishes his children and calls it grace.  He gives 
them free will only to torture them until they choose what he wants them to choose.  
This God is, in fact, arguably much worse than the God of eternal damnation.  This is 
not to say, of course, that MacDonald was himself a wicked person who delighted in 
other people’s misery, but simply to show why it was so necessary for him to turn to 
fantasy in order to reconcile his overwhelming compassion for humanity with his 
ultimate and immovable belief in divine justice.  What fantasy accomplishes in this   114 
case is to strip away the reasoning, the particulars, the argument of MacDonald’s 
theology to leave the two powerful themes which characterised his thought and belief: 
love and righteousness.  In his fantasies, set on his own terms, it is not his ability to 
theologise which is under inspection but the character and composition of his readers. 
This subtle sort of manipulation of criticism back towards the reader is just the 
sort of move that has been seen time after time in both Milton and MacDonald as they 
draw up their greatest schemes to the Enlightenment and its intellectual vices.  Here, 
by placing this dialogue in the mouth of his most divisive, controversial and crucial 
character, the North Wind, he attempts to shore up the suspension of disbelief 
concerning the nature of death, whose anthropomorphised form she is easily seen to 
be from quite an early stage in the novel.   
By showing the reader first her most beautiful form, MacDonald entices him 
not only towards that suspension but to the adoption of a willing, if temporary, 
affirmative belief.  Should the reader yet object to this characterisation comes 
MacDonald’s response that should his North Wind not strike the reader as he 
describes her—that is, good, maternal, impartial, etc.—this would reflect more on the 
reader’s character than on the nature of the North Wind (or death).  For if the North 
Wind appears as a wolf, it must be a truly beastly personage who forces her to appear 
in such a way.  Of course, the disciplined reader has more than enough defences 
against this sort of literary trick or snare, for he can just as easily reply to himself, the 
text or the author—whichever he imagines himself to actually be dialoguing with—
that it is also untrue and illogical to suppose that all appearance is due to the viewer 
and not the thing itself.     115 
Of course, once the reader reaches this point it could be fairly said that 
MacDonald has already won.  For when the educated, disciplined and reasonable 
reader finds himself locked in an attempt to overpower and scotch a fairy tale—
locked in a room hissing and fuming about a book with fanciful illustrations for every 
chapter—the illusion of logical superiority has already become exposed and its 
position deconstructed.  In a way, MacDonald’s move to frustrate and expose the 
obstinacy of his most critical readers is a rhetorical one, or rather the technique of a 
skilled and experienced dialectician.  For it certainly seems that the reader who would 
not grant the simple claim of a character already admitted as being quite supernatural 
that she appears according to the nature and needs of others is guilty of not being a 
good sport in the matter—that is, he has not played his part in establishing a minimum 
degree of the suspension of disbelief and he cannot claim that the text has not done its 
own part to support it and maintain it as good fiction should.  Instead he has from the 
onset adopted a combative posture towards the text which makes him look like a 
shallow and villainous bully and begs the question of why he started in on the text in 
the first place if not to perpetuate some irrational malice.  In this way, though 
MacDonald’s logic seems to be lesser or at least paradoxical in comparison to that of 
his imagined opponents, he still emerges victorious in as much as he appeals to a code 
which still holds just as much if not more sway over the human mind as logic.   
This code, or as it could even be deemed, impulse, is one of decency and 
empathy which sternly if not invariably presides over social relations.  Reading 
becomes such a “social relation” as soon as the reader starts, in one way or another, 
dialoguing with a text or author (real or imagined) if not even before then.  He 
becomes the politician who, in a debate, wins all the major points but in the process 
alienates himself from the public (as with the first televised debate between Nixon   116 
and Kennedy in 1960).  In the case of the reader, it is not some unseen audience 
which will judge him and shun his bad behaviour, but rather himself.  For in the 
instant which the reader recognises his rather heated and naughty attitude towards the 
text or its author, the reader’s response criticism becomes true self-criticism, putting 
him in just the right position to read and benefit from something like MacDonald’s 
work.  As for the reader who merely enjoys his malevolent games of deconstruction 
which is to some extent incapable of “fighting back” in such a violent hermeneutical 
engagement, it must be said that the ethical urge in At the Back of the North Wind, 
which is a kind of kenosis (as it is in many of MacDonald’s fictional writings), is 
entirely unavailable to such an individual to begin with.  
What this dialogue really betrays, even more so than MacDonald’s consistent 
and continuing attempts to draw his readers into a position of either belief or self-
criticism, is the way in which for him, a hermeneutical position was the beginning of 
all theological work.  The position is the one of Anodos, standing on the cliff, 
deciding to meet death half-way, the position of Mr. Vane as he finally lies down to 
do the “work” of dying, the position of being At the Back of the North Wind.  The 
nature of this position and its consequences for a fantastic theology will be explored 
in the chapter to come. 
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MacDonald’s Hermeneutics as Kenotic Liturgia 
The characteristic of MacDonald’s prose which in fact links him to Milton 
was not just its fantastic, imaginative nature but its ability to invoke a participatory 
reading, its sermonic nature and its tendency to deflect criticism from itself and back 
onto the reader.  This cooperative, creative and participative dynamic to the fiction of 
George MacDonald is no passing coincidence, but a reflection of his extensive, 
deliberative and developed view of hermeneutics.  The most informative piece on this 
subject was a short essay titled “The Fantastic Imagination” which first appeared in a 
collection of his essays known as A Dish of Orts.  The essay laid out both 
MacDonald’s thinking on what was necessary for a good fairytale as well as his 
theory for the interpretation of them and their truth value.  Much of his thinking falls 
directly in line with Romantic, specifically Coleridgean, thought on the matter.  For 
instance, he says: 
The natural world has its laws, and no man must interfere with them in 
the way of presentment any more than in the way of use; but they 
themselves suggest laws of other kinds, and man may, if he pleases, 
invent a little world of his own, with its own laws; for there is that in 
him which delights in calling up new forms—which is the nearest, 
perhaps, he can come to creation.  When such forms are new 
embodiments of old truths, we call them Imagination; when they are 
mere inventions, however lovely, I should call them the work of 
Fancy: in either case, Law has been diligently at work.  (Orts 206) 
The actual extent to which Coleridge influenced MacDonald is unknown, however it 
is not difficult to imagine how such a statement could be added in a later addendum to   119 
Biographia Literaria which covered the advent of fantasy novels for adults.  Here the 
Imagination is more than a creative faculty; it is a moral one. 
  MacDonald’s conception of “Law,” roughly equivalent to how one might 
expect a Romantic to view Nature, was central to his thinking about the value and 
beauty of Fantasy.  “Law,” he says, “is the soil in which alone beauty will grow; 
beauty is the only stuff in which Truth can be clothed; and you may, if you will, call 
Imagination the tailor that cuts her garments to fit her” (Orts 207).  In this way 
MacDonald synthesises the thinking of close friend John Ruskin to form a productive 
framework for his theory of aesthetics in this new and emergent literary genre.  In 
these things, aesthetics and literary theory, MacDonald was very much a man of his 
times.  Yet as he was so keen to do in many areas of his life, MacDonald would go 
even further in developing this theory than his fellows.  He, of course, very much 
needed to do so as he intended to tread virtually fresh literary sod.  Because his work 
would seek to do more than to preach at his readers, and rather to dialogue and 
interact with them, he needed to dialogue with his “reader” about this new dialogue in 
reading, that is, his hermeneutical theory.  To this end MacDonald employs a 
sceptical interlocutor with whom he will round out the essay. 
  Queries the interlocutor:  “You write as if a fairy tale were a thing of 
importance: must it have meaning?”  To which MacDonald responds: 
It cannot help having some meaning; if it have proportion and harmony 
it has vitality, and vitality is truth […] Everyone, however, who feels 
the story will read its meaning after his own nature and development: 
one man will read one meaning in it, another will read another. (Orts 
207) 
At the onset it seems that MacDonald favours a casual and slightly apathetic form of 
hermeneutical relativism foreign to the unrestrained passion of his novels.  Yet this is 
not the whole of his thought.  The interlocutor follows up on his question adding “If   120 
so, how am I to assure myself that I am not reading my own meaning into it, but yours 
out of it?”  The key to MacDonald’s hermeneutics is in the following response: 
Why should you be so assured?  It may be better that you should read 
your own meaning into it.  That may be a higher operation of your 
intellect than the mere reading of mine out of it: your meaning may be 
superior to mine. (Orts 208) 
MacDonald’s text, then, is not one starved of meaning but saturated with it.  The 
meaning flowing from it neither excludes nor denies its author’s intentions, but 
simply exceeds them.  For MacDonald, writing itself is a kenotic activity in which 
one gives up the right of possession of his own thoughts expressed in words and 
makes himself vulnerable to the reader.  He is happy to give his writing as a gift so 
that it may in fact inspire things in others greater than he himself could have 
envisioned.  To put it another way, he allows for the text itself to become its own 
“other world” beyond the scope of his control.  This, according to Bridget Nichols, 
puts him in league with the wider scheme of Romantic hermeneutics which “based its 
project of interpretation on the premise that the present reader was able to understand 
the original author of a text better than he was able to understand himself” (21). 
  When the interlocutor next exclaims that words are “meant and fitted to carry 
a precise meaning!” MacDonald is afforded the opportunity to expand his thought on 
the interplay of words, meaning and intentionality.  
It is very seldom indeed that they [words] carry the exact meaning of 
any user of them!  And if they can be so used as to convey definite 
meaning, it does not follow that they ought never to carry anything else 
[…] I will go further—The best thing you can do for your fellow, next 
to rousing his conscience, is—not to give him things to think about, 
but to wake things up that are in him; or say, to make him think for 
himself. (Orts 209) 
MacDonald’s supreme suspicion of the ability of words to function as intended is 
visionary for its time.  Yet to hold conterminously this suspicion and an ultimate   121 
optimism of words to accomplish even more than conveying meaning is rather 
unique.  The crux of the whole theory is again MacDonald’s focus on the reader as 
subject.  It is not the material which he puts down with pen on paper which most 
interests him, but how it might spring some tangential reaction in his reader. 
  Of course, the attitude and character of the reader is of supreme importance.  
MacDonald reverts perhaps to his deterministic Calvinist roots, echoing the voice of 
the North Wind when he states “If he [the reader] be not a true man, he will draw evil 
out of the best […] If he be a true man, he will imagine true things; what matter 
whether I meant them or not?” (Orts 210).  The statement simply reflects the fact that 
productive literary encounters occur when both the reader and the author choose to 
meet together by virtue of prioritising something beyond themselves.
35  This 
‘something beyond’ is the literary encounter itself, found in, or through, or at the text.  
This is a hermeneutical environment which emphasises the ultimate importance of the 
act or process of reading over and above even the reader himself.  That is, the author 
privileges the reader with the text and the reader privileges the text (and its author by 
extension) by recognising rather than exploiting its vulnerability.  Only when all 
parties renounce ownership or control over the text is the text free to be as itself: 
What the reader, like every true monastic (as hagiography insists), 
must learn is to cease to be at all—to become entirely imaginary, 
utterly decentered, and only then can he or she become a “true” reader.  
In the act of reading, we must also learn an absolute kenosis, which is 
alone the guarantee of true incarnation, or enfleshment, and then, in the 
imagination, consumers and consumed, we can be free to be 
interpreters of the hidden text.  Of course, in the actual text, and 
necessarily, the author will continue to test and defy us, realizing our 
unwillingness to let go and our inability to stop asking the wrong 
questions.  Texts remain dangerously seductive to the mind. (Jasper, 
Body 58-59) 
                                                 
35 This is something like Gadamer’s hermeneutics of friendship.  “For Gadamer, 
hermeneutics means a way to hear and welcome the coming of the other, both in 
person and living dialogue, and in the great texts and works of art in our tradition” 
(Caputo 42).   122 
This dynamic is illustrated by the language which MacDonald uses for both the untrue 
man and the true man.  The untrue man is said to “draw” out evil, that is take for 
himself, while the true man will “imagine” or create true things.  Thus in 
MacDonald’s hermeneutical system the evil, untrue one is exemplified by selfish 
commandeering while the true man is characterised by a selfless contribution to the 
work itself.   
If, at this point, there would seem to be an uncharacteristically religious 
dimension to what is normally a very secular conversation (more unreligious than un-
theological, certainly), that of hermeneutics, then appearances support the thesis of 
this chapter: liturgy, in both its corporate and formal aspects, is indispensible to the 
reading of Fantasy literature after MacDonald.  Yet, the fantastic is also crucial in 
understanding what is happening in liturgy as well.  If Fantasy functions as a liturgy, 
it is also true that liturgy functions as corporate fantasy.  Recognising this dual reality 
is key to developing a richer and more productive hermeneutical approach to each of 
these but even more instrumental in instructing the reader/worshiper on the art and 
discipline of living between two “worlds,”  which are temporal and eternal, 
respectively.  If the last chapter dwelt with mostly theoretical or doctrinal aspects of 
theology as mediated by the fantastic, this chapter will focus on a practical aspect of 
theology.  
 
The Death-Cycle 
Liturgy does not exist in the particular but in the corporate.  It is, literally, “the 
work of the people.”  For this reason it would be improper and unfounded to speak 
simply of MacDonald’s work, as singular texts, in terms of a liturgical remembrance 
and observation.  In order for it to be truly liturgical it must have a community to   123 
support it to these ends.  The community is constituted in the primary sense between 
the author and the body of his readers.  But it extends also to the communities 
surrounding other Fantasy texts which likewise remember the Passion through the 
same formal engagement.  The focus in this respect is not on Christ figures in a 
particular sub-genre, but rather on characters who, by their deaths, remember and 
perform the Passion type which dominates Fantasy literature after George 
MacDonald.  The unmistakable elements of this form are as follows: 
1.  The hero is made aware of the need for him to die. 
2.  The hero undertakes a journey to death, accompanied by a guild or 
company of friends (the community can be either dead or living). 
3.  The guild/company gives help to the hero along the way which 
enables him to complete his journey. 
4.  At a crucial point, the hero must leave the guild/company behind 
and face death alone. 
5.  The hero gives his life (usually in an attempt to save others). 
6.  The hero return from death, victorious. 
Although this form has been stamped across the entire genre, the sad constraints of 
necessity and practicality insist this study only undertakes a few notable examples.  
With this in mind it is pertinent, at least, to choose from among them not only those 
well known and iconic but well situated within the narrative of ideas that this thesis 
has been laying out.  The subjects will be the work of the three most well known and 
widely read fantasists of the twentieth century (and likely of all time), J.R.R. Tolkien, 
C.S. Lewis and J.K. Rowling.  Among these it is appropriate to begin with Lewis 
who, of them all, most consciously drew his inspiration and his project from George 
MacDonald.     124 
 
 
Lewis and Eleusis 
Lewis’s adoration (in that word’s most ecclesial sense) of MacDonald has 
been so widely expounded that it hardly needs further explanation here, but it does 
need to be noted if only to cement the transmission of MacDonald’s types to Lewis’s 
work.  Of course it was the work of MacDonald which Lewis said in his spiritual 
biography Surprised by Joy (1955) which “baptised” his imagination.
36  MacDonald 
even shows up in Lewis’s death-Fantasy The Great Divorce (1945)—which is fairly 
and predominantly read as autobiographical—as the protagonist’s spiritual guide out 
of purgatory onto the threshold of heaven.  Within his writing the spirit of MacDonald 
clearly asserts itself in themes of death, joy, reality and truth all throughout the canon 
of Lewis’s fantastical works. 
  Of course the most obvious example that offers itself is the story of the death 
and subsequent resurrection of Aslan in The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe 
(1950).  Yet this is the very example which must be done away with most quickly in 
order to retain the heart of the matter.  For while it displays all of the characteristics of 
MacDonald’s Fantasy death-cycle, it does so not as a remembrance or celebration of 
the original Christological form, but as a recreation of it.  It is because Aslan 
represents not a type of Christ but an attempt at translating Christ himself into 
“another world” that makes his character most problematic.  Instead  of maintaining 
the fluidity, multiplicity and contingency that characterised true the fantasy of Milton 
and MacDonald, Lewis succumbs to the temptation of the totalising allegory. It is at 
the conclusion of The Voyage of the Dawn Treader (1952) where the transcendence of 
                                                 
36 For an explanation of this relationship, see the introduction to Kerry Dearborn’s 
Baptized Imagination.   125 
Aslan’s character is made explicit.  Of his own world, our world, Edmund queries 
Aslan, “Are you there too?” to which the lion responds “I am.  But there I have 
another name.  You must learn to know me by that name” (Lewis, Narnia 541).  In 
this one must be reminded that while the trope may appear overworked and kitsch to 
an adult, the allegory is fresh and full of wonder to children when first learning the 
mechanism of symbolism.  It is for these minds which Lewis undoubtedly wrote his 
Narnia tales and for those who had lost the wonder of myth altogether. 
Indeed, there have been untold amounts of sharp criticism levelled at Aslan, 
including a quip that the character was “full of dark, neofascist implications” which 
might be a small amount overstated for a creature who likes being cuddled and who 
sometimes causes flowers to spring up beneath his very feet (Jasper, Body 44).  In 
truth the character should probably not be blamed for being stretched as a metaphor 
further than was ever tenable so that he could be so easily read in nefarious ways.  
Some heed should be given to David Brown’s statement that “If words contribute to 
religious beliefs most effectively when they are nearest the visual, that is, in metaphor 
and analogies, then inevitably their impact will be distorted unless the rules 
appropriate to such forms of language are properly appreciated” (132).  Therefore, 
Aslan is still just a metaphor which clings to the imagery of other, more particular, 
biblical metaphors and should be read in light of this reality—lest his character should 
simply burst under the weight of expectation placed on him by virtue of his 
representation of the irreducible Word.  If Lewis has failed here he has done no more 
or less than any other theologian or artist who takes on the task of speaking about the 
divine.  He has inscribed, but not circumscribed.
37 
                                                 
37 This phrase comes from the tradition of iconography, specifically St. Nicephorus, 
linked to metaphor in Brown as cited earlier (Mondzain 216; Jasper, Body 22).   126 
So then, without indicating that Aslan is irredeemable/inexcusable or that The 
Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe should somehow be done away with, it will be 
better to consider other examples of Lewis’s embodiment of the death-cycle which 
are not so entrenched in problematic symbols and controversy.  Instead, it will be 
fruitful to look to the most widely acclaimed of Lewis’s literature for adults, the epic 
retelling of the Eros and Psyche myth called Till We Have Faces (1956).   Much of 
the effort to revive the old tale centred on Lewis’s belief in the centrality of and 
commonality of all human myth.
38  Therefore he undertakes a redemptive project on 
behalf of not only the Eros and Psyche myth, but of all myths. 
One of the central figures in the re-telling is Ungit, the ancient, primordial 
goddess of the Kingdom of Glome who is at once all-mother and all-consumer as well 
as the lover of the God of the Mountain (who takes Eros’s place in this retelling).  The 
character, if she can be called that for indeed in the tale she appears as much as myth 
itself as a figure in a myth, is a vastly complex one and the interaction of the 
protagonist, Orual (or Maia as she is called in Greek by those close to her), is 
similarly complex.  For most of her life Orual resents Ungit and her backward priest.  
She, being herself admittedly hideously formed and a stranger to intimacy, hated even 
more the deep carnality of the fertility rituals of the cult and the “temple girls” (who 
are undoubtedly temple prostitutes, although Lewis might have been embarrassed to 
say as much).  From a young age she is taught by her Greek slave tutor, called the 
Fox, to deconstruct Ungit as “lies of poets” (Faces 8). 
                                                 
38 Incidentally, this belief in the universality and fluidity of all human myth is why 
Lewis was not particularly worried by the obviousness of his metaphor in Aslan—the 
whole point was to show how a type or an image could bleed over into another world.  
What makes it problematic is that while it is an interesting and productive theory of 
myth, in this case it works out poorly as literature.   127 
Yet, immediately before Orual (in her middle and later years “Queen of 
Glome”) undertakes the death-journey which will be the object of this investigation, 
she attends the annual festival at which the high priest of Ungit must be “born” from 
her temple.  She describes again the chaotic, tense, sweaty ritual that she has 
remarked on so many times before and which even the reader by this point knows all 
too well.  What strikes her at this last viewing is the pure “joy of the people” inspired 
by this rite (273).  What troubles the wise, hardened queen at the end of all of these 
years of turning a stone-face to the House of Ungit, with all of the venom of deep 
personal hurt and traumatic experience on the honed steel of Fox’s philosophy, is that 
she realises that Ungit bears a reality insofar as she works for those who believe her.  
Orual recounts observing and then questioning a peasant woman who, during the 
festival, came before the vast, shapeless, blood and smoke caked stone that was the 
image of Ungit and fell on her knees weeping in its presence.  Moments later the 
woman got up, her crying soothed, and was leaving the temple when the Queen spoke 
to her: 
  “Has Ungit comforted you, child?” I asked. 
“Oh yes, Queen,” said the woman, her face almost brightening, “Oh 
yes.  Ungit has given me great comfort.  There’s no goddess like 
Ungit.” (272) 
This is the catalyst of destabilisation which makes the journey to come possible.  
Orual returns to the temple and “[sinks] into deep thought” (273).  While she is in this 
state her father, the long dead spectre of fear and repression in her life, appears before 
her and bid her to follow him.  Strangely, there is no philosophy in her at that moment 
to protest that ghosts are such things as “lies of poets,” and she complies, every bit as 
fearful as she had been in her terrible life as an abused teenager.  “How could I ever 
have thought I should escape from the King?” she laments.  He instructs her to aid 
him in digging a hole in the throne room and, after the removal of several flagstones,   128 
there appears a deep hole which the King bids her fling herself into.  There was no 
resisting, and the King pulled Orual down into the abyss with him.  They land in a 
cavern and repeat the digging ritual several times, each time removing Orual further 
and further from her grasp on reality.  Her father taunts her, “There’s no Fox to help 
you here,” for he had always interceded before the King on her behalf and the King 
both resented and coveted his command of logos, “we’re far below any dens that 
foxes can dig,” he says (275).   
When at last the final dregs of her will to resist the impossible thing which 
was happening to her, when its grotesqueness became at last mundane, then the King 
assaulted her, over and again, with this question: “Who is Ungit?”  At first she would 
not respond, but neither would the King relent.  Again came the question, “Who is 
Ungit?” and at last her broken soul wailed out in the cavernous abyss “I am Ungit” 
(276).  At this point Orual finds herself back in her bedchamber.  So full of despair 
was she at this revelation of unanimity with that very thing which she hated so 
supremely, the very essence of earth and flesh, that she despised her life and made to 
run herself through with her old sword, but was by this time so racked with the frailty 
of her later years that she was unable even to hold it.  The next day she resolves to 
destroy herself again and makes her way to the river to drown herself from which she 
hears a mighty voice cry out from across the river: “Do not do it.” 
Instantly—I had been freezing cold till now—a wave of fire passed 
over me, even down to my numb feet.  It was the voice of a god […]  It 
may well be that by trickery of priests men have sometimes taken a 
mortal’s voice for a god’s.  But it will not work the other way.  No one 
who hears a god’s voice takes it for a mortal’s. 
“Lord, who are you?
39” said I. 
                                                 
39 A true “road to Damascus” experience grips Orual here, the language being used to 
signify the enormity of this revelation and its significance to the conclusion of Orual’s 
tale.  Perspectives, it foreshadows, will be changed utterly and history, indeed the 
humanity of the Queen herself will be “baptised”.   129 
“Do not do it,” said the god.  “You cannot escape Ungit by 
going to the deadlands, for she is there also.  Die before you die.  
There is no chance after.” 
“Lord, I am Ungit.” 
But there was no answer. (279) 
 
The impetus given to Orual remembers and celebrates
40 the one given to Mr. Vane by 
Mr. Raven, that he must sleep before he can work, die before he can live. 
  The hinted sacramentality of Orual’s remark “Then the gods left me for some 
days to chew the strange bread they had given me” is no mistake.  For before Orual’s 
tale is complete (te/loj) she will face utter silence in the face of the Total Presence of 
the Eucharistic moment in which the only speech which remains is that of the 
declarative Word.  Whether or not this somewhat numinous culmination moves one’s 
imagination to the sacral feast or not is obviously a vastly subjective matter, but not 
so for one who engages the text in such a manner as described by Jasper’s “third way” 
approach to reading (in opposition to literalist totalisation and depreciative 
demythologisation): “But there is another way of reading […] that is, to dive into the 
stories and the text, to embrace them and instantiate them in yourself; that is […] to 
‘read religiously’ ” (Body 144).  In this manner the reader is overwhelmed by the 
sacramentality of the entire myth, from the yearly birthing in the House of Ungit to 
the blood sacrifices that stained her face to the giving of Psyche to the 
Shadowbrute/God of the Mountain to be at once devoured and courted.  Were this not 
enough to cause the mind to think in terms of the liturgical, one is pointed even more 
explicitly in that direction: 
I knew that were certain initiations, far away at Eleusis in the 
Greeklands, where by a man was said to die and live again before the 
soul left the body.  But how could I go there?  Then I remembered that 
conversation which his friends had with Socrates before he drank the 
                                                 
40 “Remember” of course in its sense of a0namnh/sij and “celebrate” in its Latin sense 
of celebrare.   130 
hemlock, and how he said true wisdom was the skill and practice of 
death.  (281) 
While, of course, the Eleusian mysteries remain by and large mysterious, it is 
not in fact difficult to suppose why they are included here and undoubtedly conflated 
with Christian baptism.  The idea that Eleusian initiation constituted a “death before 
dying” comes down from antiquity only from a fragmental quotation of Plutarch in 
Stobaeus: 
Thus death and initiation closely correspond; even the words (teleutan 
and teleisthai) correspond, and so do the things. At first there are 
wanderings, and toilsome running about in circles and journeys 
through the dark over uncertain roads and culs de sac; then, just before 
the end, there are all kinds of terrors, with shivering, trembling, 
sweating, and utter amazement. After this, a strange and wonderful 
light meets the wanderer; he is admitted into clean and verdant 
meadows, where he discerns gentle voices, and choric dances, and the 
majesty of holy sounds and sacred visions. Here the now fully initiated 
is free, and walks at liberty like a crowned and dedicated victim, 
joining in the revelry; he is the companion of pure and holy men, and 
looks down upon the uninitiated and unpurified crowd here below in 
the mud and fog, trampling itself down and crowded together, though 
of death remaining still sunk in its evils, unable to believe in the 
blessings that lie beyond.  (qtd. in Grant 148) 
 
From what is known or easily deduced of the Eleusian cult, it was deeply steeped in 
the imagery of death and new life that typified the myth of Demeter and Persephone 
in their relationship to Hades—and indeed, it is of course Demeter and Persephone to 
which the Eleusian cult was dedicated.  The religion of Demeter and Persephone was, 
like Ungit, very carnal, very fleshly and still ultimately sacramental (and thus also 
musth/rion).   
Cicero remarks at the higher purpose of the rites, “as the rites are called 
‘initiations,’ so in very truth we have learned from them the beginnings of life, and 
have gained the power not only to live happily, but also to die with a better hope” (De 
legibus 2.14, 36).  The emphasis, which Plutarch wrongly interprets as a hyper-
Platonism, is actually the exact opposite.  It is the immanence of divinely renewed life   131 
as it is posed by the Demeter and Persephone legend where, because she ate the 
pomegranate seeds of Hades, Persephone must forsake the earth every year and live in 
death one month for every one of the six seeds she ate.  Yet while this “fatal flaw” 
annually draws her down towards Death, it is not the final word: every year the 
reunion of Demeter and Persephone was celebrated with the Eleusian mysteries.  In 
conjunction with this, Hippolytus states that the greatest musth/rion of the Eleusian 
Cult was actually the presentation in silence of a reaped ear of corn (5.8.39-40).  The 
mystery, ostensibly, is the cycle of the seed in its death and regeneration.   
The ancient Mediterranean world used underground silos to store corn after 
the harvest.  In fact, there is even an inscription bearing an order for one such silo to 
be built at Eleusis to hold the corn offerings brought to Demeter there (Nilsson 58).  
Interestingly, there is an annual festival in Sicily which celebrates the harvest and is 
known as the Descent of Kore
41 (Persephone) where the harvest is taken underground 
for storage. In the planting season the corn is brought back up in what is called, quite 
significantly for this study, a&)nodoj.  Whether George MacDonald named his 
character in the sense of “wayless one” or “the ascending one” is ultimately 
indeterminable.  Yet it is entirely possible that it could have been intended in both 
ways, each at different moments in the narrative.  What is certain, however, is that 
such a detail would not have slipped past the notice of the ever attentive and the 
Classically well-versed Lewis.  But here one strikes to the heart of the character of 
Hades as he appears in ancient myth.  He is, at once, the god of death and the 
underworld to whom the dead are committed and also Plou/twn, the wealth giver, 
who releases Persephone (and her corn) to the surface to provide for life again.   
                                                 
41 “Katagoge Kores”   132 
In their originality, the Eleusian mysteries probably connoted what Nilsson 
calls “the immortality of generations,” or the idea that life continues on always 
through one’s own seed (spe/rmoj).  Yet this was not consolation enough for later 
generations who sought immortality for themselves, and indeed the cult began to 
interpret itself this way. In these days the purpose of the mysteries was nothing less 
than "to elevate man above the human sphere into the divine and to assure his 
redemption by making him a god and so conferring immortality upon him" (68, 52).  
Indeed, the later Athenians planted corn on the graves of the dead and called them 
dhmhtrei/oi (65).  Cosmoupolos notes in his recent study of the cult that the fact that 
Tertullian names the mystery as a phallus is not in fact problematic and refutes the 
arguments that Hippolytus confused the Eleusian cult with the Phrygian cult (36-37).  
It is not difficult to imagine that the former could be used as (a symbol of) the latter—
an ear of corn could be a phallus.  The seeming digression in tone here actually 
returns us to the primary subject at hand, which is Ungit in all of her seething, vulgar, 
earthy and lewd splendour. 
By referencing the Eleusian cult initiations, not only is Lewis making a wider 
appeal to a Christian archetype of baptism, but he is actually introducing the liturgy of 
his subjects.  In this moment, Orual reinterprets her role within the myth and realises 
she is not one of Psyche’s jealous sisters, for they meet their demise immediately after 
their treachery soils the marriage bed of their sister and her divine lover.  Yet, even 
after this event, Orual must live on plagued by her actions and their consequences.  In 
Lewis’s tale the jealousy Psyche’s sister has is born out of a very shallow and twisted 
form of loving that wishes to possess.  When the introduction of the God of the 
Mountain as Psyche’s devourer/lover challenges this vision of the love Orual has for 
Psyche, it begins to deconstruct both itself and her.  Orual reminisced later, “A love   133 
like that can grow to be nine-tenths hatred and still call itself love” (266).  So she 
grows from the jealous sister into the spiteful Aphrodite, who is also Ungit.
42  It is this 
realisation that ruins her, she has reinserted herself into the myth and its liturgy as a 
villain rather than a tragic victim.  For it is Aphrodite who, in her wrath, sends Psyche 
to Death in order to make her (Aphrodite) beautiful again.  Orual is Ungit, by her own 
admission, and yet it is Ungit who is the very centre of her complaint which she is 
forced to read, horrified at her own voice, before the gods. 
The response to Orual’s utterance is a pure, unrelenting silence.  Then the 
judge at last speaks and says “Are you answered?”  Orual’s pathetic and yet perfect 
reply is simply, “Yes.”  In her memoir at this point she laments of the total negation 
of language she experienced before the divine host: 
Lightly men talk of saying what they mean.  Often when he was 
teaching me to write in Greek the Fox would say, “Child, to say the 
very thing you really mean, the whole of it, nothing more or less or 
other than what you really mean; that’s the whole art and joy of 
words.”  A glib saying.  When the time comes to you at which you will 
be forced at last to utter the speech which has lain at the center of your 
soul for years, which you have, all that time, idiot-like, been saying 
over and over, you’ll not talk about the joy of words.  I saw well why 
the gods do not speak to us openly, nor let us answer.  Till that word 
can be dug out of us, why should they hear the babble that we think we 
mean?  How can they meet us face to face till we have faces? (294) 
It was only after the removal of everything she thought that she was and of everything 
she thought the gods were that Orual was able to both see herself for who she really 
was and to speak before the gods, no matter how truly vile her countenance and 
poisoned or foolish her words.  The scene is strikingly reminiscent of Marion’s 
statement “And hence the Word, the Said, finally says nothing; he lets people speak, 
he lets people talk, ‘Jesus gave him no answer’ (John 19:19 = Luke 23:9).  And so he 
                                                 
42 Since the Fox reformed Glome’s temple, a Greek image of Aphrodite stood next to 
Ungit as an alternative it more primal alternative, but wasn’t favored by the 
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does by letting be said, and so he says by letting be done” (140).  Similarly, it is only 
at this moment of negation that Orual is prepared to witness/participate in the sacred 
liturgy which is Psyche’s journey to Death and back again.  It is in the antechamber of 
the divine courtroom in which she is to be judged that Orual witnesses the living 
mural of Psyche and Orual, living as each other, journeying ever closer, as one, to 
Death and to their judgment. 
  Orual remarks and wonders at the living paradox of the two of them, separate 
and yet somehow sharing the same journey, the same life, the same being.  “Is it 
possible?” she asks the Fox, the second of her ghostly guides after her father.  “That 
was one of the true things I used to say to you.  Don’t you remember?  We’re all 
limbs of one Whole.  Hence, of each other.  Men, and gods, flow in and out and 
mingle” he replied (300-301).  The last chapter in the liturgy sees Psyche to the 
Deadlands (even as Orual has already herself gone) to gather the remedy that will 
make Ungit and all things beautiful again.  Then, just as Psyche has completed the 
final task, the pageant being played out before Orual becomes actual and Psyche 
returns to Orual and presents her with the casket to make her beautiful.  Yet their 
reunion is cut short by the God of the Mountain, who is also Eros and so much more 
at this point in the text that it almost bursts with the volume of meaning, referentiality 
and sacrality.  “I was being unmade,” Orual remembers.  “I was no one” (307).  She 
stood hand in hand with Psyche and happened, just before the God entered, to catch 
their reflection in a pool.  There were two Psyches.   No sooner had she seen this than 
the God appeared and declared the otherwise ineffable, “You also are Psyche,” and 
the vision ended and Orual was back in her chamber (308).  It would seem that 
Orual’s death was in fact the figurative and fantastic liturgical “death before dying” 
after all.     135 
  The necessity of this process for Orual is twofold: firstly it provided her with 
the revelation that she existed as part of a beautiful Whole and secondly, by virtue of 
that truth, changed, transformed and even redeemed her very being.  With this 
transformation accomplished, Orual was at last able to die in fact which is exactly 
what she did several days after her vision while compiling her memoir. 
  Lewis’s myth presents its reader with celebration in total of the liturgical 
death-cycle of MacDonald.  He takes the reader into the heart of not the Eleusian, but 
the Christian musth/rion.  There is silence there also, as there was silence in the 
Eleusian rite, but not the revelation of an object as mystery, although the carnal 
sacrality of Orual’s body is ever central as a being-towards-death, but a declarative 
Word: “You also are Psyche.”  In this mystery the initiate is unmade and remade and 
also united with the redemptive whole just as in the work of Paul: “Now you are the 
body of Christ, and each one of you is a part of it” (1 Co. 12:27).  That this 
declaration is one rightly and necessarily embedded in myth and, indeed, fantasy is a 
revelation Lewis derived from reading MacDonald and talking (generally about this 
experience) with Tolkien (Duriez 57).  It was a changing experience because it was, 
in fact, a liturgical experience and this is what Lewis and MacDonald both intended to 
accomplish in their fantasy. 
  It is fitting, then, to turn consequently to that great friend of Lewis’s, J.R.R. 
Tolkien.  The turn is not in the same sort of doting, adolescent infatuation that has 
been loaded onto the pair by generations, now, of hero-seeking religious enthusiasts 
and devotees to Fantasy literature alike.  No, it is instead because of their unique 
position as both well respected mythographic scholars and theological aspirants who 
inherit a sort of modified Romantic myth-structure through the irreplaceable George 
MacDonald.  So then, it is not the fact that they were friends for which they are paired   136 
here, as if in some daytime television drama, but because of the commonalities that 
made them friends in the first place.  This, then—although it has an obvious human or 
relational element to it—is primarily a literary conjunction. 
   
Tolkien and the Greatest of Fairy Stories 
  Fantasy, and all things Faërie, were things of no little importance for 
Tolkien.
43   He famously interpreted the act of Fantasy to be nothing less than “sub-
creation” and it is this particular slant on his fantasy writing that must direct the scope 
of attention towards it.  Because Tolkien wrote as sub-creator, he felt no need to re-
create subjects already attended to by God.  This is perhaps the seed of his deepest 
dislike of anything approaching allegory, though many have fruitlessly attempted to 
read him in these terms.  This is perhaps what sets Tolkien apart from Lewis (and 
even MacDonald) more than anything else: rules.   
  Tolkien thought that beauty was derived from order and that the joy of Faërie 
was to create entire new worlds with entire new orders.  By his exacting standards the 
suspension of disbelief was “a substitute for the genuine thing, a subterfuge we use 
when condescending” and that his adult readers, “if they really liked it, for itself, they 
would not have to suspend disbelief:  they would believe—in this sense” (Tree 36-
37).  Now, whether or not this is true, whether or not it could possibly work this way, 
this is the thought which governed Tolkien’s creative process.  So while it would be 
impossible for Tolkien to insert a liturgy—Christian, Greek or otherwise—or any 
other such worldly thing like Father Christmas, for which he so unremorsefully 
attacked Lewis, he would enthusiastically compose his tales based on what he deemed 
the moral or spiritual types and orders of the “Primary World” (Duriez 131).  
                                                 
43 Essentially the art of making fairy stories in Tolkien.  “But in such ‘fantasy’, as it is 
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Furthermore, while certainly not the preacher that either Lewis or MacDonald tend to 
be in their texts, he was not adverse to writing with a purpose or a function.  “The 
magic of Faërie,” he writes, “is not an end in itself, its virtue is in its operations: 
among these are the satisfaction of certain primordial human desires” (Tree 13). 
  Indeed, this is the function of Fantasy which has scared so many literary 
Puritans across the years—that it could range anywhere from the simply vapid to the 
absolutely carnal and perverse.  Indeed, this was a problem which Tolkien was aware 
of:  “Fantasy thus, too often, remains undeveloped; it is and has been used frivolously, 
or even half-seriously, or merely for decoration: it remains merely ‘fanciful’ ” (Tree 
49).  Yet at the same time, when Tolkien states that Fantasy can satisfy “primordial 
human desires” he refers to those urges that run so much deeper than whatever 
adolescent desires towards indulgence may exist more recognisably at the surface.  
These range anywhere from desire to, in turn, create like one’s Creator,
44 to wonder, 
to experience true joy and to, at last, escape.  Tolkien writes, “And lastly there is the 
oldest and deepest desire, the Great Escape: the Escape from Death.  Fairy-stories 
provide many examples and modes of this—which might be called the genuine 
escapist, or (I would say) fugitive spirit” (68).  It is at this point which Tolkien notes 
his reading (and no doubt inspiration) of George MacDonald
45 and in specific his 
treatment of death noting that it was not an escape or constant running from death 
which allowed it to be overcome, but only proper submission to it. 
  For Tolkien, the highest form of fairy-story was the one which best delivered 
the happy ending, or, as he deemed it, a eucatastrophe: 
                                                 
44 “Fantasy remains a human right:  we make in our measure and in our derivative 
mode, because we are made:  and not only made, but made in the image and likeness 
of a Maker” (Tree 56).  
45 “Death is the theme which most inspired George MacDonald” (Tree 68).   138 
The eucatastrophic tale is the true form of fairy-tale, and its highest 
function.  The consolation of fairy-stories, the joy of the good 
catastrophe, the sudden joyous ‘turn’ (for there is no true end to any 
fairy-tale):  this joy, which is one of the things fairy-stories can 
produce supremely well, is not essentially ‘escapist’, nor ‘fugitive’.  In 
its fairy-tale—or the otherworld—setting, it is a sudden and 
miraculous grace: never to be counted on to recur.  (Tree 69) 
This is where Tolkien most submits to the true nature of fantasy—that which affirms 
the impossible—for in order for a eucatastrophe to be the “sudden, miraculous grace” 
he describes it as, it must tear at the fabric of any reality with which the human can 
identify which says that there is nothing beyond, no solace after death, no hope of 
redeemed sorrows, nothing.  This is indeed quite the “sudden turn” in the man who 
was so obsessed with creating reasonable, believable worlds full of the “inner 
consistency of reality” which, for him, made good art from fantasy.   
  Yet what this affirmation truly reflects is a belief that ran deeper in Tolkien 
than any of his literary or aesthetic opinions.  It was, in truth, submission to that 
which he took to be the ultimate, archetypical story which governed and judged all 
other stories: 
The Gospels contain a fairy-story, or a story of a larger kind which 
embraces all the essence of fairy-stories.  They contain many 
marvels—peculiarly artistic, beautiful, and moving:  ‘mythical’ in their 
perfect, self-contained significance; and among the marvels is the 
greatest and most complete conceivable eucatastrophe […] There is no 
tale ever told which men would rather find was true, and none which 
so many sceptical men have accepted as true on its own merits.  (Tree 
72)   
Thus, even Tolkien who cannot permit or suffer in any fashion the “mixing” of worlds 
must admit at least one type into his mythology, the type first established in fantasy 
by MacDonald, the liturgical death-cycle remembered and reaffirmed by all those 
who count it the greatest of all possible narrative formulae.  “The Evangelium,” 
Tolkien declares, “has not abrogated legends; it has hallowed them, especially the   139 
‘happy ending’ ” (73).  It is this cataclysmic happy ending which is the object of 
Tolkien’s pursuit when Tolkien utilises the death cycle.  Whereas it occurs again and 
again throughout his epic saga The Lord of the Rings, each time the sort of grace or 
salvation it offers is yet more extraordinary. 
  Three examples of the death-cycle provide themselves especially from the 
Rings saga, those of Gandalf the Wizard, Aragorn the Ranger, later King of Gondor, 
and Frodo Baggins of the Shire, the one who bore the Ring of Power to the depths of 
Mount Doom.  Now, even to see this odd assemblage of names, titles and deeds 
strewn across a paragraph as such might bid one to scoff at the sort of faux grandeur 
of it all.  One must put aside scepticism long enough to recognise what it is that 
causes these displays; Tolkien’s myths are not a laughing a matter, but powerful 
literary structures which, if allowed, can call to some of the very depths of human 
emotion.  This is indeed why they are like a hallucinogen for a culture which 
perceives the calling and significance of the myth but does not know, precisely, how 
to synthesise it. 
  So it is that be-cloaked and with Elfish dictionary in one hand and replica 
Sword of Isildur letter-opener in the other that we turn to the first character under 
study, Gandalf the Grey, as he and his company face a time of dire crisis trapped 
underground in the formerly Dwarven realm of Moria which has been, by this time, 
apparently overrun with orcs and any number of other evil creatures.  The company 
are being hotly pursued by a host of these creatures and a sense of dread is palpable 
and even the very war drums of the enemy sound out “Doom, doom” (Fellowship 
421).  Gandalf, clever wizard that he is, is able to discern their position within the 
massive complex, however, and commands the others to flee and “choose paths 
leading right and downwards” while he stays to try and hold a door against the entire   140 
hostile assemblage (424).  Ironically, it seems that the only way out is to travel further 
into the depths, on into the shadowy depths and cavernous abyss.   
  So the company flies ever downward while Gandalf holds the door, sealing off 
their escape and succeeds for sometime until a mysterious enemy enters who is well 
Gandalf’s match: 
Then something came into the chamber—I felt it through the door, and 
the orcs themselves were afraid and fell silent.  It laid hold of the iron 
ring, and then it perceived me and my spell.  What it was I cannot 
guess, but I have never felt such a challenge  The counter-spell was 
terrible, it nearly broke me […] The door burst in pieces.  Something 
dark as a cloud was blocking all the light inside, and I was thrown 
backwards down the stairs.  (426) 
The whole company perceived even more that the possibility of their escape was a 
slight one.  What was more, fear embedded itself in their minds and hearts as they 
raced ever downwards through the twisting halls and spiralling staircases as though 
they were in fact in some terrible dream and not, in fact, reality. 
  At last they came to a long and narrow bridge spanning a dark and seemingly 
bottomless cavern.  They charge across, but not quickly enough, as their faceless 
enemy at last appears behind them: 
What it was could not be seen:  it was like a great shadow […] power 
and terror seemed to go before it […]  The flames roared up to greet it, 
and wreathed about it; and a black smoke swirled in the air.  Its 
streaming mane kindled, and blazed behind it.  In its right hand was a 
blade like a stabbing tongue of fire; in its left it held a whip of many 
thongs. 
“Ai! ai!” wailed Legolas.  “A Balrog!  A Balrog is come!” (429) 
To this striking and horrible revelation, the reader is surely due to respond as well, 
“Oh no!  A Balrog!” and then, several tense seconds later, “What is a Balrog?”  
Briefly stated, a Balrog is demon of ferocious might and composition.  When one 
plumbs the depths of the Tolkien legendarium, however, he finds a deep and 
significant history to this brood.  They were originally Maiar, or “lesser powers,” who   141 
were drawn to the rebellious Melkor (of the Valar, or “greater powers”) after his 
corruption near the beginning of the world.  The Silmarillion states “Dreadful among 
these spirits were the Valaruakar, the scourges of fire that in Middle-earth were called 
Balrogs, demons of terror” (23). 
   Of course it is not merely for the sake of trivia that the history of Balrogs is 
mentioned here, but to establish, in part, their close association with death itself.  For 
to meet a Balrog was to meet one’s end—they were powers above what even heroic 
might could overcome.  In the entire expansive history of Tolkien’s world, there exist 
only two other encounters wherein a Balrog meets its end.  In both cases the battle 
results in mutual demise.  The first is the account is a duel between Ecthelion of the 
Fountain, a “High Elf,” and Gothmog Lord of the Balrogs wherein “each slew the 
other.”  The second is between another elf, named Glorfindel, and an anonymous 
Balrog wherein “both fell to ruin in the abyss” (Silmarillion 292-293).  Balrogs, in the 
myth and history of Tolkien’s world, were synonymous with death itself. 
  Against such an enemy Gandalf now turned himself, lamenting “What an evil 
fortune!  And I am already weary” (Fellowship 429).  Gandalf had been journeying 
towards this point from some time, but is just at this moment made aware of the 
necessity of his death.  He isolated himself, sending the others across the bridge while 
he remains to confront the demon himself: 
“You cannot pass,” he said.  The orcs stood still and a dead silence fell.  
“I am a servant of the Secret Fire, wielder of the flame of Anor.  You 
cannot pass.  The dark fire will not avail you, flame of Udûn.  Go back 
to the Shadow!  You cannot pass.” (430) 
 
Then Gandalf did battle with the Balrog and smote the bridge between himself and 
the others so that, should he fall, no enemy could pursue them.  He cast the Balrog 
down into the darkness in a spiritual triumph, but as the demon fell it cast its whip 
which grabbed Gandalf around his legs.  “He staggered and fell, grasped vainly a the   142 
stone, and slid into the abyss. ‘Fly, you fools!’ he cried, and was gone” (431).  The 
wizard knew, of course, that victory over a Balrog could not come without death.  
Indeed, that is the price he pays for the escape of his friends who, moments later, 
emerge from the nightmarish abyss and mourn for the loss of their companion and 
saviour.  The dream was over, but the sorrow and absence were real.  
  Strangely enough, Gandalf was actually, in the mythology, cousin or brother 
to the Balrog with which he did battle.  For the wizards, called Istari, were of the 
same stuff as Balrogs, but constituted different choices and destinies.  Whereas the 
Balrogs were Mainar who had fled paradise to join Melkor (and Sauron was chief 
among them), the Istari were those Mainar sent by the other, good Valar to aid the 
men, elves and dwarves of Middle Earth in opposing the forces of evil.  Tolkien 
writes of him in a letter to the Jesuit Robert Murray in November of 1954: 
There are naturally no precise modern terms for what he [Gandalf] 
was.  I wd. venture to say that he was an incarnate “angel”—strictly, 
an a)g/geloj:  that is, with the other Istari, wizards, ‘those who know’, 
an emissary from the Lords of the West, sent to Middle-earth, as the 
great crisis of Sauron loomed on the horizon.  (Letters 202) 
Yet even saying so much of what, for him, these wizards function as must have been 
tremendously difficult.  He was stuck, so to speak, between a type and a hard place.  
The type was the divine myth with which he invested so much meaning and purpose 
and the “hard place” was his conviction against all things trite and allegorical.  “I 
have purposely kept all allusions to the highest matters down to mere hints, 
perceptible only to the most attentive, or kept them in unexplained symbolic forms” 
(Letters 201).   
Tolkien could not, though, disguise the death cycle.  It was the trope used time 
and again to accomplish his “eucatastrophes,” or moments of unexpected and 
inexplicable grace.  Among them, it is perhaps that of Gandalf that plays most   143 
significantly, for it is afterwards possible to say  “The great storm is coming, but the 
tide has turned” (645).  Speaking of the significance of Gandalf’s death at the hands 
of the Balrog, Tolkien writes: 
Gandalf alone [of the Istari] passes the tests, on a moral plane anyway 
(he makes mistakes in judgment).  For in his condition it was for him a 
sacrifice to perish on the Bridge in defence of his companions, less 
perhaps than for a mortal Man or hobbit, since he had a far greater 
inner power than they; but also more, since it was a humbling 
abnegation of himself in conformity to “the Rules”:  for all he could 
know at that moment he was the only person who could direct the 
resistance to Sauron successfully, and all his mission was in vain. 
(Letters 202) 
Therefore it is because of his death and its precise manner in remembrance of that 
great type which allowed him to be used by Tolkien’s God, Eru Ilúvatar (The One, the 
Father of All) to “send” him back to complete his mission.  This is precisely the 
eucatastrophic moment in this particular death-cycle, for “He was sent by a mere 
prudent plan of the angelic Valar or governors, but Authority had taken up this plan 
and enlarged it, at the moment of its failure” (203). 
  Liturgically speaking, it was necessary for Gandalf to undergo this sort of 
hermeneutical kenosis in which he abandoned any claims over “the plan” (or indeed, 
as it may rightly be called, o/( lo/goj) and his role within it in order for him to catch 
any glimpse of what the actual Plan was at all.  This is likely the sort of thing that 
David Jasper is getting at when he speaks in purely theological/hermeneutical terms: 
[R]eading, and therefore, the reader must deliberately divest him or 
herself of all possible claims over the text, especially and above all the 
scriptural text resisting every possible textual seduction of beauty or 
meaning, in order to enter into the text itself and thereby overcome it, 
and be overcome by it in an utter defeat that is the only possible means 
of victory.  (Body 19) 
It is precisely this “meaning” and “beauty” which Gandalf abandons on the Bridge of 
Khazad-Dûm.  He must no longer see his life with meaning, he must relinquish his   144 
cherished role as interpreter of his own fate and experiences and at last fill himself 
with despair in order that he might have any hope.  In this moment, Gandalf leaves 
“reality” altogether.  It is also a moment of death and a moment of pure sacramental, 
eucatastrophic grace.  For only in this way can he banish the Balrog, a brother-spirit 
evocative of the language of the primal struggle of Beowulf, to which Tolkien 
devoted so much of his academic study.  “We fought far under the living earth, where 
time is not counted.  Ever he clutched me, and ever I hewed him” (Towers 654).  
Gandalf relates to his companions after they are at long last reunited.  At length, 
Gandalf also tells of how he at last overcame the demon: 
I threw down my enemy, and he fell from the high place and broke the 
mountain-side where he smote it in his ruin.  Then darkness took me, 
and I strayed out of thought and time, and I wandered far on roads that 
I will not tell.  Naked I was sent back—for a brief time, until my task 
is done.  (655) 
The task, it appears, is to give aid in the form of hope and direction to those mortals 
left in that world who strove to resist the ever increasing power of evil under Sauron.  
Indeed, at the point where he meets three of his companions in the depths of despair 
and in a deep forest, both literal and figurative, of not knowing what course they 
should pursue or if there is even any point in pursuing altogether.  “Beyond all hope 
you return to us in our need!” Aragorn exclaims (645).   
More to the point is not the fact that he comes back with significantly 
enhanced powers to kill villains but with a renewed understanding—although, 
importantly, not a complete one—of the plan to rescue the world from evil.  Again, by 
giving up his claims over destiny and meaning in the world, Gandalf allows himself to 
be filled in return with this Word, this Purpose which, to the extent which it is able to 
be uttered in the world, drives the characters forward towards a more complete grace 
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Part of this “purpose” comes in the form of a message he delivers to Aragorn 
from the Elf Queen, Galadriel, which will define and spur on the next of the death-
cycles in the Rings saga: “But dark is the path appointed for thee: The Dead watch 
the road that leads to the Sea” (Towers 656).  While this word is delivered to Aragorn 
in the middle of Tolkien’s third book, it is not until some time later, at the beginning 
of the fifth book, that any action concerning the word takes place.  Thus the 
foreboding sink into the heart of Aragorn as he goes on, constantly searching and 
wondering about the words and what they will in fact mean for him.  At last the time 
comes that he raises an army to relieve the imperilled Gondorian city of Minas Tirith, 
of which he is rightful heir and king, although secretly, but the muster goes slowly 
and the need for quick support becomes clear lest the city fall and a wide swath of the 
continent become open to Sauron’s marauding hordes.  Aragorn perceives this need 
but is caught in indecision, sensing all the time that darkness awaits him—“it is dark 
before me, I must go down also to Minas Tirith, but I do not yet see the road.  An 
hour long prepared approaches” (Return 773).  
In this moment of dilemma, a company of his kinsmen fortuitously arrive from 
the North and bring tidings from one of their elders, “The days are short.  If thou art 
in haste, remember the Paths of the Dead” (Return 775).  This proclamation reminds 
Aragorn of the words he had received earlier from Gandalf and it becomes clear to 
him that this is indeed the path he is destined to and must take.  For the Paths of the 
Dead are the haunt of undead souls of a kingdom of marauders who broke an oath of 
fealty to a king of men in days long before and now remain in the hollows of their 
ravine, cursed to remain there until they can fulfil their debt.  The place is shrouded in 
fear and mystery, no living person had ever emerged from there, the very place was 
Death.  But Aragorn was the one living heir of the king to whom the wraiths were   146 
bound and the way was in fact the most direct between him and Gondor in need, so he 
resolved to take the Paths of the Dead despite the fact that it was certain death for him 
and any who followed.  A confidant objects, “But this is madness,” to which Aragorn 
simply replies, “It is not madness, lady […] for I go on a path appointed.”  
So Aragorn leaves in isolation along with only a few companions and embarks 
on the way to the Dead.  At its gate one of the companions remarks “This is an evil 
door […] and my death lies beyond it.  I will dare to pass it nonetheless” (Return 
786).  All those that entered the gate surrendered their lives.  Yet, because of this self-
emptying, this submission of self to word, Aragorn is able to exercise his authority.  
As the dead approach, he summons them to keep their oath and fulfil the duty owed to 
his family.  Silently the Dead fall into line and follow Aragorn as he leads them 
through the country side, to the horror of all onlookers who cry out “The King of the 
Dead is come upon us!” to the Battle of Minas Tirith where his ghostly legion turn the 
tide of battle and eventually save the city and, presumably, the race of men altogether 
(789). 
Admittedly, there is less significance placed on this tale of Aragorn who does 
not, in fact, suffer any physical death.  However it has been a deeper thing altogether 
which has been under consideration with the death-cycle especially as it functions 
liturgically and this definitely comes into play in the Paths of the Dead episode.  For 
not only does Aragorn submit himself to a will beyond his own, spoken in the word of 
prophecy, but relinquishes himself to Death (that he does not literally die is 
inconsequential in terms of the faith displayed and sacrifice made, as in the episode of 
Abraham and Isaac) and is baptised into greater spiritual maturity.   
Aragorn, throughout the saga, is ever diminishing his identity as a king and 
Isildur’s heir, preferring much more the wild freedom of his life as a Ranger and the   147 
more quiet responsibility it bore.  He feared that to be Isildur’s heir would be to 
inherit Isildur’s inherent flaws and failings as he succumbed long ago to the tempting 
allure of the Ring of Power and was destroyed by it.  So, for him, the hardest thing he 
could be faced with on a journey of spiritual development, or Bildungsroman, would 
be to recognise and act on that identity, to take up the authority that he was born into 
in order to save others.  Of course, this is precisely what he has to do when he enters 
the Paths of the Dead, signifying that he not only relinquished control over his 
physical being but also his very identity.  In so doing, he becomes not only the King 
of Gondor but “King of the Dead”—indeed, King of Death itself.  For he has passed 
through it and emerged on the other side its master.  Not by force, obviously, but 
through the purest, kenotic self-sacrifice; in the end by fulfilment of the death-cycle. 
One last cycle begs mention, if ever briefly, as it is the most central tale to the 
whole saga and therefore needs the least  exposition.  It is, of course, the story of 
Frodo Baggins, the diminutive Hobbit, and his gardener, Samwise Gamgee, who must 
carry the terrible Ring of Power all they way from the far-off Shire deep into the dark 
and evil kingdom of Sauron, Mordor, against impossible odds so as to at last destroy 
the thing in Mt. Doom, the point of the artefact’s origin.  They are lead by the 
creature, Gollum, who is rightly read as a sort of spiritual pole for Frodo.  Gollum, of 
course, being so obsessed with the ring as his former possession that he is willing to 
serve Frodo and Sam if only to have a hope at manipulating his way to being back in 
possession of it. 
As the Hobbits progress on their journey, it becomes clear that thinking of it as 
sheer impossibility was in itself naïve, and that what they were journeying towards 
was certain death, whether or not they actually manage to destroy the Ring.  As they 
enter Mordor, land of countless hostile orcs and polluted to the point where its very   148 
water was poisonous to their lips, the intrepid duo are betrayed and abandoned by 
Gollum, formerly their guide, who leaves them to try and make their way to Mt. 
Doom on their own.  The closer they come, crawl and stammer the heavier the weight 
of the Ring becomes on Frodo’s neck.  Its symbolism is dense.  It represents certainly 
nothing less than the collective power of the lusts of the mortal races. So weighed 
down by it is Frodo that when they reach the foot of Mt. Doom, not stopping to 
marvel even at their progress thus far, Frodo stoops to crawl for he can no longer 
walk.  When at last he ceases even to crawl, Samwise carries him on his back.  Where 
once there set out a whole company of men, dwarves, elves and other hobbits from 
Rivendell with the quest of the Ring’s destruction, now only Frodo and Sam remained 
to complete the task.  Yet when, at last, they reach the fiery bowels of the mountain 
where Frodo is meant to cast the Ring down and destroy it forever, he refrains, now 
rejuvenated and standing tall: “ ‘I have come,’ he said.  ‘But I do not choose now to 
do what I came to do.  I will not do this deed.  The Ring is mine!’ ” (Return 945).   
Here at the very end of his spiritual struggle Frodo proved unequal to the task 
before him, the temptation of the Ring too great.  He had come all this way, separated 
from home and companions, he resigned himself to death and yet still that decision 
was too much for him.  It was not for raw material existence that he yearned, poised 
there above the inferno, but for a perverse image of life which was the opposite of 
kenosis—pure power over others and nature.  He had willed so long, but the doing of 
the thing proved too much.  The scene brings to mind the tortured words of St. Paul, 
“What a wretched man I am!  Who will rescue me from this body of death?” (Ro. 
7:24).  It is at this very moment when all appears and is for all purposes lost that fate, 
or perhaps that which Tolkien called “Authority” intervened.  Gollum enters the scene 
and struggles with Frodo.  The monster manages to gain the Ring from its bearer by   149 
biting off the very finger that wore it.  This, then, must be the depths of despair: to 
have come so far and lose the Ring altogether.  Yet at this moment grace intervenes 
decisively and Gollum, in his ecstasy, dances right off of the ledge and into the fiery 
pit, destroying both himself and the Ring with him.  The mountain shakes to its 
foundations and erupts, the hobbit pair are left on its slopes quietly awaiting their 
deaths and the eucatastrophe, arguably,
46 completes itself when they are rescued by an 
army of giant eagles sent to their aid by Gandalf. 
The point of going to such lengths to detail several occurrences of the death-
cycle within such a well know narrative as Tolkien’s saga is to demonstrate the many 
possible functions it holds as well as the variety of ways it can be employed.  In 
Tolkien’s Rings, none of the characters exist to serve as a “Christ” any more than in 
Lewis’s Till We Have Faces.  In each of their cases, the death cycle was involved for 
its own sake, because of its inherent power to convey, in Tolkien’s words, 
eucatastrophic grace.  They were, in truth, actual sacraments to the narrative effort 
Tolkien was making.   
Likewise, they each involved the kenosis of the subject.  For Gandalf it was 
the emptying of the self and the self’s story of meaning and beauty in faith but 
without hope of any personal redemption.  For Aragorn it involved a similar 
abandonment of self in terms of his control over his own identity, his interpretation of 
destiny, in the form of an adoption of a type of being-towards-death which, flipping 
the scales of reason, then allowed him to take up identity, interpret the narrative of his 
destiny and exhibit authority over the very death to which he surrendered.  Lastly, for 
the poor hobbit, Frodo, it meant a spiritual struggle that saw his very body winnowed 
                                                 
46 I would, for instance, maintain that it would have been just as well if Tolkien left 
the pair there to die happily.  But it might be for the joy of their friends that they are 
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away as an outward witness to the compliance of his spirit only to be levelled, at last, 
with the realization that his will was not strong enough to do away with the spiritual 
burden he bore.  In that moment of surrender to his own ineptitude he received a 
moment of grace and the burden was no more.  Just as in the most primal form of 
baptismal imagery it is apparent that salvation is not something one can accomplish 
on his own, but must have done for him. 
Tolkien is an instrumental subject for this study because, while his figure is 
now so commercial as to appear radically gauche or lowbrow and tasteless, the 
emphasis he places on the idea of utter capitulation within the liturgical sphere of his 
death-cycles is absolutely indispensible in a discussion of the relation between 
Fantasy, liturgy and hermeneutics.  This silence and abnegation is the beginning of 
the significance of Tolkien’s literature as theology.  For, as Marion states: 
To do theology is not to speak the language of gods or of “God,” but to 
let the Word speak us (or make us speak) in the way that it speaks of 
and to Gxd […] for in order to say Gxd one must first let oneself be 
said by him to the point that, by this docile abandon, Gxd speaks in our 
speech, just as in the words of the Word sounded the unspeakable 
Word of his Father. (143-144) 
Just as Tolkien seeks to thwart the readers in their attempts to totalise and speak over 
the text by keeping “allusions to the highest matters down to mere hints” and 
problematising his own symbols, his characters likewise surrender their own rights 
and abilities of interpreters of the story which they occupy and exist instead as those 
things which are said first and only afterwards say themselves. 
  Without then leaving from the kenotic vision of J.R.R. Tolkien, it is 
appropriate to continue on in mention of the last author under study in this chapter, 
J.K. Rowling, a writer singularly obsessed with the goal of keeping her readers 
guessing.  Of course, it was more commercial necessity than artistic conviction which 
likely drove this ambiguity as the cult of her admirers grew like wildfire over the   151 
course of the publication of her seven volume Harry Potter series.  Because of the 
massive amount of scrutiny her plots came under from readers both young and 
mature, amateur and adult, there was no other option than to remain cryptic both 
textually and in person whenever interviewers, driven on by the furore of passion her 
narratives generated, came to her hungry for the one off-hand remark that would 
prove to be the definitive key statement in unlocking the boy wizard’s destiny before 
it appeared in print.  Little did they know then that the real key lay solely in context.  
The public was well aware, of course, that the somewhat reclusive writer’s personal 
context would come in to play, but with that subject largely out-of-bounds, it was 
indeed rather odd that no one took seriously Harry Potter’s identity as a set of British 
Fantasy novels.   
 
Harry Potter and the Death of Fantasy Literature 
  One of the factors which likely contributed to the rather mixed critical 
reception of the Harry Potter novels is the dubious recent history of the genre called 
Fantasy.  Indeed, it was the sad wane of this genre into comfortable tropes and 
exhausted imagery that, at least in part, necessitated the distinction made at the 
beginning of this thesis between what I have called Fantasy (just that lower reckoning 
of the form, the simple recreation of genre) and fantasy which exists to challenge 
perception of the “real.”  Even the dedicated reader of fantasy (of either sort)—
indeed, especially the dedicated reader—must admit that the trend of the genre has 
been steadily degenerative since Tolkien ceased publishing and that there are precious 
few exceptions to this rule.  Even those novelists who show potential are forced into 
the mundane by publishers who demand new works at obscene intervals until it 
becomes difficult to tell one volume from another.  At best, fantasy writers have   152 
aspired to be like Vonnegut’s cynical (and depreciatory) character, Kilgore Trout—a 
terrible Sci-Fi writer who happens to have interesting ideas on occasion. 
  One look at any mainstream book retailer will confirm as much as this.  Sci-
Fi/Fantasy sections host hordes of identical, mass marketed paperbacks clad in 
prurient cover art all jostling for position on over-crowded bookshelves like runners at 
the beginning of a marathon.  In such an environment, any attempt in this genre 
cannot reasonably expect to be received, without patient and dedicated effort, as 
serious literature.  To be an academic approaching Fantasy literature today feels about 
as appropriate as a monastery in a red light district. 
  Even so, it is not just the deterioration of the quality of fantasy literature which 
clouds its reception, but also a loss of imagination as a whole over the later half of the 
twentieth century.  This is, indeed, the strange part of it—that it was neither the 
depression nor either of the wars of that era which spawned it, but the peace, 
prosperity and stability of the decades which followed.  The narrative seemed to be 
that all of that great human suffering at the beginning of the twentieth century meant 
that humans must now grow up and put away the bedtime stories of Romanticism in 
order to get on with the real work of modernity.  Yet it is within the very disparaging 
nihilism, the aching doubt, that humanity finds itself in the ultimate fantasy 
“Wandering between two worlds.” 
  Indeed, it was fantasy which sustained western civilisation through the years 
of struggle, in one form or another.  For some it was any of a number of utopian 
political fantasies, for others it was the sort of extreme scepticism which detached one 
from reality and for others it was fairy stories.  It was in fact materialism, not some 
high-browed realism or noble sense of responsibility which killed Imagination as the 
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traditionally posited as the interplay of science and religion, with science being the 
inevitable, predetermined winner, it is clear that the narrative itself is a fanciful one.  
As physicists move further and further into the nature of existence and the very fabric 
of reality, terms like “fuzzy logic” and ideas such as quantum mechanics abound.  
They depend on paradoxical metaphors and Kantian lateral reasoning to derive their 
consistency: 
Quantum physics gives an example of a reality which is concrete and  
but also enigmatic, and which must be interpreted on its own terms.  
The paradoxes and counter-intuitive nature of quantum theory do not 
lead physicists to abandon reason; rather the dialectical nature of our 
knowledge compels physicists to adopt a more critical realism. (Myers 
and McKenzie 49-66) 
The philosophical underpinnings of the triumphalist, progressive narrative of post-
Enlightenment reason were swept away by Thomas Kuhn’s classic, The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (1962).  Then came the Post-Modernism of Continental 
philosophy, which radically problematised meta-narratives as a whole and the very 
language with which modernists espoused their confidence.   
Yet even this movement could not do away with Modernism as such and all 
the time imagination and fantasy suffered under the terrible weight of materialism.  It 
was perhaps because the Western world now had so very much material that it forgot 
the lessons of its ideological ancestors who, even as they laid the bricks of existential 
epistemology, radically subverted its very existence (as shall be seen through Hume, 
Kierkegaard and others in the following chapter).  Had these dogmatists, even 
presently, much less in terms of material (either possessions or existence itself) as so 
many others in the world actually do, they would likely think rather differently in 
terms of their claims that nothing extends beyond the material.  In this way the 
Empire of Post-Enlightenment “reason” proves to be less ideological than material 
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It must, then, come as no surprise that the conception of Harry Potter 
famously came at a point in the life of its author in which very little was available in 
terms of material comfort.  The story is now famous in which the struggling single 
mother, overwhelmed with the raw difficulty of simple daily existence, scratched out 
on café napkins an outline for a story about a boy who, like herself, was caught in a 
rough life with little material freedom and little comfort and even less love when, in a 
eucatastrophic moment, he is swept away into a hidden but connected world in which 
he has an identity, freedom, power, acceptance, love and, yes, destiny and purpose.  
The truth of the matter is that had Rowling written her now treasured tale at a 
different moment in history it might have gone unnoticed for many years until it was 
rediscovered at precisely the moment in which its voice needed to be heard.   
The fact is, no matter how cynical one chooses to be about its material 
success, that Harry Potter was born into a world which desperately needed it.  It 
voiced out a rebellion against the rampant empiricism and materialism at a point when 
people the world around were ready to listen in and join the effort.  The edifice had 
long been crumbling, eroded long ago by the changing tide of philosophy, but in order 
to complete the coup the public needed a gospel that they could identify with and rally 
behind.  Now, Harry Potter stands as a symbol of cultural resistance.  It is, of course, 
only the very beginning if it even turns out to be anything at all.  But, one can see that 
it is heading along the right path when even the academy has taken up the banner of 
its cause.  If the panel at the 2008 meeting of the American Academy of Religion 
titled “The Potterian Way of Death:  J.K. Rowling’s Conception of Mortality” is any 
testament, the significance of Rowling’s work is just beginning to be recognised, not 
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The world of Harry Potter has been, since the very first, one that not only 
reflected Christian types and figures but that was actually saturated in Christian 
thought.  Yet for most devoted readers across the length of time in which the novels 
were being written and published, whether this was an intended, accidental or 
inevitable reality was a question of significant debate.  Rowling herself remained 
almost entirely silent on the subject, despite the fact that she could have likely 
escaped the fury of fundamentalist Christians everywhere from the American South to 
the Holy See had she done otherwise, knowing that to acknowledge the place of 
Christianity within her work would be to admit that it could only ever end one way.  
Rowling expressed this sentiment in an interview saying, "To me [the religious 
parallels have] always been obvious.  But I never wanted to talk too openly about it 
because I thought it might show people who just wanted the story where we were 
going" (Adler). 
Rowling’s work was one of the few in the twentieth century that truly existed 
within the tradition of MacDonald.  Therefore, there was really never any question as 
to whether or not the death-cycle would reveal itself at one point or another because it 
is this type, itself a liturgical remembrance of Christ’s Passion, which is the making of 
what Tolkien considers to be a “happy ending” and what others simply deem as the 
standard for being a “good story.”  This is why Phillip Pullman’s attempt at an 
atheistic fantasy is not as successful as Rowling’s more traditional effort.  In the first 
part, it fails to be actually atheistic and reverts into the rather primordial Sophia 
worship of some of ancient theistic mysticism.  Secondly, its best attempt at a happy 
ending, highlighted by Tolkien as the very heart of fantasy, is the identification of 
eros with “Dust” (which is best read in the novels as wisdom or truth), a revelation 
which, if pursued to its logical end, would make prostitutes the philosophers of the   156 
world.  Whereas Rowling has rescued Fantasy in its ability to challenge assumptions 
and change its readers, Pullman is simply another peddler of unusual pornography, 
disturbingly marketed to children as a manifesto of modern, scientific wisdom and 
enlightenment. 
This is the paradox, indeed, the challenge and promise, of the tradition of 
“Western” culture at present: in a cultural and intellectual atmosphere which makes 
theistic belief sometimes difficult and other times impossible, it is still those stories 
which speak in the pattern of Christ’s death and resurrection, of love in the way of 
self-sacrifice, of victory over the total negation of speech and experience which is 
death, which have the greatest power to move, inspire and transform the very core of 
a person.  What does it mean to have a society which inherits distrust of the Christian 
gospels as objects but still constantly gropes for the Christian Gospel in its substance, 
as a fantastic story which irreducibly subverts perceptions and poses the power to 
eucatastrophically change lives?  Why is it possible to believe in the kerygma of 
Harry Potter but not in that same kerygma as expressed in the Bible?  To answer such 
questions is essentially one of the goals of this project, but one cannot allow the horse 
before the cart and begin to answer at present.  First it is necessary to examine for one 
last time the structure of the myth in Harry Potter which inspires both joy and belief.  
Only then will it be possible to make claims about its relation to the MacDonald 
tradition of Fantasy and indeed to liturgy and the formation of belief. 
The life of Harry Potter is one marked more than any others studied thus far 
by the seal of destiny.  As an infant his parents were killed by an evil wizard who 
styled himself Lord Voldemort although he had been born as the rather ordinary Tom 
Riddle.  Voldemort was obsessed with power and immortality so that when he 
received information concerning a baby which, as he interpreted the prophecy, would   157 
be the end of him should he not kill it first he moved decisively to eliminate this 
mysterious rival.  He succeeded in killing Harry’s father, James, without any 
resistance and killed Harry’s mother as well when she interceded between the villain 
and her son.  But when the Dark Lord turned on Harry, several inexplicable things 
happened.  Firstly, he was undone by the power of the love that Lily had poured out 
as a sacrifice for her son.  Secondly, a mysterious bond was created between the two, 
represented in Harry by a lightning bolt shaped scar on his forehead which sometimes 
allowed him to perceive Voldemort’s thoughts and, on one occasion, allowed 
Voldemort to possess his body. 
The more Harry learned about his own personal history and the prophecy that 
was made concerning himself and Voldemort the more he sensed that he had to play a 
crucial part in the permanent elimination of the Dark Lord.  Yet, not having the full 
measure of information on the subject (which was possessed alone by his headmaster 
and mentor, Albus Dumbledore, who himself was never in complete control of 
events) he was free to and did on many occasions err in his interpretation of this 
destiny only for it to be revealed to him in the very last chapter of the final volume, 
Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows (2007). 
If the title alone was not menacing enough, nor the prophecy that “either must 
die at the hand of the other for neither can live while the other survives” which hung 
over Harry’s head and in the minds of readers, then the two quotations which open the 
last volume should leave no doubt as to the path that this final episode would lay out 
for Harry.  They are significant enough that they bear quotation at length here.  The 
first is from Aeschylus’ tragedy The Libation Bearers: 
  Oh, the torment bred in the race, 
    the grinding scream of death 
      and the stroke that hits the vein 
    the haemorrhage none can staunch, the grief,   158 
  the curse that no man can bear […] 
   
Now hear, you blissful powers underground— 
    answer the call, send help. 
  Bless the children, give them triumph now (qtd. in Hallows xi) 
 
Like Lewis, and indeed MacDonald, Rowling draws inspiration from sources that 
expand beyond the realm of Christian literature but which, when made subservient to 
their appropriation, reflect its nature and substance.  It is, in its way, an affirmation of 
the truth which all fantasists hold dear, that there is truth to be had in myth which 
exists only in fragments of shadows elsewhere.  The second quotation synthesises the 
first.  It is from the Quaker leader, William Penn’s More Fruits of Solitude: 
Death is but crossing the world, as friends do the seas; they live in one 
another still.  For they must needs be present, that love and live in that 
which is omnipresent.  In this divine glass, they see face to face; their 
converse is free, as well as pure.  This is the comfort of friends, that 
though they may be said to die, yet their friendship and society are, in 
the best sense, ever present, because immortal.  (qtd. in Hallows xi) 
 
This, then, is the setting for the final adventure of Harry Potter.  The words are potent 
because of how many deceased “friends” Harry has by the beginning of the seventh 
book.  His two parents, of course, his close friend and Godfather, Sirius Black, his 
mentor, Albus Dumbledore  as well as, by the book’s end, several other friends and 
teachers. 
  Rowling said of the quotations, "I'd known it was going to be those two 
passages since 'Chamber' [1998] was published. I always knew [that] if I could use 
them at the beginning of book seven then I'd cued up the ending perfectly. If they 
were relevant, then I went where I needed to go” (Adler).  All along, Harry had been 
unknowingly treading ever onwards towards early end.  All Harry has, though, until 
his Swan Song is upon him is his own broken interpretations of the cryptic prophecy 
which had been made concerning him.  At last, it is the memory of his (perceived) 
arch-enemy, the double agent Professor Snape, given up magically in vision as he lay   159 
dying, which shows Harry what the plan, Dumbledore’s plan, had been all along.  
Harry learns at last the full measure of his connection to Voldemort, that he had 
received an actual fragment of the Dark Lord’s soul which split off from him after the 
terrible and unimaginably evil act of trying to kill a baby which bonded to him, the 
victim, although Voldemort did not know it.  Thus, as long as Harry lived a portion of 
Voldemort would live also.  “So the boy […] the boy must die?” Harry sees Snape 
ask Dumbledore in his memory.  “And Voldemort himself must do it, Severus.  That 
is essential” Dumbledore answered (Hallows 686). 
  The text reveals how Harry thought about this fact, this utter condemning to 
total demise, and how it constituted betrayal on the part of Dumbledore.  Even so he 
chose to take the path as it had been planned for him.  He chose it because he, like 
Dumbledore, knew it was right.  He knew that it was the only way: 
Finally, the truth […]  Harry understood at last that he was not 
supposed to survive.  His job was to walk calmly into Death’s 
welcoming arms […] Terror washed over him as he lay on the floor, 
with that funeral drum pounding inside him […] If he could only have 
died like Hedwig, so quickly he would not have known it had 
happened!  Or if he could have launched himself in front of a wand to 
save someone he loved […] He envied even his parent’s deaths now.  
This cold-blooded walk to his own destruction would require a 
different kind of bravery.  (692) 
He would have to face death alone, as well.  The guild of his two best friends, Ron 
and Hermione, would have to be left behind as they would try to save him instead of 
allowing him to accomplish death.  There had been a battle that night.  Violence and 
death were yet strewn around as Harry, during a chilling respite, learned of what he 
must do.   
  It was, to their world, an apocalypse—a battle to end all battles as such.  The 
battleground was none other than Hogwarts school itself and the Dark Lord and his 
minions had withdrawn to await Harry, for even he knew that Harry would not allow   160 
his friends to die when his death alone would satiate the Dark Lord’s rage.  It is in this 
moment when Rowling arguably produces the crowning achievement of her literary 
effort.  For as the cold realisation descends on Harry and he withdraws to the forest 
where he will meet his end Rowling well and truly grabs hold of her readers’ hearts.  
In this moment of sheer, primal humanity—primal in its highest and lowest senses—
there is no device, no fanciful invention, no literary tool which can distract from what 
is happening.  A boy walks to his death; “Like rain on a cold window, these thoughts 
pattered against the hard surface of the incontrovertible truth, which was that he must 
die” (693).  It is ugly, bloody and abhorrent.  Yet it is, to couch it in liturgical terms, 
the terrible necessity of the devouring of divine flesh and blood: 
“At the heart of the [Eucharistic] mystery there is an irreducible 
violence and a necessary scandal of the flesh, an insistent reminder that 
the body cannot be removed from thought, and that human history, red 
in tooth and claw, swims in the river of blood from its torn and 
shredded victims, torn by hatred and torn by desire.” (Jasper, Body 
109)  
 
In this moment one reads not a fantastic, whimsical fiction of a boy who learns to use 
wands and ride a broomstick, but the very deep-rooted myth of humanity as perceived 
through the Christian gospel and its liturgical representations—be they in churches or 
novels.  There can be no doubt in this moment, literary or otherwise, because death is 
itself the central mystery of human existence. 
  The account which Rowling gives of Harry’s death march is a chilling one and 
represents the very furthest extent of her abilities as a writer.  The tortuous extremity 
and crushing totality of the protagonist’s fate is not something which the reader may 
simply identify with, but which actually becomes real.  The reader’s heart beats all the 
quicker because it knows the negation which is to come, nausea flows in a wave over 
the gut which senses the encroaching horror and the heart is torn apart in the 
excruciating agony that grips the innermost being when death becomes reality.  The   161 
liturgical moment is so profound that its intertextuality actually becomes something 
much more like “metatextuality” and words of the Passion and of the Bible itself echo 
and reverberate through it.  
 
[…] his sweat was like drops of blood falling to the ground. 
 
With everything in his being, the reader wishes, like Harry, that this fate would pass 
away from him.  Yet with every line he reads he forces Harry that one step closer to 
that dreadful fate.  He cannot stop reading and  Harry cannot stop walking.  It is 
necessary that both go on.   
  Then, a grace appears from the depths of despair.  Harry finds an artefact left 
to him by the departed Dumbledore.  It is one of the trinity of artefacts which give the 
novel its name, a Deathly Hallow, so-called because it was said to be given as a 
reward by Death himself.  It is a stone which will allow, for a time, the appearance of 
loved ones deceased, “as though by a veil” (Rowling, Beedle 92).  When Harry uses 
it, there appear before him his parents, Godfather and a pair of his friends who had 
been lost in the preceding battle.  They walk with him, beaming their pride and 
admiration.  “You’ve been so brave” says the mother he never knew; “You are nearly 
there, very close.  We are […] so proud of you” says his father (Rowling, Hallows 
699).   
 
Therefore, since we are surrounded by such a great cloud of witnesses […] 
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Harry, who had come so far in becoming a man, matured far beyond his years 
by the trials he had faced in his short, traumatic life, was reduced to the likeness of a 
child, grasping all about himself for reassurance: 
  “Does it hurt?” 
The childish question had fallen from Harry’s lips before he could stop 
it. 
“Dying?  Not at all,” said Sirius.  “Quicker and easier than falling 
asleep” […] 
“You’ll stay with me?” 
“Until the very end,” said James. 
“They will not be able to see you?” asked Harry. 
“We are a part of you,” said Sirius.  “Invisible to anyone else.” 
Harry looked at his mother. 
“Stay close to me,” he asked quietly. (699-700) 
In death, all mankind is reduced to infancy.  Not only are people often old, infirm, and 
dependent at the time of their deaths, but the very nature of the experience itself 
confounds all lived experience.  There is nothing on earth that can prepare one for the 
enormous negation of death.  It is utterly other, it must be learned as man learns all 
things—by stumbling along, wailing for help and, finally, by simply doing.   
 
Let the little children come to me, and do not hinder them, for the kingdom of heaven 
belongs to such as these. 
 
  It is the might of a fairy tale which brings Harry, full of courage though ever 
wavering, to the point of his heroic death.  Underlying the entire narrative is a myth, 
said to be a children’s story, of the three Deathly Hallows.  According to their legend, 
they were given to three wizard brothers who cheated Death by conjuring a bridge 
over a dangerous stream.  Death sought to trick them by offering them each a reward 
of their choosing through which he hoped to sow their demise.  The first brother was 
violent and wished for an unbeatable wand but was soon murdered in his sleep and   163 
the wand stolen away.  The second brother was proud and wanted to humiliate Death, 
so he wished for something which could bring back the dead.  He was given the 
Resurrection Stone, the very object Harry was using on his way to die.  But the 
second brother was soon driven mad by the transience of those he brought back and 
slew himself so he could be with them.  The third brother was wise and wished for 
something that would allow him to escape Death and never be found by him.  Death 
was much put out at this request, and grudgingly bequeathed to the brother an 
invisibility cloak whose guise even he could not penetrate.  When the man had lived 
to a ripe age he left the cloak to his son, “And then he greeted Death as an old friend, 
and went with him gladly, and, equals, they departed this life” (Rowling, Beedle 87-
93). 
  Harry was unwittingly wearing this very cloak as he escaped from Hogwarts 
unnoticed and walked into the enemy’s camp.  He had been in possession of the cloak 
ever since he arrived at Hogwarts and it never seemed extraordinary to him.  In truth, 
it hid him from Death on more than one occasion.  At last he saw Voldemort and he 
longed for it to be over.  He dropped first the stone, his comforters disappeared, and 
then he took off his cloak and looked his enemy in the eyes.  He was greeting death as 
an old friend.  “He saw the mouth move and a flash of green light, and everything was 
gone” (Hallows 704). 
 
[...] Jesus said, “It is finished.”  With that, he bowed his head and gave up his spirit. 
 
  Yet this is not the end.  That this is not the end should not surprise those 
familiar with the tradition within which Rowling was writing does not mean that it 
also diminishes either the ground shaking tragedy of the event of Harry’s death nor   164 
the joy and triumph of the moment when he regains consciousness and finds himself 
in an empty King’s Cross station on a bench with Albus Dumbledore.  Surprised to 
find himself in a state which Dumbledore declares as somewhat other than dead, 
Harry exclaims, “But I should have died—I didn’t defend myself!  I meant to let him 
kill me!” (708).  He was worried, of course, that he had not achieved his purpose.  But 
the shard of Voldemort that was within him had perished.  He had, in a sense, died—
but the fact that he chose to do it in order to save others, in Dumbledore’s words, 
“made all the difference” (708). 
 
Where, O Death, is your victory?  Where, O Death, is your sting? 
 
In the end, Harry returns to life to banish Voldemort from the world altogether 
and forever.  His ultimate demise was in fact a lack of knowledge.  It was not a lack 
of knowledge in the terms of how to make things work, how to accomplish one’s ends 
and the like.  Rather, it was a lack of knowledge of the proper meaning of things that 
destroyed him.  Dumbledore says to Harry, “Of house-elves and children’s tales, of 
love, loyalty, and innocence, Voldemort knows and understands nothing.  Nothing.  
That they all have power beyond his own, a power beyond the reach of any magic, is 
a truth he has never grasped” (710). 
 
Out of the mouths of babes you have ordained strength. 
 
  Harry Potter represents a timely and powerful incarnation of the death-cycle.  
It, in fact, sounds the death knoll for the death of fantasy.  Indeed, as Harry reads on 
the gravestone of his parents, “The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death” (328).    165 
That untold millions of readers across the globe have trod the same road to death as 
Harry, have experienced the joy of his return to life demonstrates perhaps better than 
anything else the power of Fantasy literature to perform as liturgy.  It is not simply a 
singular remembrance or a solitary tribute to a biblical type, for it joins precisely in 
the form set out by MacDonald over a century ago as not a recreation of the Passion, 
but a celebration and anamnesis of it.  If Harry Potter were simply just one more 
Christological figure in the literature of the English language, he would not be 
significant as such.  He is, however, much more than this.  He is the power of Fantasy 
to act as liturgy—that is, to problematise perceptions of reality and inspire a new 
belief or perspective that enables the participant (reader or worshiper) to navigate the 
reality of life between two worlds.   
   
Liturgy as Fantasy 
So then, is the relationship between liturgy and Fantasy one way?  Does 
Fantasy literature simply borrow from the liturgy in order to accomplish its ends or 
does the relationship go deeper?  J.R.R. Tolkien has already been summoned for his 
view that the Gospel is the truest or ultimate fairy story.  In what way is this true, 
though?  Is it true only because of its happy ending?  Certainly not, for in the Gospel 
one finds an ultimate and irreducible literary paradox.  For God, who is radically 
other in both nature and character, was made flesh and dwelled among men.  That 
which was invulnerable made itself frail, fragile and subject to infirmity.  He who was 
both immanent and transcendent through the world (e9auto\n e0ke/nwsen), emptied 
himself and took on the form of a human and a servant (Phil. 2:5-11).  What is more, 
“God made him who had no sin to be sin for us, so that we might become the 
righteousness of God,” (2 Co. 5:21).  Still further, God, who being immortal cannot   166 
die, did die.  The God who is one as in the shemah became sundered: “Eloi, eloi, lama 
sabachtani?” (Mt. 27:46).  And, for the final coup de grâce to any hope of 
comprehension, to complete the wonderful absurdity of the whole event, that which 
could not die and did die came back to life!  This sudden and ironic turn, which in 
Tolkien is the token eucatastrophe, is the scandal to the Jews and stupidity to the 
Gentiles of 1 Corinthians 1:23.  It is the story for which Paul is both derided and 
applauded at the Areopagus in Acts 17.   
The story is Fantasy at its uttermost, it is a paradox and an impossibility.  It is 
easily derided and yet, like all Fantasy, so radically destabilises perceptions of reality 
to the point where the joy of it can actually engender belief and in doing so becomes 
“the power of God for salvation” (Ro. 1:16). 
[T]he Word of the Cross effectuates the transcendence of the Logos by 
setting it over against the paradoxical figure of the servant who is 
obedient to death, even death on the Cross.  The Cross is thus the place 
where two excesses intersect, the one by which thought itself is 
outpassed, the other where willing ceases, especially the willing of 
oneself in any form.  (Breton 1) 
This scene where thought and willing cease is, then, paradoxically the place where 
life begins in earnest, “For whoever wants to save his life will lose it, but whoever 
loses his life for me will save it” (Lk. 9:24).  Indeed, the whole fabric of the kingdom 
of God which the cross of Christ is meant to establish must operate in paradox, “For 
the foolishness of God is wiser than man’s wisdom,” (1 Co. 1:25).  Therefore it 
should come as no surprise that those who are weak and foolish are the ones marked 
out by Christ in the Beatitudes as being “blessed”.  Nor should it be amazing that 
Jesus’ own statements concerning the kingdom picture it as something which is at 
once present, imminent and to come in the more distant future.   
The difficulty of it is that while the Cross has interjected the kingdom into a 
world which is not-kingdom, that interjection has not to date done away with the not-  167 
kingdom placing those new citizens of the “otherly” realm in the awkward position of 
existing in both.  They live, as it were, a fantasy.  They live as fools, but the height of 
their foolishness is not the fact that they affirm the fantastic as ultimately real—for 
this is only the beginning of the thing—but that, because of this they actually live the 
scandal, the ludicrousness of Christ’s Passion, his kenosis.  Breton affirms this strange 
truth: 
All those who have followed him [Christ] have lived and verified the 
Pauline assertion “It is no longer I who live but Christ who lives in 
me.”  Folly consists indeed in “being outside of the self” and alienated 
in that Other who becomes one’s very depth.  This ecstatic going out 
of the self, Plato’s Mania, is also a reduction, a simplification that 
returns unceasingly from the world where it must live, to this sign, to 
this Eidos where it expires.  A reduction, but also an anamnesis of the 
one thing necessary to the forces of oblivion.  (42) 
This return and expiration, which Breton rightly deems an anamnesis, is the 
heart and function of liturgy.  The same mechanism which allows fantasy to function 
as literature enables liturgy to be the vessel which sails the fantastic other-world 
which is the existence between two worlds.  For when reading a fantasy novel one 
must suspend disbelief in the first place and then also adopt a temporary literary belief 
wherever the narrative retains an internal cohesion.  But this is not the end of the 
process, there is indeed much more mystery involved.  For, seizing upon this belief—
be it however temporary—fantasy can and does grasp onto the reader, draw him into a 
position necessitating self-criticism and, by eroding the artificiality of its relationship 
to “the real”
47 and upsetting associated assumed hierarchies between “real” and 
“imaginary,” can actually change the way he perceives himself and experience and 
transform the way he interacts with the world.  From this standpoint he is liberated 
                                                 
47 Two examples of this already noted phenomenon being when Harry finds biblical 
quotations on his parents’ tomb even though the entire world before this moment had 
been devoid of both God and religion as such as well as the moment at which Anodos 
admits that his time in Faerie Land was not a dream and that he will return there one 
day through his grave.   168 
with the claim that the Fantasy is more real than what he once construed as reality.  
As he continues on in his life, the perceived ethical implications of his altered 
perspective (and identity) will either help or hinder the navigation of life experiences, 
based of course on whether or not there was actually any truth to the fantasy at all 
(and, as MacDonald says, the more truly beautiful the Fantasy, the more it must 
reflect truth). 
Worship, or liturgy, functions the same way.  It creates a temporary space in 
which paradoxical or fantastic thinking and acting can take place.  The negativity of 
experience which reflects the non-kingdom nature of the worshipper’s daily 
surroundings as well as any lingering trace of disbelief (for those who are in fact 
“believers,” the proportion being obviously greater for those who claim no belief or 
who struggle greatly with it) are suspended, and all of the congregation—Christians 
or otherwise—are beckoned to participate in actions which assume the supreme 
actuality of the numinous and fantastical kingdom of God.  Wherein this process 
succeeds in creating belief, so too it also creates Real Presence.  Even more so, where 
this belief partakes in this Presence, as a sacrament, kenosis is complete and change 
begins.  Breton says of such worshipers, “Living utopias, they seem to meander 
between heaven and earth” (34).  Bridget Nichols affirms this, saying: 
The whole Christian background to acts of liturgical worship is rooted 
in the seeming paradox of giving up one’s identity in order to recover 
an identity in Christ.  This is not so much a paradox, however, as a 
hermeneutic exchange.  The impetus of liturgical action is towards the 
transformation of individuals, who discover a new identity as members 
of a worshipping community engaged in a journey of faith.  In the 
return movement, that community is continually reconfigured by 
responding to individual needs in the context of its own action.  It is 
this reconfigured community that returns from worship to life in the 
secular world.  (26) 
 
Of course this giving up of one’s identity is an act of supreme folly which 
should obviously not be taken seriously.  Yet, at the same point, it is the only way of   169 
reconciling to the Other—whether the relative other of human relationships or the 
radical Other of the divine.  In this way it is also the only way of reading, with the 
author/text as other, as Jasper insists in calling for the reader to become “utterly 
decentred” (Body 58-59). 
In both liturgy and hermeneutics one approaches a vulnerability.  In 
hermeneutics it is the vulnerability of the author who has given himself over in the 
body of his text that at one point it was even possible to declare that the author is 
dead.  In the liturgy it is God who has been made vulnerable as Word made flesh 
(indeed, he has been declared dead by Nietzsche, Altizer and many others, but this is 
nothing new for him—life to death to life seems to be the modus operandi).  Both 
have been the subject of violence by their various interpretive communities, thus also 
a great deal of “reading” and “religion” amount to nothing more than either blind or 
malicious violence. 
  Why, then, is violence still at the very centre of the Christian liturgy?  It is a 
sign of the vulnerability of God in his love for mankind and the hatred with which 
man has treated both God and his brother and sister in the way of Cain.  It is not an 
event recreated out of malice or perverse bloodthirst, but a remembrance of the 
significance of that vulnerability for the human relationship with the divine.  It is not 
a celebration of violence, but the simple affirmation that it must be recognised before 
it can be dealt with.  For the violence, emptying and death of the cross speaks towards 
the healing, exultation and life present in the resurrection—the two constitute one 
event—just as the Eucharistic meal points at the new life and exchanged identity 
present in baptism.  The process is a transformative one, and this is its entire purpose.   
  The only right response to the vulnerability present in both text and Word is a 
response in kind.  It is that thing which Fantasy literature in particular has always   170 
demanded—that the reader for a moment make himself subject to the stipulations of 
another and, in that subjection, suffer the possibility of being changed.  Anyone who 
refuses to do this may do any number of things with a fantastic text, but he cannot 
read it.  Likewise, anyone who enters into the liturgy stubbornly refusing to admit its 
premises, scorning all the time its ludicrousness, can say many things about liturgy 
but it cannot fully understand what it is or claim to have experienced it in the same 
way as a true participant. 
  At this point it is appropriate to at last return to a question introduced earlier in 
this chapter which was at the time dismissed.  The question was why it was possible 
for so many to toss aside reasonability and adopt a literary suspension of disbelief to 
the point that the actual kerygma in this case of the Harry Potter novels could be 
adopted, while the same kerygma in the biblical gospels remains largely, intentionally 
neglected for so many of the very same readers.  In the end, it cannot be anything 
other than the subjective choice of an individual.  It is dependent less on what an 
individual is willing to believe, even if only in a temporary sense, and much more on 
the threat perceived to be inherent to such a belief as well as the strength and 
profligacy of negative assumptions about the text under consideration.  Nicholls states 
that: 
for textual purposes, the liturgical process begins with an assumption 
of the Faith, but that it only comes to its fulfilment through an act of 
faith made possible by performance.  The liturgical action marks the 
crossing of the divide between the Faith and faith [where “the Faith” is 
the collective creedal faith of the Church based on biblical witness and 
tradition].  Liturgy is therefore a discourse, a practice, generated by the 
tension between faith and the Faith […] Hermeneutics can proclaim 
this as a possibility, but cannot force it into being.  The final task—the 
leap of faith—always lies with the performers at each enactment. 
(Nicholls 26-27) 
The point is that the decision to approach any fantastic requires the same faith and the 
same performance.  It is not in its nature a different thing to make believe for Harry   171 
Potter than it is to do the same for the Bible, the two are hermeneutically the same.  
Indeed, it is just as necessary when evaluating it for the thing that it is rather than as 
an object to be put to use for the sake of a religion, philosophy, historical narrative, or 
political ideology.  The key in any of these cases is not just the existence of a 
hermeneutical system but the actual act of performing faith.   
This is not in any fashion a prejudice in favour of those who espouse 
particular beliefs as the only “authorised” readers of their own theology.  Indeed, it is 
quite the opposite.  For any “believer” must similarly suspend all of his own belief 
which is effectively as prohibitive as any negative assumption.  This way of reading, 
of imagining, is in fact the only way of doing theology also.  It places all people on 
equal footing before texts and, truly, in equality with the texts themselves so that the 
present becomes a time in which “genuinely imaginative theology […] has again 
become possible” (Jasper, Body 157).  For it is not only the portion of society which 
has been alienated from theology by the entrenchment of Enlightenment reasoning, 
even as it crumbles into bits, for whom theology has become impossible, but also 
those who, unknowingly, have been pushed away from theology by Theology itself. 
  Therefore liturgy and Fantasy, ever entwined and consubstantial, present a 
way for both believers and unbelievers to meet together, again, as equals at the text of 
theology.  Who will risk the kenosis of being read?  Who will suffer the possibility 
that not only might his ideas and opinions be changed as in any intellectual exercise, 
but even more his beliefs and his very self?  Theology is dangerous occupation, losing 
himself is the minimum requisite.  Yet it is not what he might lose, but what he might 
gain which is at stake.  It is the very risk of belief, its seemingly tenuous 
epistemological foundations, which must next be investigated.  
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Textually Transmitted Diseases: the Risk of Hermeneutical Intimacy 
It all began with Aristotle.  Yet, perhaps this is a minor misstatement, for the 
idea goes back at least to his mentor, Plato, before him.  Still, Aristotle provides a 
wonderful starting place for a discussion on categories of truth and the epistemology 
of belief simply because his statement on the subject is so well known and 
foundational.  Writing, of course, in his Poetics, Aristotle writes “Hence poetry is 
something more philosophic and of a graver import than history,” (27).  Now, 
Aristotle was certainly not an adversary of history, nor did he find it a trivial matter.  
His statement was fuelled by his belief that universals were categorically more 
important than particulars.  De facto, then, he creates what is essentially an 
epistemological hierarchy between literary forms. 
Whereas commitment to Aristotle’s strict theory of universal and particular 
has come and gone over the centuries, what has remained is this (often in the 
minority) nagging insistence that there is truth in places other than those privileged by 
a given society or intellectual hegemony and that there are indeed categories of truth 
with even the possibility of qualitative difference between them.  Generally, this 
cause has been one championed by various literary and artistic cliques already on the 
margins of society and, since at least the nineteenth century, losing the last vestiges of 
their prestige to an ever more encroaching and leviathan amalgamation of 
Enlightenment reason.  Yet the artists were not the only voice of alterity in this 
discussion, they were eventually accompanied to a certain extent in this trend by the 
philosophers.  For both had in common the fact that their enterprise consisted more of 
considering those thing possible while science dazzled societies with its inventions   174 
and the intellectual allure of proving the actual.  No longer were the greatest thinkers 
among men dependent on strict rationalisation but, buoyed by an investigative 
empiricism, man could now set his sights on actual achievements which could not 
themselves simply be brushed aside by a subsequent generation of thinkers.  A steam 
engine, a telegraph machine, a light bulb—these were actual objects which could be 
seen, touched, experienced and indeed be made useful.  What had Kant ever done for 
the Shropshire farmer, the Manchester mill worker, the London mother of twelve? 
No longer did it seem so Romantic or important to make a career of sitting, 
thinking and writing.  The nineteenth century was an age of industry, a time for doing 
and accomplishing.  In this sort of ultra-materialistic environment it was indeed very 
difficult for poets and subsequently philosophers to hold their ground and not be 
bullied out of the way by engineers, biologists, physicists and the medical sciences.  
Even within literature itself during this period there was a sharp divide between the 
direction being taken by a majority of novelists towards realism and the darker 
literary underbelly of the time.  Most recognisable among the dissidents were the 
Gothic writers, as in the case of Mary Shelley, who asked very directly questions like 
“Where is this science taking us?”   
Two important things ought to be noticed here about the Gothic phenomenon 
in the nineteenth century.  Firstly, Gothic often was an expression of the same rigid 
realism of other standard fiction at the time.  While something might at first seem out 
of place or contradictory to popular paradigm, it would turn out a ruse in the end and 
some trope like Sherlock Holmes would come along and explain how it all was 
perfectly reasonable.  This is what made Gothic so entertaining in many instances, 
that it allowed its readers to have  fright and then laugh at their own silly mistake and 
inner suspiciousness.  For Gothic was not truly Gothic unless one could, in the end,   175 
mock the crude, unenlightened superstition of it all.  This is certainly what is going on 
in The Mysteries of Udolpho (1794), for instance.  This is also why Gothic literature 
so often features women, or in the case of The Castle of Otranto, peasants—naturally 
these sort of people are weak minded and would be more prone to be subject to a 
superstitious whimsy and even more so to believe it.  This is also, of course, why 
particularly evangelicals through this period insisted so sternly on keeping Gothic 
“romances” out of the hands of (young) women. 
The second aspect of Gothic which needs drawn out was hinted at by the 
first—this is that Gothic itself was rarely ever meant to be at all “serious” and often 
got quite a poor reception when it did.  The overarching purpose or function of Gothic 
was to entertain, not to lastingly challenge people’s perceptions of reality.  As 
insidiously spine-chilling as much of the very good Gothic literature was, it was 
important to be able to dismiss it rather rapidly after one had finally closed the book.  
This is why stories like James’ “Turn of the Screw” were and indeed still are much 
more disturbing than some of their peers—for James offers no consolation, no salve 
or cordial, nothing that would make the haunting image of malevolent spirits preying 
on children any more palatable.  It is no wonder why these, one could call them 
“unequivocal,” works were in the minority of the genre throughout the period.  
All of this, then, is to say that Gothic differs from what I am calling fantasy in 
this work in that it simply seeks to twist or play with the “rules” of reality or the 
metanarrative of Enlightenment whereas fantasy seeks to subvert its privileged status 
altogether and does so rather audaciously.  This begins to speak of the risk of fantasy.  
In truth, it is really the risk of all literature.  But where this risk might be subtle and 
cunning in some recesses of narrative and poetry it is forthright and brazen within 
fantasy literature.  The risk is very much in the open and unabashed with fantasy and   176 
perhaps this contributes to its own particular powerfulness.  This was the risk that the 
Puritans sensed when they strove to keep fiction out of the hands of the 
impressionable.  They knew the convicting power of literature because of their own 
devotion to the Scriptures.  Yet other texts were a priori regarded as unsafe, 
unhygienic, unwholesome.   
Their logic was the same as those who encourage abstinence as a way of 
combating venereal disease; by limiting the number of texts one interacted with it was 
possible to minimise or negate the likelihood of some sort of intellectual malady.  But 
there is no such thing as a “pure” text or a “virgin” text (and no such thing as a virgin-
birthed text, either).  They are randy, prurient little things.  When one speaks of texts 
one must mention their “textual immorality,” their proclivity towards incest and 
orgies and all other manner of activities usually listed under “do not” in the Bible.  Of 
course, not even the Bible is “pure” in this sense (one might even say especially not 
the Bible!).  Who would have expected that in its “God-breathed” pages one might 
find an unwelcome lover—“What’s this?  Greek Poetry?  Why Paul,  how could 
you?” 
Every textual experience bears risk, every sexual experience bears risk—if not 
the risk of exposure, then the risk of vulnerability.  What is worse, Chlamydia or 
heartbreak?  Intimacy is dangerous not only because it exposes but because it gambles 
with losing control to the Other, even, perhaps, to the point of kenosis.  When one 
reads, he braves the possibility not only of what he might do to the text (if he holds it 
in high regard) but of what it might do to him (can it be trusted?).  The risk is a social 
one as well.  Derrida might be good-looking, but also the worst date ever—such a 
conversation killer!  Likewise in some circles it would doubtless be scandalous to go 
about arm-in-arm with a Heidegger or a Proust and in most places it is certainly most   177 
unfashionable to get caught out as the Gospel of St. Matthew’s inamorato.  When one 
chooses a lover, consents to intimacy, it constitutes an act of faith—a true credo, a 
crediting of that other person with the belief that she or he will not take advantage of 
or manipulate that bond, that exposure and insecurity.  Now, such a decision is never 
based on an accumulation of experiences, for more often than not such liaisons result 
in more pain than pleasure.  So why do people do it?  Why read?  Why take a lover, 
husband or wife?  If not based on evidence, then why suffer such an irrationality?  It 
is, of course, because the promise of the possible which, to nicely return to Aristotle, 
is more important to people than the actual.  Aristotle’s statement is not philosophical, 
not axiomatic; it is an observation.  It is the case because human beings have and 
continue to make it the case. 
Now, just as there are degrees of intimacy, so are there degrees of risk.  There 
is only a little risk in a blind date.  The worst that could happen is to have to endure a 
tedious evening or the awkwardness of cutting an engagement short by saying, “Look, 
this really is not working for me.”  There is more risk in an one night stand and even 
more risk than that in a marriage vow.  The goal of this chapter is to consider the 
scope, degree and type of risk involved in temporary, literary belief, the same sort of 
belief encountered in liturgical enactment as I have posited previously, and to 
contextualise it among the other strands of belief which are more commonly or 
thoughtlessly engaged in contemporary society.  This will mean investigating what 
can be loosely called the epistemology of belief, starting in the Victorian era with the 
main subjects of our discussion and following on into the present. 
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The Hermeneutical “Leap” 
To start the discussion it is appropriate to consider first that eminent Danish 
philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard, not because his influence on his period was the 
greatest, but because he exemplifies the intellectual struggle and the way in which 
thinking persons were made to “go on” with their faith in the face of an epistemology 
which gradated towards empiricism.  It is Kierkegaard, undoubtedly, who coins the 
definitive axiom for theistic belief in the face of empirical indeterminacy, the “leap of 
faith”—or, at least, this was the metaphor he used if not the phrase itself.  
Kierkegaard was an intellectual paradox: he at once doubted most vehemently and 
thoroughly yet he also believed the most fervently and passionately.  For him faith 
was not a cool wager, as for Pascal, nor the sum of evidence as it will be seen in 
Cardinal Newman.  No, it was an epic journey, a life-shattering decision based from 
the very bottom of his soul and coursing through his entire body and out through his 
thin, worn down fingertips.   
Kierkegaard was nothing if not bold.  His decisive grandeur would echo 
throughout philosophical theology even into the work of Tillich who wrote of “the 
courage to be.”  Regard the intense urgency with which he discusses his decision in a 
journal entry dated 1 August, 1835: 
And so the die is cast—I cross the Rubicon!  This road certainly leads 
me to strife; but I shall not give up …  I will hurry along the path I 
have discovered, greeting those whom I meet on my way, not looking 
back as did Lot’s wife, but remembering it is a hill up which we have 
to struggle. (Kierkegaard 6) 
For Kierkegaard, one who doubted above and beyond even most every sceptic, the 
doubt itself had none of the noble, Byronic overtones which it did in Britain (and 
here, perhaps, is the greatest benefit of his being Danish).  In his thinking, doubt was 
less legitimate than faith because its assumptions were in fact greater than those of   179 
faith and instead of producing a healthy, productive life yielded only paranoia and 
indecision.  In 1841 he writes: 
My doubt is terrible.—Nothing can withstand it—it is a cursed hunger 
and I can swallow up every argument, every consolation and 
sedative—I rush at 10,000 miles a second through every obstacle.  It is 
a positive starting point for philosophy when Aristotle says that 
philosophy begins with wonder, not as in our day with doubt.  
Moreover the world will learn that the thing is not to begin with the 
negative, and the reason why it has succeeded up to the present is that 
it has never really given itself over to the negative, and so has never 
seriously done what it said.  Its doubt is mere child’s play.  The idea of 
philosophy is mediation
48—Christianity’s is the paradox. (14) 
It wasn’t doubt which was necessarily the most problematic aspect of the thinking of 
his contemporaries, but the way in which it was utilised by philosophers, as antithesis, 
in order to systematise, synthesise and ultimately sterilise all of existence.   
  According to Kierkegaard, Christianity’s “idea” is necessary because in its 
paradox, which in Fear and Trembling (1843) he calls “the paradox of life and 
experience,” there is something much more real or substantive than philosophy which 
sought to categorise an indeterminate, continuing world which was full of both 
paradox and possibility (126).  It is this paradox which urges him to “begin with 
wonder” rather than the negative which seeks to synthesise existence as if it were a 
chemical equation needing to be balanced.  How can he take such a position?  Does 
he experience no fear?  What if he is wrong?  Did he simply indulge in self-delusion 
for the sake of his own comfort?  In another journal entry from 1839 he writes: 
The whole of existence frightens me, from the smallest fly to the 
mystery of the Incarnation, everything is unintelligible to me, most of 
all myself; the whole of existence is poisoned in my sight, particularly 
myself .  Great is my sorrow and without bounds; no man knows it, 
only God in heaven, and he will not console me […] (11) 
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To Kierkegaard paradox was important not because it simplified or made anything 
easier but for precisely the opposite reason—that “it is a hill up which we have to 
struggle”.  God, then, was unreasonable simply because reason had no means of 
encapsulating or analyzing him.  What a crime it must be, then, to posit a system of 
the universe or a cosmogony!  Likely this is ultimately what is at the very root of 
Kierkegaard’s distrust and dislike of organised religion—that it translated mystery 
into reasoning’s and ethics. 
  The famous declaration he gave of this state of affairs in Fear and Trembling 
was that “our age is not willing to stop with faith, with its miracle of turning water 
into wine; it goes further, it turns wine into water” (118).  In a stunning stroke of 
irony, it was the sort of mythologisation of theology which, in the end, “ruined the 
sacred truths” by its demythologisation.  It is in his Philosophical Fragments (1844) 
where Kierkegaard unleashes the fullness of his philosophical and rhetorical vitality.  
It was, in essence, a Declaration of Independence from the prevailing empire of 
philosophy and he was its Thomas Jefferson.  Taking on the dignity of himself 
penning an introduction as the “future” Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard declares of 
his own work: 
… this book was nothing less than a declaration of independence, not 
only from the reigning Hegelianism of S.K.’s time and locality, but 
also from the whole tradition of rationalistic, “systematic” thought 
which, with one or two significant interruptions, had held the stage in 
Europe for at least two centuries.  (190) 
This empire, then, was the same which the Victorian fantasists rebelled against and 
was remarkably metaphorically akin to the Roman Empire in its last days.  It was 
divided into two realms, one of which was ruled by philosophy and the other 
theology, though both regimes were hapless and tensions ever divided the two.  In 
Kierkegaard’s mind, the real fantasist was the philosopher which had “gradually come   181 
to be so fantastic a being that scarcely the most extravagant fancy has ever invented 
anything so fabulous” (200). 
  Kierkegaard’s charge and claim was that philosophers had been made 
redundant not by industrialisation and the physical sciences, but by their own 
determination to be elite, abstract, removed and irrelevant towards normal human life: 
As soon as it is remembered that philosophizing does not consist in 
addressing fantastic beings in fantastic language, but that those to 
whom the philosopher addresses himself are human beings; so that we 
have not to determine fantastically in abstracto whether a persistent 
striving is something lower than systematic finality, or vice versa, but 
that the question is what existing human beings, insofar as they are 
existing human beings, must needs be content with: then it will be 
evident that the ideal of a persistent striving is the only view of life that 
does not carry with it an inevitable disillusionment.  (203) 
The “persistent striving,” is in fact faith and not doubt.  Of course, this principle is a 
theological one as well as philosophical.  The truth requires “persistent striving” 
because it is paradoxical and therefore unable to be systematised, rationalised or 
legitimated.  The truth is not paradoxical by its own nature  but “by virtue of its 
relationship to an existing individual” (216).  Therefore faith itself is not a place of 
permanence or assent to an eternal set of propositions but rather a process.  Faith, 
according to Kierkegaard, is necessary in an incomplete existence which cannot be 
understood.  It is the only way to approach it, and conversely it is the only thing that 
can thusly be approached.  “For the absurd is the object of faith, and [thus] the only 
object that can be believed” (221). 
  If this postulate is true, then it follows that faith, wherever it happens, must 
contain equal risk or absurdity or else it is not, in fact, faith.  Kierkegaard argues at 
length in Philosophical Fragments that  it is impossible to have objective knowledge 
of Christianity’s truth (but neither of its untruth), but that this is what made it most 
important.  What is known cannot be believed and Truth is a thing which, because it   182 
is paradoxical, must be believed rather than known.  “Truth,” he says, “is 
subjectivity” (191). 
  Therefore, if faith is the pursuit of paradoxical truth, then any process which 
claims to possess in entirety, finality and objectivity must be a ruse.  “In a 
speculative-fantastic sense we have a positive finality in the System, and in an 
aesthetic-fantastic sense we have one in the fifth act of the drama.  But this sort of 
finality is valid only for fantastic beings” (Kierkegaard 204).  To believe, then, is not 
a fantasy.  To “know” with objectivity and finality is possible only for “fantastic 
beings”.  To believe entails risk all the same—“Without risk there is no faith” (214).  
Yet the risk in believing must be considerably less than that of knowing.  For the 
believer has never claimed knowledge, so that he can not be proven wrong.  He who 
“knows” God, however—this type characterising as many religious persons as 
nonreligious—risks everything in what must always be a losing bet. 
  Such a perspective also liberates faith from dogmatism, for this too codifies 
and finalises where such things are impossible.  While he himself maintained the 
centrality of Christianity, it was never the precise object of faith which really made a 
difference for Kierkegaard (and here one might see again the result of encroaching 
doubts throughout the nineteenth century over the traditional doctrine of eternal 
punishment).  What mattered most was a person’s seeking after truth and making 
himself subject to that truth.   He states in a journal entry that “It is this divine side of 
man, his inward action, which means everything—not a mass of information” (5).  
Therefore, the body of knowledge in a person’s possession, should it comprise 
doctrines, theological arguments, or anything of the sort, is by far less substantial than 
the “inward action,” that is, the intellectual and spiritual pursuit of truth.     183 
In a century where Christendom was preoccupied with the concerns of 
missionaries, the example Kierkegaard provides in Philosophical Fragments is apt: 
If one who lives in the midst of Christianity goes up to the house of 
God, the house of the true God, with the true conception of God in his 
knowledge, and prays, but prays in a  false spirit; and one who lives in 
an idolatrous community prays, but prays with the entire passion of the 
infinite, although his eyes rest upon the image of an idol: where is 
there most truth?  The one prays in truth to God although he worships 
an idol; the other prays falsely to the true God, and hence worships in 
fact an idol.  (212) 
While stopping well short of MacDonald’s universalism, Kierkegaard reiterates 
powerfully the extent to which faith must be differentiated from knowledge.  The 
significance of this is that it qualifies the sort of risk taken in the act of belief itself, 
specifically the temporary literary/liturgical belief at the centre of this paper.  For it 
means that content itself cannot be dangerous to an individual with a proper “inward 
action.”  There is never any danger in any text for the person of faith and “inward 
action.”  St. Paul says as much when he states  “All things are yours, whether Paul or 
Apollos or Cephas or the world
49 or life or death or the present or the future—all are 
yours, and you are of Christ, and Christ is of God” (1 Co. 3:21-23).  Neither was the 
idea unique to Paul.  Jesus articulates the same idea by stating “Don’t you see that 
nothing that enters a man from the outside can make him ‘unclean’?” but rather, 
“What comes out of a man makes him unclean” (Mk. 7:18, 20). 
  There is no doubt as to why Kierkegaard remains to this day an archetypical 
existentialist.  He rejected the objective wherever he found it, whether in “truth” or 
philosophy, faith or religion.  His response to the Cartesian question was essentially to 
dismiss it as either unanswerable or unimportant.  He avoided ultimate foundations as 
being every bit as unattainable as ultimate conclusions and posited a different way of 
existing within the paradigm of intellectual (and otherwise) existence:  “What if, 
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instead of talking or dreaming about an absolute beginning, we talked about a leap”  
(200).  By taking that leap he became the “master and way out of the league that the 
rest of us play in” (Fodor 17).  Of course, his work doesn’t seem nearly so radical as it 
was in the nineteenth century, but this is because he influenced such a wide range of 
philosophers and theologians that his famous “way out” became in many ways and for 
many readers and students of philosophy a “way in.” 
  In terms of the project at hand, Kierkegaard’s work provides an excellent 
philosophical matrix which is then filled with the “stuff” of a hermeneutic of fantasy 
to at last produce a sort of spellcraft by which it again becomes possible to speak of 
belief, or to assert or even simply infer that which is “other” to the overarching, 
tyrannical metaphor and metanarrative of Enlightenment reason.  The difference 
between the framework which Kierkegaard provides and one adopted from, for 
instance, a Post-Structuralist approach is the intentionally constructive, progressive 
function of Kierkegaard’s philosophy in contrast to the deconstructive and sometimes 
nihilistic methodology of the Post-Structuralists.   
This Post-Structuralism begins, in one sense, with Nietzsche and his 
“genealogies.”  So to speak of the Kierkegaardian “leap” is to respond not only to the 
totalising “positivist” effect of reason but also the negative force of deconstruction.  
To leap is to make the same movement as in the adoption of literary belief, although 
without the safety valve of that specific kind of belief’s characteristic temporal 
expiration.  When Kierkegaard crosses the Rubicon, it is not an experiment, but an 
adventure.  Because for him the world is so full of risk and uncertainty, it makes no 
sense at all to hold back.  The present state is neither safe nor satisfactory for 
Kierkegaard, he seeks always to move forward.  Therefore, he does not mark his trail 
with breadcrumbs because “home” is an eschatological, apocalyptic category, not an   185 
origin and “self” a journey rather than a set of characteristics.  He cannot be taken 
from his path because his path is itself the process rather than any intellectual “place.”   
In this way the Kierkegaardian model demonstrates its potential for doing 
away with the risk of a literary/liturgical encounter altogether.  Instead of temporarily 
exchanging one set of beliefs or assertions for another, with the somewhat frightening 
prospect of never being able to quite reclaim the ones which were set down in the 
beginning, ideas become catalysts for intellectual and spiritual evolution instead of 
some sort of internal possession or, even more drastically, definitive characteristics 
and identity markers.  Because it is the general tendency for an individual to believe 
himself right in all things until he alters his position (a possibility rarely admitted, 
much less sought after or encouraged), believing otherwise becomes an automatically 
threatening prospect as it seems to threaten his treasured property or even his very 
selfhood.   Yet Kierkegaard proves the Marx of the intellectual economy, 
problematising such conceptions of ownership and identity based on, essentially, the 
social stratification of ideas.  Thoughts, notions, assertions, beliefs and (the most 
numinous category of them all) knowledge are not mental objects but functions of a 
process which result from faith, or objective uncertainty/paradox.  
  When Kierkegaard speaks of philosophers as “fantastic beings,” he speaks 
himself as a fantasist, employing the classic turn of metaphor in which that which is 
reasonable becomes absurd and the profoundly obvious, illusory.  He himself 
becomes Anodos, who, even after returning from Fairy Land, yearns to return to the 
land which, for him, will forever be truer and more actual than the mundane.  It is no 
wonder, then, that Kierkegaard, like most fantasists, remained peripheral and 
marginalised throughout his own lifetime.  For him it was the finality of that which 
was posited as “real” or “reasonable” which rendered it, in the end, absolutely   186 
untenable and ridiculous.  In the same way as anything which claims mimesis is 
inevitably fictive (thus rendering realist fiction as the most truly fantastic of all 
literature), Kierkegaard saw all explanation or systematisation as patently 
unreasonable.
50  Thus he became to philosophy what George MacDonald, Lewis 
Carroll and their counterparts were to literature. 
  Despite his own admission that his scepticism was boundless and all-
consuming, Kierkegaard can never be for many the definitive Post-Enlightenment 
sceptic nor eminently qualified because of his (albeit non-traditional) commitment to 
the public expression of specifically Christian faith.  Thus, it becomes quite facile to 
become sceptical and consequently dismissive of Kierkegaard as an individual solely 
interested in the legitimisation of personal sentiment.  Undoubtedly, there is far too 
much force and vigour to his work for it succumb to such mild attempts at 
reductionism.  Yet, if the Victorian fantasists are to be contextualised philosophically, 
Kierkegaard alone simply will not do.  To understand what someone like MacDonald 
is doing in his fantasy literature, it is necessary to consider a more British  tradition.  
   
An Unexpected Fantasist 
If one is to understand the philosophical roots of Victorian British fantasy 
literature, it is essential to move back in time from that period in order to discover the 
controversial, enigmatic father of Post-Enlightenment British scepticism, David 
Hume.  Indeed, while Hume might seem an unnatural choice to link to an evangelical 
like MacDonald or Kingsley, they have much more congruence than first appearances 
might indicate.  Why Hume has been passed down through the ages as a champion of 
atheism, whether through an unwillingness to associate scepticism with any religious 
                                                 
50 In this way it is perhaps Kuhn who becomes the most excellent contemporary heir 
to Kierkegaardian tradition.   187 
perspective other than agnosticism or atheism, or a transmission of the somewhat 
overstated charges levelled against him by his contemporaries without respect to his 
thoroughgoing responses to them, or a simple revisionism it cannot be determined or 
resolved.  Yet the internal evidence of some of his most prominent writings (and even 
more so in private correspondence) clearly and consistently places Hume as a theist.   
While it is an interesting reading of Hume to regard these statements as an 
ironic cover for bitter inward atheism, the reading’s foundation on the argument that 
Hume was forced to be a theist by social and professional constraints simply does not 
hold.  For if Hume was in the habit of editing his philosophy or beliefs for the sake of 
professional advancement, he did so with remarkable inconsistency and 
incompetence.  Instead, he persistently combated the idea that he was an atheist or 
sought to undermine Christian faith even on occasions which he had nothing 
particular to gain from his dissent.  Most notable among these, perhaps, is his “A 
Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh” (1728) which was undertaken 
after, not before, he was rejected for professorship when there was little to no hope of 
ever reversing the faculty’s decision.  Hume was unarguably at odds with many of the 
institutional theologians of his day, but the conflict always had more to do with his 
objections to Thomism than opposition to faith itself.  In the same way, he was 
supremely critical also of the claims and epistemologies of his contemporary 
philosophers, even fellow sceptics. 
What binds Hume together with Kierkegaard and the Victorian fantasists is his 
relentless attack on both the reason and epistemology which was being developed 
around him throughout the Enlightenment.  He sought not to dismantle what he calls 
common reason or indeed even the philosophical or theological endeavour, rather to 
moderate the claims of his peers in these fields:   188 
As to the Scepticism with which the Author is charged, I must observe, 
that the Doctrine of the Pyrrhonians or Sceptics have been regarded in 
all Ages as Principles of mere Curiosity, or a Kind of Jeux d’espirit, 
without any Influence on a Man’s steady Principles or Conduct in Life.  
In Reality, a Philosopher who affects to doubt the Maxims of common 
Reason, and even of his Senses, declares sufficiently that he is not in 
earnest, and that he intends not to advance an Opinion which he would 
recommend as Standards of Judgment and Action.  All he means by 
these Scruples is to abate the Pride of mere human Reasoners, by 
showing them, that even with regard to Principles which seem the 
clearest, and which they are necessitated from the strongest Instincts of 
Nature to embrace, they are not able to attain a full Consistence and 
absolute Certainty.  Modesty then, and Humility, with regard to the 
Operations of our natural Faculties, is the Result of Scepticism; not a 
universal Doubt, which is impossible for any Man to support, and the 
first and most trivial Accident in Life must immediately disconcert and 
destroy.  (“Letter” 116) 
To Hume, scepticism was nothing more than a tool with which to examine the popular 
doctrines of the day, not entirely unlike the role of deconstruction in Derrida.  It is 
here, in correspondences like the one sent to the Lord Provost, John Coutts, that the 
student of Hume gains critical insight into just the sort of thing he was really trying to 
accomplish in his philosophical writing.  Opinions which declare the letter a “gloss” 
fail to recognise the import of Hume breaking his customary silence with regards to 
his own work and the unequivocal nature of his self-defence.  It was his own pride 
and sense of dignity which typically kept him from responding to what he must have 
seen as petty and misguided criticism. Therefore, it would be absolutely absurd if, for 
the sake of that dignity or some other sentiment, he broke the silence only to trivialise 
his own work!  It must be the case, then, that Hume wrote material like the “Letter” in 
earnest, otherwise it is utterly unaccountable.  To dismiss it all as sarcasm or self-
service would be the real gloss. 
  Because Hume wrote as a contemporary to the Enlightenment, he of course 
had no cause to react to the startling division it would reap between theology and 
philosophy and even more so the sciences.  The problem to Hume was that at that   189 
point theology did not yet know that its relationship with philosophy and “pure 
reason” had been ruptured.  Theologians wanted to hold on to the Aquinas who said 
that God could be deduced while ignoring the Aquinas who disparaged the ability of 
reason alone as the mechanism of theology and of knowing God, even its potential to 
know God.  What Hume did, essentially, was to recognise the inherent and historic 
problem that “pure reason” presents to theologians (and also, in a related manner, to 
philosophers):   
In Reality, whence come all the various Tribes of Heretics, the Arians, 
Socinians and Deists, but from too great a Confidence in mere human 
Reason, which they regard as the Standard of every Thing, and which 
they will not submit to the superior Light of Revelation?  (“Letter” 
117) 
Hume discovers the very same experience undergone by Milton and MacDonald, 
finding that entirely reasonable theology is inevitably heretical theology.  Whenever 
the paradox, the true “faith” of Kierkegaard’s later objective uncertainty, is 
eliminated, so too is banished the orthodox faith of historical, Biblical Christianity.  
The Thomism of that time had more in common with St. Thomas the Doubter, who 
needed to see, touch and know the resurrection, than St. Thomas Aquinas. 
  Hume, like Kierkegaard, considered subjectivity and belief as things to be 
embraced rather than shunned.  For belief, belief in the evidence of the senses and 
sentiments, was the very core of Hume’s epistemology.  To him anything which 
purported to be knowledge began with belief, such that religious beliefs were held on 
the same terms as other much more mundane assertions: 
And must not a Man be ridiculous to assert that our Author denies the 
Principles of Religion, when he looks upon them as equally certain 
with the Objects of his Senses?  If I be as much assured of these 
Principles, as that this Table at which I now write is before me; Can 
any Thing further be desired by the most rigorous Antagonist?  
(“Letter” 117)   190 
Now, in order to contextualise such a statement in Hume, one must enact one of two 
choices.  Either he must make and support the claim that in it Hume is somehow lying 
without restraint, a notion which has already been dealt with and dismissed, or he 
must use it to enlighten Hume’s other statements on the nature and foundation of 
belief. 
  Hume appears at his most adversarial with regards to religion when he 
confronts the use of miracles in support of the veracity of religion.  He cites the 
weight of evidence against miracles as the entire weight of human experience which 
is regarded as non-miraculous to say of them what was already known, that they are 
impossible:   
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and 
unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a 
miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument 
from experience can possibly be imagined.  (Enquiry 76) 
Hume goes further by establishing the weight of the many false miracles of history, 
but makes the categorical error of assigning all miracle events to this designation.  He 
has demonstrated the prevalence of false miracles, but it is of course a non sequitur to 
assume that all miracle events must be the same.   
Yet it is important to realise that the real object of Hume’s criticism here are 
not the miracles of Christian tradition but the way in which the Church used them as 
justification of its belief while ignoring and dismissing the similar claims of all other 
world religions.  He not only problematised this way of reasoning, but openly mocks 
the method of employment by associating those he calls the “dangerous friends or 
disguised enemies of the Christian Religion” with the very parties who they 
themselves scorn mercilessly: “when we believe any miracle of Mahomet or his 
successors, we have for our warrant the testimony of a few barbarous Arabians” 
(Enquiry 89, 81-82).  He undertakes his argument, he says, solely to “confound” such   191 
persons and their hazardous influence on faith.  “Our most holy religion,” Hume 
states, “is founded on Faith, not reason; and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it 
to such a  trial as it is, by no means, fitted to endure” (89). 
  In support of this claim, he beckons the examination of the Pentateuchal 
miracles, “not as the word or testimony of God himself, but as the production of a 
mere writer or historian” (Enquiry 90).  This could, perhaps, be called Hume’s own 
unique wager—that if the weight of divine revelation lies on the holy scriptures, then 
its miracles do not need the validation of any number of witnesses and to pretend to 
such would lessen, not strengthen, their weight.  From this perspective, it would be 
cheap and ludicrous to say “I believe in the resurrection because of the character of 
St. Mark and the other witnesses who observed it.”  To Hume, no number of 
witnesses of a miracle has ever been assembled so as to legitimate its claims 
historically.  In contrast, it would be much more preferable to assert the resurrection 
on the basis of faith, because this does not need to be reasonable.  It is a claim which 
reason cannot touch, affect, or speak of much less dismiss.  This is a claim which he 
does not rely solely on his sceptic criticism to propagate, but he even enlists the 
authority of his ecclesial predecessors.  “All of the ancient Fathers, as well as our first 
Reformers, are copious in representing the Weakness and Uncertainty of mere human 
Reason”
51 (“Letter” 117). 
  It should begin to become clear at this point why Hume has been chosen as the 
person to contextualise the Victorian fantasists’ reaction to the Enlightenment.  He 
was the intellectual foundation on which the fantasists wrote, always chipping away at 
the magnificent claim of philosophers and theologians and, in so doing, usurping the 
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throne of reason and exposing its claims to royalty as being as spurious as Henry 
Tudor’s.  He did not go so far in terms of constructing a positive alternative to the 
perspective he so doggedly criticised, but this is mainly because there was so much 
criticism to be done in his lifetime.  The influence of Kant, who himself was 
awakened from “dogmatic slumber” by Hume’s relentless critiques,
52 undoubtedly 
made it much more feasible for someone like Kierkegaard to develop something 
constructive and progressive out of the Kantian remnants leftover after the meadow of 
his thought and critique had been thoroughly ploughed by Hegel.  Indirectly, it is 
Hume who makes possible Kant, Kierkegaard and the Victorian fantasists.  In this 
way, he may rightly deserve to be called a Romantic in his own, peculiar right.  
  To speak of Hume as a Romantic or even someone who in an obscure way 
paved the road for later fantasists begs the question of his perspective on imagination 
and belief.  Imagination was as powerful of a concept to Hume as it would become for 
the poets who exemplify the term “Romantic” a generation after him.  For him, like 
his poetic successors, the concept of imagination was also closely linked to one of 
belief.  In a thinker as thoroughly sceptical as Hume, one would expect to find, 
however, a rigorous and rigid distinction between things imagined and things 
believed.  However, actuality confounds this expectation to a great degree, for the 
explanation of their relationship in Hume is much more intangible, idiosyncratic: 
Nothing is more free than the imagination of man; and though it cannot 
exceed that original stock of ideas, furnished by the internal and 
external senses, it has unlimited power of mixing, compounding, 
separating, and dividing these ideas, in all the varieties of fiction and 
vision […]  Wherein, therefore, consists the difference between such a 
fiction and belief? […]  the difference between fiction and belief lies in 
some sentiment or feeling, which is annexed to the latter, not to the 
former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be commanded at 
pleasure.  It must be excited by nature, like all other sentiments […]  
(Enquiry 31) 
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In reality, Hume sees no firm and unmovable wall or barrier between imagination and 
belief, only a very subjective “sentiment” which is entirely outside of the scope of the 
will’s influence.  All the same, imagination is pictured as being entire orders of 
magnitude less important that actual belief—“belief is nothing but a more vivid, 
lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone 
is ever able to attain” (32).  Although little separates the two, in function they are 
almost entirely different:   
And in philosophy, we can go no farther than assert, that belief is 
something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the 
judgment from the fictions of the imagination.  It gives them more 
weight and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; 
enforces them in the mind; and renders them the governing principle of 
our actions.  (32) 
So, of course, the difference between imagination and belief is very important even if 
that which separates them is very little. 
  Again, to return to the literary subject at hand, this would place the risk of 
hermeneutical imagination, which entails that subtle, literary belief, in the fact that, 
according to one’s own nature and sentiment, it could involuntarily create a much 
more firm and lasting belief which could thereafter scarcely be abandoned.  Within 
the Humean sense, though, this is both hardly and cataclysmically problematic.  It is 
cataclysmically problematic because it is the imagination which allows interface with 
thought and experience.  It is at the same time hardly problematic because the risk is 
that of existence, the one already undertaken in every moment of every day.  Thus its 
difficulty becomes so great as to require a “leap,” but one which humans are 
demonstrably capable of and are comfortable making.  
Hume also is no absurdist.  He moderates his claims to the point where 
imagination does not need to be either radical or nearly so frightening.  For, in him at   194 
least, the familiar and the sensible are that which govern the sentiment of belief such 
that belief ought to be based on firm experience.  He provides this example:   
I hear at present, for instance, a person’s voice, with whom I am 
acquainted; and the sound comes as from the next room.  This 
impression of my senses immediately conveys my thought to the 
person, together with all the surrounding objects.  I paint them out to 
myself as existing at present, with the same qualities and relations, of 
which I formerly knew them possessed.  These ideas take faster hold of 
my mind, than ideas of an enchanted castle.  They are very different to 
the feeling, and have much greater influence of every kind, either to 
give pleasure or pain, joy or sorrow.  (Enquiry 32-33) 
It is because one knows or in some other way identifies closely with an idea that it 
excites his imagination into belief, while that which is entirely unfamiliar to him, 
through every fibre of his being, will  doubtless receive much less esteem.  Yet the 
point of the enchanted castle in the sort of fantasy which this thesis has been 
concerned with is not that it is entirely unfamiliar, but that although it is entirely alien 
it still manages to be shockingly evocative by delving deep into those feelings and 
ideas which, though deeply embedded in the reader’s person, are nevertheless 
suppressed or forgotten. 
  So even as Hume labours to mediate the “danger” of his intrinsically 
subjective and, after all, greatly a priori epistemology of belief, he yet cannot fool the 
close observers.  His guarantees are more like hastily prepared balms and snake oil 
ointments which cannot disguise the fact his system must always be an intensely 
personal one, that throughout pieces such as An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding a great proportion of the evidences are highly individualised anecdotes 
which may bear little or no weight for any reader other than Hume himself.  Yet, 
whereas this aspect of his writing might have been an embarrassment to him earlier in 
his career, by the time he finished his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion in   195 
1776, the year of his death, after a quarter of a century working on it, it was clear that 
he had embraced the humanity of his discipline and its discourses.   
  Despite the massive intellectual contributions of his other works, it is the sheer 
literary weight of his Dialogues which qualify it as his unique masterpiece of writing.  
There are, it may be argued, other places in which his thought is more original, 
vigorous, or profound.  But none of these may carry affective weight of Dialogues.  
While taking the appearance of a classical philosophical dialogue, the work is truly 
character driven.  What it is about is much less the subject of discussion and much 
more about the way it is being discussed.  It is, in that sense, a real dialogue.  Its three 
protagonists scoff, dismiss, label, insult and walk out on each other.  There is no 
objectivity to be found anywhere.  The character, Philo, who dominates the 
conversation and, as some claim, represents most closely Hume’s own view does not 
actually come out the winner of the argument, per the declaration of its narrator, 
Pamphilus.  The orthodox theist, Demea, storms out half way through the discussion 
never to return.  The empirical theist, Cleanthes, is unable to withstand or respond to 
the sometimes baffling scepticism espoused by his friend, Philo, and yet calmly 
maintains that he would not be held hostage by such rhetorical shock tactics which he 
deemed empty and not a little trite. 
  Upon first reading, Dialogues seems to be a confounding mess.  It continues to 
confound critics who are thwarted by wanting to elevate Philo, while Hume himself 
favoured Cleanthes and the Demea, the weakest of the three, often quotes more or less 
directly from Hume’s other works in support of his own view.  Perhaps the difficulty 
here arises from reading Dialogues too much as a philosophical tract trying to prove 
or state something along those lines instead of more in terms of what it actually is, 
which is literature.  It is not necessary to identify one of the characters with Hume as   196 
they all reflect aspects of himself in one way or another.  Instead of weighing and 
measuring the force of their arguments, one must first take on the task of evaluating 
how these characters are actually acting towards one another, for their philosophy is 
closely tied to their overall demeanour. 
  Many attempts to explain away the awkward tension which is the be all and 
end all of Dialogues have been proffered and have subsequently fallen short.  For 
instance, the argument that Hume somehow, passive-aggressively mocked theistic 
believe by causing an extended debate on his existence which, if actual, should have 
been so obvious that debate concerning it could be nothing less than insulting 
(Dialogues xxxix).  What, then, of the persistent silence of Cleanthes in the face of 
the extended, impassioned orations?  What of his stubborn persistent faith which he 
refused to rebuff his opponent with on every point, but rather kept more often his 
peace, content to, if anything, remonstrate his friend’s poor form.  What also can one 
do with Cleanthes’s employment of Hume’s own system of believing, one of the 
individual natural sentiment acting upon the imagination? 
Cleanthes begs Philo to consider the wonders of the natural world and says 
“tell me, from your own feeling, if the idea of a contriver does not immediately flow 
in upon you with a force like that of sensation” (31).  Of course, at first glance one 
might wish to dismiss this as incongruous with Hume’s persistent critique of the 
argument from design.  But, again, one must look at the nuance of Cleanthes’ 
statement and the argument from design.  The argument claims that one may deduce 
the existence of a creator from the existing world.  Cleanthes says that the witness is 
not a rational one, but an emotional one.  The idea impresses the mind so powerfully 
as to be a sensation, an experience, which is directly representative of Hume’s 
characterisation of the epistemological grounds of belief.  In the end, it is Philo who is   197 
made to look more the fool by his wild orations and boundless, warrantless disregard 
for either common logic or sensation.  Cleanthes criticises Philo thusly: 
The declared profession of every reasonable sceptic is only to reject 
abstruse, remote, and refined arguments; to adhere to common sense 
and the plain instincts of nature; and to assent, wherever any reasons 
strike him with so full a force, that he cannot, without the greatest 
violence, prevent it.  Now the arguments for natural religion are plainly 
of this kind; and nothing but the most perverse, obstinate metaphysics 
can reject them.  (31, emphasis added)  
The force of this statement is the degree to which it is directly linked to Hume 
himself.  It mimics not only his consistently rehearsed views on the role of scepticism 
but also the nature of belief.  The argument that Hume intends to make a mockery of 
Cleanthes by forcing him to defend that which is beyond defence loses weight when 
one realises that in order to do so Hume would have had to mock himself in the 
process.   
  It is necessary to come to terms with the very human, very “fleshly” nature of 
Hume’s Dialogues.  Dorothy Coleman does so in her introduction by noting the 
fluidity of the argument and the plurality of readings which it tends to produce.  As 
such, she argues, rather anachronistically, that Hume’s true purpose was to relativise 
the terms of the argument and thus emphasise and encourage a sort of modern liberal 
concept of creedal toleration.  Yet, if this was Hume’s intent, then why should he 
have his narrator, at the end of the script, intervene and declare one conversant better 
than another?  Why should Cleanthes come out the winner both in terms of 
philosophy (what the narrator calls his “accurate philosophical turn”) and in terms of 
individual character?  For time and again Philo is made to be embarrassed for his 
excesses, his careless, destructive methods and his overall unsporting manner.  
Cleanthes remonstrates him: 
You can trace causes from effects:  You can compare the most distant 
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barrenness of thought and invention, but from too luxuriant a fertility, 
which suppresses your natural good sense, by a profusion of 
unnecessary scruples and objections.  (Dialogues 32) 
At this rebuff, “Philo was a little embarrassed and confounded” (33).  In terms of 
narrative, Hume could only make his judgments concerning his characters more 
obvious if he, like Shakespeare, introduced Oberon to turn Philo’s head into that of an 
ass.   
  There is nothing clean about the Dialogues.  There is no neat and tidy message 
which can sum up its intricacies.  There is no real methodology to its debates other 
than the organic texture of human conversation.  Its point of conclusion is not a 
logical one, nor is all of its discourse measured and logical.  As a whole, it seems too 
slovenly to be associated with the normally rigorous and meticulous Hume.  Even so, 
it is full of wise insight, the sort of experience built of a lifetime of philosophical 
discussion and investigation.  The foremost hero, Cleanthes, says less about Natural 
Religion or philosophy than he does about his peers.  He addresses them as 
individuals instead of as figures for their individual systems of thought.  He does not 
talk to an orthodox theist and a Pyrrhonist sceptic, he talks to Demea and Philo. 
  What presents itself from a comparison of Hume and Kierkegaard is not just 
the way in which both of them resisted the totalising effect of the Enlightenment’s 
reasoning.
53  But if one considers the way in which both chose to confront that edifice 
and the sort of accusations they levelled against it, that will serve as a beginning 
point.  It is the foolish pride of the system which seems to draw the particular ire of 
Hume and Kierkegaard.  Were their opponents simply wrong it is certain that the 
usual sort of academic disputation would have arisen.  But it is the arrogance of the 
error which leads Kierkegaard to call philosophers “fantastic.”  Similarly, it is the 
                                                 
53 It is clear that Hegel, Kierkegaard’s primary ideological opponent, was much more 
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sheer hubris of the philosophical theology which Hume was opposed to in 
constructing with reason a system for understanding God—as much a shamble as the 
tower of Babel if it were made out of rusty Soviet scaffolding.  His narrator concludes 
Dialogues with this cutting remark: 
While the haughty dogmatist, persuaded, that he can erect a complete 
system of theology by the mere help of philosophy, disdains any 
farther aid, and rejects this adventitious instructor.  To be a 
philosophical sceptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential 
step towards being a sound, believing Christian.  (102) 
For both Hume and Kierkegaard, knowing prevents believing.  It is impossible to 
have faith in something which is known, or which appears to be known.  While 
history clearly remembers Kierkegaard as a Christian, Hume’s religious conviction is 
largely in doubt.  Yet this is due only to the fact that he combats the ideas of his 
contemporaries on how God can be known.  For those who cannot see past such a 
fraudulent theology, Hume will of course become an atheist and all his statements to 
the contrary magically will be transformed into sarcasms and ironies. 
  This, then, brings even closer the true and telling relationship between these 
two philosophers.  For the fact that Kierkegaard might be dismissed as an authority on 
the subject of epistemology and belief because of his faith and that Hume might be 
more trustworthy (even if being misread) because he has been largely revised into an 
atheist, speaks to the fact that of all things which humanity regularly grapples with, 
belief is one of the hardest, perhaps the hardest to begin to be objective about.  Belief, 
it seems—at least in Kierkegaard and Hume—is a very human subject, almost entirely 
inseparable from the individual, and is spoken of in very human ways and in 
individual terms. 
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Cardinal Newman and Life Fantastic 
Still, there is a spanner to be thrown into the proverbial works of this perhaps 
slightly sentimental argument.  That spanner comes in the form of the preeminent 
Victorian voice on knowing and belief, Cardinal John Henry Newman and his 
magnum opus, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (1870).  Newman’s famous 
project was to undertake a philosophical defence of the act of believing something 
which cannot be understood.  He came to this strange, alien body of belief and 
dissected it as though a surgeon who had been familiarising himself with the 
procedure for his entire life.  Indeed, the chronological exaggeration here is minimal:  
Newman worked on his masterpiece for twenty years in the golden age of his life.  
Yet there is a tension in the text which is very clear to see.  It begins with the intense 
personal motivation which Newman brings to his project.   
There is deep insecurity in his writing, brought on no doubt by the scores of 
friends and associates who, for reasons of either theological scepticism or agnosticism 
or out of devoted, level-headed Anglicanism, regarded his, now iconic, turn to 
Catholicism as folly.  Newman’s work, then, needed to go further in its claims than 
Hume or Kierkegaard even had a notion towards.  He took it upon himself to defend 
not just belief, not just faith in God, not even a broad Christian Theism but a precise 
and dogmatic Roman Catholicism which had been commonly regarded as 
superstitious nonsense in England for centuries.  This is the weak point in Grammar 
of Assent, it is the seam which tentatively holds the whole piece together and also the 
junction which must be breached in order to truly unravel the inner nature of the 
work. 
Without a way in, readers of Newman’s Grammar of Assent would be 
rendered as Joshua and his men circling aimlessly around Jericho blowing their   201 
trumpets every so often—without divine intervention there would be no resolution to 
the stalemate.  With only a title page by way introduction, Newman begins by 
launching into his description of the three types of proposition (interrogative, 
conditional and categorical) and their corresponding acts of enunciation which are 
doubt, inference and assent (9-10).  From the start it becomes quite apparent that 
Newman meant his title quite literally.  He developed a system for thinking about 
belief based on a (ultimately be a highly idiosyncratic) grammatical analysis of how 
belief was spoken about at the time.  Undoubtedly the perceived relationship between 
language, ideas and objects is much more complex today
54 and using contemporary 
debates as a method of criticism for Newman’s proves reductive.  However, the one 
charge that bears credibility with reference to Newman’s use of language is idiom.  
As it is, the Grammar of Assent is locked in the nineteenth century by its own 
relationship to its language.   
For Newman this means that his achievement is somewhat less than what he 
likely thought it to be.  For this project it means an important footnote in the legacy of 
the greatest British theologian of his era.  The problem with this is that, as much as 
Newman endeavoured to look objectively, precisely and systematically at belief, his 
achievements will always be mired (or enhanced?) by the prevailing subjectivity in 
them.  In almost every case he supports his arguments based on human experience but 
then often draws strange lines of distinction between the behaviour and some idea 
behind it.  He makes the example of a child who asks his mother a question and 
receives an answer which he apprehends, but cannot understand because it depends on 
very technical knowledge.  This is the early way in which Newman demonstrates that 
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even that which cannot be understood can be believed and sometimes ought be 
believed.  However, even though his goal is to examine phenomena such as these to 
determine if they are defensible or legitimate, he says of the boy and his mother: 
Of course I am speaking of assent itself, and its intrinsic conditions, 
not the ground or motive of it.  Whether there is an obligation upon the 
child to trust his mother, or whether there are cases where such trust is 
impossible, are irrelevant questions, and I notice them in order to put 
them aside.  (Newman 18) 
Yet it must be the case that an intrinsic condition of that assent is inseparable from its 
motive, the trust and authority, or the credit as Newman would say, of the mother 
with relation to the son.  He notices it in order to dismiss it, he says, but on what 
grounds has it been dismissed?  Without dismissal, the relation works out 
problematically for Newman’s usage of the anecdote.  What is being believed or 
assented to, the statement of explanation or the proposition “Mother is credible and 
authoritative and her assertions can safely be believed”?   
  Part of the lasting value of Newman’s contribution to this field of thought on 
epistemology and belief is the rigorous way in which he defines his terms (it was a 
grammar, after all!) and the consistency with which he maintains those definitions.  
No writer on the subject since has so thoroughly set about his work as Newman.  
However, where there is introduced an element of unpredictable, wherever difficult 
human behaviour inserts itself, there Cardinal Newman begins to unravel.  
Compounding this is the fact that many times the behaviour is his own.  Whether it is 
because of an attempt to rationalise the Trinity or take rhetorical swipes at colleagues 
who had refused to follow him on his Roman journey, the human peeks through time 
and again in what would otherwise be just the very sort of thing that would attract the 
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  Furthermore, the point of including Cardinal Newman was not to use his work 
as an artificial opponent to the two previously highlighted philosophers, but rather to 
show just how potent his argument could be when it cracked under the stress of its 
subjectivity
55.  Backed into a corner over the potential epistemic weight of the beliefs 
he so dearly held, Cardinal Newman makes relative the value of assertions based on 
inference in comparison to those relating to authority:   
Not only authority, but Inference also may impose on us assents which 
in themselves are little better than assertions, and which, so far as they 
are assents, can only be notional assents, as being assents, not to 
propositions inferred, but to the truth of those propositions… This 
leads me to the question, whether belief in a mystery can be more than 
an assertion.  I consider it can be an assent, and my reasons for so are 
as follows:—A mystery is a proposition conveying incompatible 
notions, or is a statement of the inconceivable.  Now we can assent to 
propositions (and a mystery is a proposition), provided we can 
apprehend them; therefore we can assent to a mystery, for, unless we 
in some sense apprehend it, we should not recognise it to be a mystery, 
that is, a statement uniting incompatible notions.  (36) 
It is impossible to say whether Cardinal Newman would have ever reached such 
views on epistemology, reason and belief had not he first endeavoured, like Milton 
and so many of the writers which have been examined after him, to defend the 
reasonability of both faith and the Faith. 
  Indeed, once the tide of criticism got started in Grammar it could hardly be 
stopped.  “Logicians,” he quips at one point, “are more set on concluding rightly than 
on right conclusions” (66).  The language intensifies even further as belief itself is 
approached.  Literary leagues away from the sparse, cold, barren beginning of his 
work, consider Newman’s description of simple, natural belief as “credence”: 
Credence is the means by which, in high and low, in the man of the 
world and in the recluse, our bare and barren nature is overrun and 
diversified from without with rich and living clothing.  It is by such 
ungrudging, prompt assents to what is offered to us so lavishly, that we 
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become possessed of the principles, doctrines, sentiments, facts, which 
constitute useful, and especially liberal knowledge.  (41) 
The concept of credence, here, is very close in a way to Kierkegaard’s leap.  In the 
least, they perform essentially the same function.  Whereas Kierkegaard approaches 
what is essentially the problem of being and the senses with trepidation and, in turn, a 
sort of Byronic courage, Cardinal Newman regards this plain, “ungrudging” belief in 
the mundane commonalities of life as some thing extraordinarily beautiful—the “rich 
and living clothing” of existence.   
  What exists in the striking tension of Grammar of Assent is perhaps a stroke of 
literary beauty and genius.  For the very language, the same which consigns the 
reasoning of his thesis to having less range of influence than it probably was intended 
to have, disdains the rational by mimicking what Newman largely considered it to be: 
cold, detached, unemotional, inhuman.  In contrast, the language for such a small, 
common belief or assent as “The sky is blue and I see it” is absolutely euphoric, 
considering its source.  It was belief which Newman thought to be at the centre of a 
person’s psychological, spiritual and physical being and why belief has so much 
power to change people whereas reason has so little.  On this point it is worth quoting 
the Cardinal at some length: 
This is why science has so little of a religious tendency; deductions 
have no power of persuasion.  The heart is commonly reached, not 
through reason, but through the imagination, by means of direct 
impressions, by the testimony of facts and events, by history, by 
description.  Persons influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, 
deeds inflame us.  Many a man will live and die upon a dogma:  no 
man will be a martyr for a conclusion… After all, man is not a 
reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting 
animal…  Life is not long enough for a religion of inferences; we shall 
never have done beginning, if we determine to begin with proof…  
Life is for action.  If we insist on proofs for everything, we shall never 
come to action:  to act you must assume, and that assumption is faith.  
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Here, at last, it can be seen that Newman’s thought is not actually in opposition to 
Hume or Kierkegaard.  For when Newman declares “man is not a reasoning animal” 
he echoes the insight Hume put forward in indicating that belief will always be a 
matter of sense or feeling because, at the end of the day, that is actually more 
important to most humans than what they think they know.
56  What an individual is 
able to infer and deduce about reality will scarcely be given privilege over what he 
feels about it.  This is indeed what makes man more than machinery.  It is what 
creates beauty in the human world and in our relationships with one another.  It is, of 
course, the flaw of logic which the perfectly rational Spock cannot comprehend when 
Captain Kirk risks life, ship and crew to bring him back from oblivion telling him that 
sometimes the needs of the few outweigh those of the many.
57   
  The binding force behind this dissertation which brings all of these various 
forces and writings together is humanism.  What Blake, Milton, Rowling, 
MacDonald, Kierkegaard and the others, even Captain Kirk, all have in common is 
that they are great humanists.  Or, if that term is perhaps too loaded, they can all be 
deemed as iconic champions of humanity.
58  They are not united by a school of 
thought, ideological or religious background, time period, genre or any other 
denominator excepting their determination to resist the dehumanising effects of “pure 
reason.”  They perform the same role as the poets and artists of Soviet gulags.  They 
scribble their lines in spray paint on the Berlin Wall.  Not only does the power of their 
words strike at the very heart of the edifice which confines them, but when they 
finally manage to “tear down this wall,” beauty remains and not just void. 
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  At present, it is common to speak of reason as that ethereal force which bears 
the potential to free humanity from the chronic cycle of self-harm which (presumably) 
results from religious dogma.  Without wishing to deny the role of religion in human 
violence through history nor resorting to the argument which compares it to the 
violence of patently anti-religious communist and fascist political movements, it 
appears unlikely that reason, itself a convention of mankind rather than an intrinsic 
attribute of it, can serve as the protector and preserver of humanity, for reason itself 
cannot grasp what humanity actually is.  Reason can only regard humanity as a race 
among other races within a biosphere.  Therefore, it seems unlikely that reason alone 
can provide a better human future.  If the human future is to be dictated by reason, 
then poetry will meet its end.  
  The list of thinkers, poets novelists and others who share the cause 
championed by Hume, Newman and Kierkegaard in this chapter is wide and diverse 
over countries, continents and centuries.  It would be pure folly to ignore from their 
ranks Pascal and his influence on the school of existentialism and also eventually 
widely influential in British philosophical and theological thought.  First published in 
English in 1688, Pascal’s classic collection of Pensées was first employed primarily 
for its apparently logical wager rather than its wholesale rejection of the privileging of 
reason in matters of faith (Daston 61-62).  It took an Anglo-French surgeon, seeing 
the inadequacies of earlier translations, to revitalise Pensées at a very significant time 
in English intellectual development—the throes of Romanticism.  There is a 
perceptible shift during this period towards emphasising more within Pascal’s 
fragmentary text than just his rhetorical wager.  For Pascal penned a statement which 
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of which reason knows nothing,” and that surely “It is the heart that perceives God 
and not the reason” (127).   
  This is ultimately the resounding critique which has been made against reason, 
that it, like any tyrant, oversteps its bounds.  The source of all of the much-heralded 
conflict between faith and reason is that in every case one has overstepped its mark 
and claimed to be able to do something which only the other is capable of.  Pascal 
describes the conflict succinctly: 
Let them at least learn what this religion is which they are attacking 
before attacking it.  If this religion boasted that it had a clear sight of 
God and plain and manifest evidence of his existence, it would be an 
effective objection to say that there is nothing to be seen in the world 
which probes him so obviously.  But since on the contrary it says that 
men are in darkness and remote from God […] then what advantage 
can they derive when, unconcerned to seek the truth as they profess to 
be, they protest that nothing shows it to them?  (127-128) 
The dialogue between theology and rational philosophy after the Enlightenment was 
problematised by the fact that the two had begun to use different languages, or that 
the meanings of all the most important words had changed without one of the parties 
realising it.  The most intense difficulty, as it was perceived by Hume especially, was 
that some theologian endeavoured to carry on speaking in a totalising, rational way 
about a God who could not possibly be such.  So, perhaps, the argument which Pascal 
reprimands for missing the point became a valid one when theology elected to reject 
the language of mystery by and large in favour of a systematic, mechanical divinity. 
  Fantasy echoes the existentialist philosophical tradition which has been briefly 
engaged in this chapter.  Though it would seem that fantasy represents anything but 
actual experience, this sees only a very small part of what fantasy of the tradition 
which has been described thus far is doing.  For this fantasy is that which describes 
the experiences for which literature has lost language for describing—lost to 
psychology and all manner of other reductionisms.  This fantasy relates the journey of   208 
the heart, of sentiment, or faith or whichever one of the many terms which has been 
used to describe that portion of human being which no longer fits into the very narrow 
system of rational explanation.  It speaks about the power of belief and is itself 
empowered by its creation of belief, no matter how temporary or numinous.   
  It also is inherently infused with risk.  Indeed, existentialism itself is shot 
through with risk, the risks of living in a world full of danger.  But the perspective of 
the existential/fantastic critique of Enlightenment reason is that it is not safe either.  
Just like the unpredictability and instability of human existence forced Cardinal 
Newman from a very rational diatribe on belief into a subjective, existential and 
sentimental expression of faith, the same instabilities and phenomena interfere with 
human attempts to construct and enact rational ways of thinking and being.  Of course 
there is danger in the seductive narratives of fantasy, but danger lies everywhere and 
with every narrative in which one might choose to participate or identify/interpret 
himself, including reason.   
The objection renews itself, however: “fantasy is not real”.  Yet if experience 
can in general be deemed “real”, then here is fantasy’s foundation.  For in its 
narratives the reader identifies its contents with his own experience and, as is often 
the case, especially in the very liturgical and participative literature which has been 
examined thus far, experiences them again.  Indeed, as C.G. Prado writes, “One 
natural response to the philosophical root issue of the failure of fiction to be about 
something real, is to say that while individual sentences may fail to refer, novels as 
wholes manage to be about the world or the human condition” (9).  The “fantasy” of 
fantasy literature is like the hypothesis of scientific thought.  Before anything which is 
deemed “scientific” can be such, it must have a notional, propositional, imaginary 
basis in hypothesis.  Only through experimentation, the experiential, can that   209 
hypothesis become actualised.  In the same way, the mechanism of a fantasy or 
fantastic narrative is like a hypothesis which becomes actual when engaged and 
experienced by the reader.  In science, it is a temporary belief in the possibility of the 
hypothesis which allows for an experimental mechanism to be developed, put in place 
and executed.  Insofar as actual beliefs towards the positive or contrary of the 
hypothesis are involved in the construction of the mechanism, the science and the 
actuality of its result will be flawed.  In literature, it is a temporary belief which 
includes the suspension of disbelief that allows the reader to experience the text and 
the fantasy itself whereas its reality hinges on whether or not it inspires Humean 
belief—that which is struck upon the senses so forcibly that to doubt its actuality 
would be to reject the entire stream of sense and experience.   
In the same way, what a hypothesis is to experimentation and what fantasy is 
to the experience of reading and identification theology is to its implementation: 
religion.  Newman states, “Theology, as such, always is notional, as being scientific:  
religion, as being personal, should be real” (42).  Religion
59 is real in Newman 
because it actualises the theological in experience itself.  Whereas it is very easy to 
discuss whether or not God (if God should exist) might be the sort of being who was 
interested in or willing to “talk” to human beings, debating among several 
propositions, it is intensely difficult to dispute or affirm another person’s assertion 
that he experienced God through prayer (just as it would be difficult for one to deny 
such if he himself regularly experienced God in prayer):   
In religious inquiry each of us can speak only for himself, and for 
himself he has a right to speak.  His own experiences are enough for 
himself, but he cannot speak for others: he cannot lay down the law; he 
can only bring his own experiences to the common stock of 
psychological facts.  He knows what has satisfied and satisfies himself; 
if it satisfies him, it is likely to satisfy others; if, as he believes and is 
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sure, it is true, it will approve itself to others also, for there is but one 
truth.  (Newman 384) 
There is nothing intrinsically risky about considering propositions in any context, nor 
should there be risk in listening to or expressing experience.  Yet where a hypothesis, 
innocuous in its own notional form, may be proven; where a fiction might be read, 
identified and believed;
60 where a theological assertion may become liturgia and 
transform itself into faith, there lies risk.    The risk exists according to the principle 
that beliefs are intellectual possessions which shape one’s character and existence.  
Yet when this principle is nullified by a Kierkegaardian “objective uncertainty” it has 
been seen that the risk also dissipates.   
However, it cannot be true that science, literature and theology, although they 
have been for a moment made analogous, are the same.  Science, for instance, is 
limited in the experiences it can create and the belief it can generate by the incapacity 
of reason to understand all kinds of experience itself and the human inability to create 
functional tests and causal links in response to all of its questions.  That which cannot 
be tested by science or reliably deduced by reason, then, must belong to the sphere of 
fantasy and theology.  Now then, imagine what the reaction might be if an objection 
were raised to a particular field or incidence of experimentation not on the grounds 
that its methods were unethical but because the experience it sought to create was 
itself too “dangerous.”  If, for instance, a mission to Mars was cancelled for fear of 
the experience (and subsequent actualisation) of alien life, there would be a massive 
protest not only from those involved with that particular scientific field, but for a vast 
majority of the public as well.  The idea is that one cannot fear his own world and 
experiencing it, and indeed should not prevent others from it.  To do so would not just 
be ignorant and phobic, but also irresponsible.   
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In the same way it is impossible to say that the “risk” of literary or theological 
engagement is debilitating and preventative.  To reject engagement with a theological 
principle or a fantastic narrative because it might supply one with a new belief is to 
reject all interaction with reality.  The purpose of fantasy, of having that objective 
uncertainty in relation to all belief that is faith, is in order to liberate experience.  
Those who reject any particular mode of experience, whether it is what has been 
called in this project the rational, the literary/fantastic or the theological (or any other 
possible mode) is equally cenophobic and sophophobic.  Each of them lives his own, 
peculiar reclusive life, sheltering himself with the rags of the ideas he loves and 
cherishes no matter how rotten or decrepit they might be nor the possibility of a better 
way of living.  Not only is his existence unnecessarily impoverished, but also 
unnecessarily restricted.  Perhaps he does not know that his mind holds the power of 
revolution, perhaps he does not perceive the oppression of the way in which he clings 
to the dysfunctional system which has become his intellectual and spiritual “home”.    
How could such a depressing state of affairs have come into being?  Barbra 
Hernstein Smith illuminates the situation: 
The rigorous, unremitting work of Reason creates a tight, taut web, 
intertextual and interconceptual.  Tighter and stronger than the shifting, 
contingent, partial, and always contestable ideas and claims produced 
and justified by mere experience or mere sentiment, preference, desire, 
imagination, faith, custom, or convention, the ideas and claims 
delivered and justified by Reason are unconditional, universal, and, for 
better or for worse, inescapable.  ‘For better or for worse’ because, as I 
have been suggesting, the certainty or stability of belief promised and 
delivered by such a system becomes, for the believer, the 
inescapability of belief from the system.  (120) 
As it has been seen, the “tight, taut web” of reason disenfranchises wherever it is 
imported as a complete system of “knowing” or experiencing the world.  Because its 
claims of totality, comprehensiveness and cohesion are eventually illusory, the system 
itself is not real and thus a fantasy.  Yet one of the conditions of the system is that it   212 
alone defines what is real such that an individual is disenfranchised from believing 
otherwise. “[A]rguments for Reason through Reason are evidently powerful and 
persuasive for many people, largely, it seems, because they are circular,” and in their 
circularity there is security dependent on the system’s very inescapability (118).  In 
order to believe otherwise, in order to escape, fantasy is necessary.  Historically, one 
of the fears related to fantasy was that escape is indulgent.  The fear is obviously not 
entirely fabricated, fantasy is a tool which is free to be used by libertines just as much 
as by libertarians.  It is the particular relation of fantasy to reason in literature which 
makes it an important function for the ongoing work of theology. 
  Reason, if it were efficiently employed, would create uniformity among 
humanity.  Where it is used it is used just like magic, to exert power over another 
person in order to make it impossible for him to believe otherwise than the way in 
which one reasons that he must.  “You’re being unreasonable” is the anthem of 
bickering people.  The charge itself is one almost never absent from any argument.  
Of course, just because one is unreasonable doesn’t mean that he or she is in fact 
wrong.  Many times, it seems, irrationality is right and reason wrong.  Consider as an 
example the concept of preemptive war.  The argument is such that if one knows that 
his nation will be attacked by another and that this attack will cause massive loss of 
life, a weakened ability to defend one’s own nation and so forth, it is reasonable that 
the nation under threat attack first and thus limit the potential for loss of life among its 
own citizens.  The argument is reasonable, it “works” on its own terms.  Yet as more 
and more have been asserting since the American invasion of Iraq, executed on the 
basis of this very rationale, it is not right.  The problem does not lie within the system 
but without it—the assumption of violence here is too great to legitimate the act of 
violence.  The reasoning again, in its presumption, inhibits the free action of the other   213 
state.  By assuming the intent is an actuality of violence, magically it becomes the 
case, within its own system of thought.   
  Fantasy is useful and dynamic because it has the ability to question 
assumptions (something which cannot come from within the thought process of that 
assumption), to challenge privilege and to liberate from intellectual oppression.  It is 
in its essence an agent of diversity in contrast to the conforming nature of reason.  
What is more in the nature of man, to dream or to reason?  Dreaming, fantasy, comes 
naturally whereas reasoning must be learned.  The real danger of fantasy is that it can 
expose a person to who he really is.  Belief, sentiment reflects what is within not the 
operation and effects of the fantasy itself.  The fantasy is only one reagent, the other is 
the individual and belief is merely the product.  The threat of fantasy is 
powerlessness.  Pascal Engel describes it in this way: 
[I]t may be rational for me to believe in God, but the very fact that I 
find the belief useful or beneficial in some way is not enough to create 
in me the corresponding state…  This is why Pascal, after giving his 
famous wager argument for belief in God, advises us to go to church, 
to take the holy water, and to get the habits which regularly go with 
such belief: This will dull you (‘Cela vous abêtira’).  Getting oneself to 
get an habit does not count as stopping to have belief as a matter of 
habit or of passive disposition; quite the contrary.  Getting the habit to 
have an habit may be voluntary, but the habit itself is not … the very 
fact that I need to acquire the belief through some sort of causal 
process does show that beliefs are in general caused by some 
processes, even when the processes are, to a certain extent, under our 
control. (5)   
If the danger of fantasy, then, is that it might reveal one’s powerlessness to an extent 
over his own nature and character, the danger of reason is that it gives the illusion of 
power.  That one might believe this narrative above all others does indeed say 
something about the individual! 
  Fantasy literature is not alone in its project of resistance against the force and 
dominance of reason through and after the Age of Enlightenment.  It is given a   214 
foundation and context from philosophers as diverse as Pascal, Hume, Kierkegaard 
and Newman.  It provides a space for thought and experience that lie without the 
realm of reason which is still valuable and desirable.  It is not epistemologically 
flawed, for it is a thing entirely and demonstrably out of reach by epistemology
61; its 
foundations are in the subjective being of humanity and its experience as beings ruled 
more by sentiment than reason.  Fantasy bears the ability to make a person human 
again, to diversify where there is uniformity and indeed to breathe life back into a 
theology which had long since suffocated under reason.  Its perils are no more than 
those associated with being a living, sentient human.  Its promise reflects nothing less 
than the promise of life and possibility.  Of course, having begun this foray into the 
history of epistemology and belief with Aristotle, it seems fitting to conclude it by 
then remembering that it is just this very category, the possible, which Aristotle exalts 
and elevates far above even the actual. 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
                                                 
61 “It is currently argued … that this skeptical questioning of reason is fatally self-
contradictory…  As one such defender of reason puts it, post-structuralists, 
postmodernists, and others who reject the claims of classical rationalism are ‘in 
pursuit of an understanding whose possibility has in fact already ruled out on a priori 
grounds.’  This ability to rule out in advance all skeptical or adversarial views is a  
considerable advantage for any system of ideas.  As might be expected, however, 
those whose views are thus ruled out don’t see it that way themselves.  What they do 
see is the unbreachable circularity of the reasoning just given, each link of which 
depends on the prior acceptance of the claims, concepts, and definitions at issue” 
(Hernstein Smith 105-106).   215 
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The Fantastic Thus Far 
The trend which I have traced through the tradition of what I have deemed and 
christened “fantasy” literature—indeed, the very characteristic which has guided the 
usage of this term—is the phenomenon in literature of employing certain 
hermeneutical or literary devices (such as the imagination or willing suspension of 
disbelief, born largely out of the Romantic period) in order to uniquely approach 
aspects of human existence which reason and its “realism” are unable to reach.  They 
are the aspects and elements which Freud among others banished to the subconscious, 
the experiences which vanished in the demythologisation of the world.  For this 
reason, much of the literature discussed thus far could be or already has been 
classified in philosophical terms as anti-rationalist literature.  At times it even gives 
the appearance of being a literary polemic contra the Enlightenment and its 
intellectual value system.   
However, to settle with either of these titles would be unbearably reductive.  
This literature is not simply reactionary, a movement bent on upheaval and the 
destruction of the epistemological hierarchy of the eighteenth century and onward.  
To begin with, the survey started in the seventeenth century with Milton, before the 
hierarchy even existed as such.  To the contrary, this literature and this literary 
function have something positive to contribute both in terms of artistry and 
intellectual life.  What they provide is a place for exploring what a society has 
difficulty considering with the tools otherwise available to it or which have 
sometimes has been forgotten altogether.  Yet because of this immense power which 
it holds, power to inspire belief of many kinds and make real the impossible, it is in   217 
fact susceptible to the prurient, the misguided and the false; ultimately, all the reasons 
for which Iris Murdoch claims Plato treated the arts with such great antipathy (Fire).
62  
For the very same reasons, though, it became a place of refuge and empowerment to 
others seeking more spiritual and edifying discourse. 
Considering this fact of the long history of fantasy literature as the instrument 
or location of positive theological endeavour, it follows that one can now begin to 
consider the significance of this literary phenomenon in light of its function.  The 
claim being made throughout this paper is that fantasy literature has didactic value for 
theology as a discipline and for theological discourses more generally.  That is, it can 
teach theology something about itself.  To make the lesson that much clearer, the 
literature which has been highlighted and surveyed up to this point is literature which 
specifically and intentionally adopts theological tasks, questions, language, imagery 
and forms as a sort of case study in their interrelation.  But being that the last writer 
under close study was MacDonald in the Victorian era, it becomes appropriate to ask 
particular questions:  Where does this trend or line in literature go after MacDonald?  
Who, if anyone, is the right and proper inheritor of the legacy which he channelled?   
 
After MacDonald 
Traditionally, the answer to questions like these is a very easy and obvious 
one.  In terms of pure genre, it still is very much the case.  The tradition renewed and 
in a way reinstituted by George MacDonald’s greatest Edwardian devotees, the 
Inklings (and especially Lewis) is a clear descendent in many ways of the earlier 
Victorian project.  Still, there remains a great plurality in terms of ways in which one 
might very well answer these questions and, among them all, the one just mentioned 
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might be the most banal and unsatisfying.  The reason for a statement, which to some 
will undoubtedly seem rather controversial, is manifold.  For one, Lewis’s writing 
seeks in some way to recreate rather than renew or continue the project of his 
predecessor.  He does not perceive the change in philosophical and social sitz im 
leben between himself and the man whom he called “master.”  He likewise does not 
recognise the collapse of certain ecclesial forms between the two periods, living at all 
times a mostly sequestered life at university and in the church.  He appreciates 
MacDonald as a purveyor of something like ‘timeless moral truths,’ but ignores him 
as a writer who was very much à la mode.  What is more, their theological views are 
askance and as the way they respectively relate them to their writing could be called 
much more, incompatible, even. 
One of the key essays which has been written since the American-fuelled 
MacDonald revival of the last twenty years separating the legacy of the two was the 
rather straightforwardly titled “George MacDonald and C.S. Lewis” by Catherine 
Durie.  In it Durie sets forth a multifaceted criticism of the established view of the 
MacDonald/Lewis relationship.  She does so firstly by pointing out that Lewis 
actually does not at all respect MacDonald as a novelist, a revelation which should be 
abundantly clear to anyone who has ever read Lewis’s writing on MacDonald,
63 but 
which has been overlooked either because of the overwhelming endurance of Lewis’s 
affection or, shockingly, because many perhaps concur that MacDonald was a poor 
novelist.  It would be pure folly to compare MacDonald as a novelist or writer to 
English or American contemporaries.  The problem in brokering appreciation for 
MacDonald’s literary magnitude has in no small part been one of education—that is, 
                                                 
63 David S. Robb laments that “It has taken a long time to shift the Lewis-driven 
consensus that MacDonald’s novels are to be valued only for what they contain (their 
Christianity) rather than for what they are” (12)   219 
most readers do not know how to read them for what they are.  While Lewis was 
reduced to marking in MacDonald’s novels a “queer awkward charm in their very 
faults,” he fails to recognise MacDonald’s position within the Scottish literary 
tradition.  What is remarkable with Lewis is that he even knows the problem, he 
knows that in order to rightly appreciate MacDonald’s novels one “will need to love 
Scotland too” (Anthology 17).  David S. Robb comments: 
Experience suggests that Lewis was actually correct, for it seem likely 
that adequate reassessment of these novels, if it is going to come at all, 
will come from the perspectives provided by critics consciously 
working towards a fuller understanding of Scottish literary traditions. 
(13) 
Yet the difficulty for Lewis is that he doesn’t, actually, or he would better love 
Scotland’s literary tradition.  His parochial view of Scotland and its literature as a 
whole is betrayed by the way in which he expresses the “queer awkward charm” of 
MacDonald’s novels—likely the best thing he could say about the literature of, to his 
mind, a “queer awkward” place.  If Lewis appreciated Scottish literature and culture 
in the same way he appreciated, for instance Milton, his appraisal would surely have 
been much different. 
Yet what is arguably more important to the literary relationship between the 
two, however, is actually not Lewis’s literary appraisal of MacDonald but how deeply 
and personally meaningful MacDonald was for Lewis.  Of course, to an extent this 
was the idea behind MacDonald’s mythmaking.  Thus when Durie relates that 
“Phantastes heals the division Lewis senses in himself between imagination and 
reason; it reunites the real and imaginary, fact and ideal, by transfiguring the mundane 
conditions of his life […],” she is not describing a phenomenal or unexpected result 
(168).  Indeed, MacDonald would have undoubtedly been pleased.  Yet Phantastes 
was even more than this to Lewis.  Even Durie falls just short of realising the full   220 
weight of it when she says “Phantastes becomes a metaphor for Lewis’s own 
experience […]” (167).  In a strange way, Phantastes actually became his experience 
insofar as Lewis would reinterpret his own personal history on its mythological terms.  
For this reason even the very scenes and characters take on much more weight of 
significance than they should and the fantasy becomes canonised and stagnant.  The 
truth is that Lewis held MacDonald’s fantasy writings too close to himself to ever 
allow them to be what they really are which is fluid and dynamic. 
This, then, also reflects the pair’s fundamental difference in understanding 
when it comes to fantasy.  MacDonald’s fantasy resists allegory.  Its symbols are pure 
and potent but remain unfixed, troubling, searching out the reader in their mysterious 
ambiguities.
64  Contrastingly, Lewis’s fantasy is many times not much more than 
allegory.  For him the daring, fantastic move was to mix the sources of his 
metaphorical material so that he could have dryads and Father Christmas in the same 
setting.  But in terms of the basic literary structure, not the material he chose to fill it 
                                                 
64 In this regard, MacDonald almost undoubtedly draws from Coleridge and his The 
Statesman’s Manual, copiously read throughout the 19
th century.  In it Coleridge 
expounds the difference between symbol and allegory with reference to biblical 
interpretation, glorifying symbol while denigrating allegory: “It is among the miseries 
of the present age that it recognizes no medium between Literal and Metaphorical.  
Faith is either to be buried in the dead letter, or its name and honours usurped by a 
counterfeit product of the mechanical understanding, which in the blindness of self 
complacency confounds SYMBOLS with ALLEGORIES.  Now an allegory is but a 
translation of abstract notions into a picture-language which is itself nothing but an 
abstraction from objects of the senses; the principal being more worthless even than 
its phantom proxy, both alike unsubstantial, and the former shapeless to boot.  On the 
other hand a Symbol […] is characterized by a translucence of the Special in the 
Individual or of the General in the Especial or of the Universal in the General.  Above 
all by the translucence of the Eternal through the Temporal.  It always partakes of the 
Reality which it renders intelligible […] The other are but empty echoes which the 
fancy arbitrarily associates with apparitions of matter, less beautiful but not less 
shadowy than the sloping orchard or hill-side pasture-field seen in the transparent lake 
below! Alas! for the flocks that are led to such pastures!  ‘It shall even be as when the 
hungry dreameth, and behold! he eateth; but he waketh and his soul is empty: or as 
when the thirsty dreameth, and behold he drinketh; but he awaketh and is faint!’ 
(Isaiah xxix.8)  O! that we would seek for the bread which was given from heaven, 
that we should eat thereof and be strengthened!” (Sermons 30).   221 
out with, Lewis uses fantasy merely as a literary bank into which he can deposit the 
theology he has already developed and withdraw in exchange new mythological 
symbols to play with instead.  Of course, one of the unique aspects of Lewis as a 
writer is just how much symbol he puts into his worlds, as Michael Ward has recently 
put notable work towards demonstrating.
65  Certainly at least in works such as Till We 
Have Faces
66 he does much more, but in these he follows MacDonald much less 
consciously (and thus ever more truly).  But Lewis rarely brings his problems to 
fantasy.  It would have been supremely interesting if The Problem with Pain were set 
in Narnia or some such world, but one imagines that this is a work somewhat more 
serious than could be played out in Narnia, even though Lewis always imagined 
himself infinitely serious about his fantasies.  Instead, the more set his theological 
ideals, the worse the actual fantasy becomes.  Often it betrays the fundamental 
difference in the way Lewis and MacDonald each approached God.  Durie remarks: 
Yet when Lewis reflects on his own history, he sees God as a divine 
Angler, playing a fish, and himself as hooked through the tongue 
(Lewis 1955, p.199); or God as a cat pursuing himself, a mouse.  
MacDonald could never have used these images of God, with their 
undertow of sheer power and even cruelty; there may be less affinity 
than appears between the two men. (177) 
It is probably the case that Lewis did not even associate cat and mouse as a symbol of 
power or cruelty and found nothing violent or at all inappropriate about the terms in 
which he chose to express his conversion.
67  This is the degree of difference between 
                                                 
65 Ward, Michael.  Planet Narnia: The Seven Heavens in the Imagination of C.S. 
Lewis.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
66 See above section “Lewis and Eleusis” in ch. 4. 
67 Lewis actually found immense spiritual value in a terrible God, or at least in the 
paradox of the Christian God as both lion and lamb.  He perceives this in MacDonald 
(although he is more taken by the lion than the lamb), saying “nowhere else outside 
the New Testament have I found terror and comfort so intertwined,” and “God is the 
only comfort, He is also the supreme terror: the thing we most need and the thing we 
most want to hide from” (Anthology 19; Christianity 24).  Durie concludes, “But at 
this point we may begin to suspect that Lewis perhaps over-emphasizes one side of   222 
MacDonald and Lewis as men; their minds operated with massive distinction towards 
the other.  All the same, Durie makes a strong point in positing that the God of Narnia 
would have repulsed MacDonald and the thought of his own work somehow being 
responsible for it would likely have shaken him to his very spiritual core. 
  The point for which Lewis admires MacDonald the most is his insistence that 
doing must come before feeling or understanding.  MacDonald writes, “Men would 
understand: they do not care to obey;—understand where it is impossible they should 
understand save by obeying,” (Hope 17).  Durie opines that the effect of this single 
idea on Lewis cannot be underestimated: “Lewis takes the point wholeheartedly; in 
The Abolition of Man he argues similarly that obedience must never be postponed 
while a precept is rationally examined, for true comprehension will only come 
through practice” (149).  Lewis grasped on to that facet of MacDonald which was 
most absolute, most forceful, but simply neglected the delicacy and nuance in 
MacDonald’s thought, driven by his overwhelming sentiment and compassion for all 
others. 
  The goal here is not at all to pass judgement between Lewis and MacDonald 
as theologians.  Lewis was in many ways much more successful as an amateur 
apologist than MacDonald was as a lay theologian. Lewis, at least, could toe the line 
of establishments and institutions he worked under.  Unfortunately this worked 
against Lewis as a fantasist.  He seldom ever grasped in his own writing even the 
smallest part of fantasy’s potential for confronting the irrational and confounding 
reason itself.  Mystery can be tasted in Narnia, in the science fiction novels, even in 
                                                 
the equation, that he underlines inexorability rather than love, divine hardness rather 
than compassion; when he does so, he is realigning MacDonald to match his own 
temperament and taste” (171).   223 
the heaven of The Great Divorce, but the only text in which it is actually palpable, à 
la MacDonald, is Till We Have Faces.   
MacDonald is the exemplar here not because his theology was necessarily 
better (although for many contemporary readers and even theologians it might very 
well be) but precisely because it was “worse”
68 and the consequences of that drafted 
themselves into the very fabric of his fantasies.  MacDonald’s fantasy is both flexible 
and dynamic, open to a diverse range of perspectives and yet still immensely affective 
and persuasive.  I suggest that the way in which figures like Lewis and even J.K. 
Rowling inherit some of the tradition of George MacDonald (and even some of the 
theologically significant ways as was illustrated in the chapter concerning liturgy) is 
not in fact the way in which MacDonald himself inherits from Milton.  To find 
MacDonald’s literary successor in terms of the function which has been discussed 
here, one must look elsewhere.   
 
Sartre and Murdoch: Phenomenology and Symbol 
One possible place to look is to some of the great modern Existentialist 
novelists.  These would seem like a logical move after having traced the philosophical 
grounding of the literary fantastic through Kierkegaard and others.  Having come thus 
far by limiting the scope to just British literature, a momentary divergence is 
necessary in order to consider the hefty work of Sartre (despite his being French) 
before returning to more familiar territory with the Anglo-Irish Iris Murdoch.  Yet 
even while dallying with the Continent, the dallying will be done through the eyes of 
                                                 
68 Worse here meaning problematic for MacDonald.  Not only did it lose him his job 
as a clergyman, but he was constantly being bogged down by others accusing him of 
heresy in arguments which were arguably valid in the strictest sense but completely 
miss the thrust of MacDonald’s thought.  Such opponents can be found in the 
interlocutors spread throughout his Unspoken Sermons and a few of the essays in A 
Dish of Orts.   224 
a foreigner, i.e. an outsider, and Murdoch will play the part of the delighted but 
sometimes critical holiday-maker.  Sartre was, of course, one of Murdoch’s greatest 
interests and most enduring inspirations.  By examining the pair of them one can 
achieve a better understanding of the way in which existentialism bifurcated  and was 
digested by independent Anglo and Continental phenomenological movements with 
significant effect for the fantastic in literature. 
The inevitable question at this point becomes why Sartre, Murdoch and not 
something more related to the traditional genre of fantasy?  This is again because of 
the shift which the genre of Fantasy literature takes after the Victorian period to 
something which is much more rigid, much less robust and in many ways and 
instances entirely boring.  The commercial success of Fantasy literature in itself partly 
signalled its own death knell as the literary foil to rationalism.  The difficulty, of 
course, was that society had incorporated and assimilated all of its structures to the 
point which they were no longer very fantastic at all and their ability to inspire 
wonder, to shock and eventually to question fell into disorder and ruin.  In La Nausée, 
Sartre achieves the fantastic through a sort of extreme isolation and existential 
introspection which tumbles over the borders of reason into a barely restrained 
insanity.
69  It abandons logic to the degree that its own conclusion appears as an 
abhorrent and unnatural growth which somehow lodged itself to the body of the 
narrative like a parasite and thereafter refused to leave.  Roquentin’s “solution” of 
writing a novel in order to somehow manufacture for himself a shred of meaning in 
the world of the contingent is purposefully unenthusiastic and illogical.   
                                                 
69 One must not give so much latitude or pity to Roquentin so as to forget that he is a 
man who feels sick when he touches things, imagines that the world touches him, 
whose only real dialogue partner a paedophile who calls himself a humanist and who 
generally sheds any and every recognizable aspect of humanity he can manage.  Pity, 
perhaps, is appropriate but not admiration.   225 
Even though it was awarded the 1964 Nobel Prize for Literature, La Nausée 
divides opinion in literary circles.  Murdoch says of its author, “His inability to write 
a great novel is a tragic symptom of a situation which afflicts us all.  We know that 
the real lesson to be taught is that the human person is precious and unique but we 
seem to be unable to set it forth except in terms of abstraction” (120).  What we might 
have with Murdoch’s opinion of La Nausée and of Sartre in general as a novelist 
might be something akin to the earlier difficulties Lewis had in appreciating the 
Scottish novels of George MacDonald.  Part of the problem with reading La Nausée 
from an Anglo or American background, for instance, is that it is just so French.  Its 
themes and conceits simply do not translate well into the English literary tradition.  In 
fact, La Nausée, being a French book written in Berlin, is even further than Lewis’s 
Oxfordian culture was from MacDonald’s Aberdeenshire roots.   
Furthermore, the troubled relationship of Murdoch (and many other English-
speaking readers) to La Nausée was in fact also a product of deeply entrenched 
philosophical positions.  The conflict was over what had come to be known as 
phenomenology—the nature and the origins of this discipline.  Sartre wrote La 
Nausée while in Berlin, working and learning alongside Husserl, the discipline’s 
founder, and Heidegger.  In it, Sartre plays and spars with the ideas which Husserl 
was putting forth at the time, only to eventually leave him in 1937 when the novel 
was being finished over a disagreement concerning Husserl’s conception of the 
transcendent ego (Drake 35).  Similarly, Iris Murdoch was a postgraduate student of 
Wittgenstein at Cambridge and regularly gives affectionate jousts to her former 
teacher as well (e.g. her wordplay in Under the Net).  Between Murdoch and Sartre,   226 
then, is an epic gap in the way in which phenomenology
70 came to be understood in 
the analytic Anglo tradition and Continental tradition, respectively.  Murdoch 
discloses both her regionalism and her philosophical commitments when she remarks 
of Sartre et alli: 
It might even be argued that recent continental philosophers have been 
discovering, with great fuss, what English empiricists have known 
since Hume, whom Husserl himself claimed as an ancestor.  However 
that may be, the anti-rationalist, anti-Cartesian, anti-essentialist 
enlightenment has developed in England in the form of an analytical 
philosophy of language […] (Sartre 8) 
Clearly, Murdoch is not opposed to Phenomenology as such, for she even says “The 
novelist proper is, in his way, a sort of phenomenologist” (Sartre 10).  What she 
opposes is the kind of deconstructive phenomenology of Sartre which overstates the 
despair of language, destroys symbol and even objectifies the self (the ultimate aspect 
being the one which drove him from Husserl).  Thus, even though Continental 
Phenomenology rightly inherits the peculiar Kierkegaardian proto-Existentialism 
which I have traced back as far as Hume, it cannot, through Sartre, embody the 
fantastic. 
What La Nausée does accomplish in terms of finding an heir to the literary 
tradition of the fantastic is to provide an example or symbol of what Existentialism 
had become (aesthetically and philosophically) by the time of its first publishing in 
1938.  It was Sartre’s famous asking of the question “Can there be meaning in a world 
without God?”  But the “world without God” which he creates also becomes a world 
of twisted contingencies which lacks any form of symbolic valuation, a world of 
unrelenting nausea and hopeless, listless fantasies about the future.  It struggles to 
                                                 
70 While some would argue that Wittgenstein was not at all a phenomenologist, he 
himself says “You could say of my work that it is ‘Phenomenology’ ” (qtd. in Gálvez 
13).  What he meant was that his work was, essentially, phenomenology, although it 
was fundamentally of a different ilk than that being done on the Continent.   227 
deal with the final consequences of the Kantian epistemological revolution.  Yet one 
thing it also does is to strongly inspire, in a strange way, Iris Murdoch, and this is 
what is most significant for this study.  Murdoch faced the same philosophical 
situation as Sartre, dealt with the same crisis of the dissociation and yet managed to 
retain the symbolic, and in doing so also write one of the great novels which she says 
Sartre never could. 
 
Murdoch’s Moral Philosophy as Resolved by the Symbolic in The Bell 
The fundamental difference between Sartre and Murdoch is that where Sartre 
laboured to kill off the symbolic in the face of contingency, for Murdoch contingency 
just made the symbolic all the more valuable and beautiful.  One great novelistic 
example of this was Murdoch’s early work, The Bell (1958).  This section will 
examine how Murdoch uses the symbolic as a literary/rhetorical manoeuvre which 
allows her to work through and around problematic areas of her moral philosophy in 
convincing ways, but also to draw the reader into a position of self-criticism.  It 
exemplifies an aspect of Murdoch’s work which is well known, but nevertheless 
important to rehearse in this case.  That is, Murdoch’s worlds, although described in 
realistic terms, are shot through with the fantastic.  Many times this plays out in the 
way characters interact with each other, interpret their own circumstances, in the way 
which contingencies pile themselves into coincidence and eventually the numinous 
and even through the narrator which poses as omniscient and objective but is in 
actuality the subject of the perspective and idiosyncrasies of the character it follows.
71 
                                                 
71 In The Bell, the conceit of unreliable narrator, at least unreliable in its guise of 
objectivity and omniscience, reveals itself in many ways which include discrepancies 
in accounts of shared events, especially in the interactions of Michael and Nick and 
Michael and Toby (eventually also Nick and Toby).  Another indicator is how the 
narrator reveals in Ch. IV how Toby had recently learned the word “rebarbative” and   228 
The Bell takes this Murdochian meme to the point that it greatly seems as if 
the whole narrative were written in the Gothic genre.  It certainly is full of Gothic 
images and symbols with secretive nuns, slightly strange lay community, a priestly 
figure caught up in an inward spiritual deformity and acts of sexual malfeasance, an 
abbey bell and all it symbolises and portends and its mirror, Catherine, in all her 
strange, lovely and yet horrible elfishness.  Then of course there are the dreams 
Michael is haunted with, which torment the poor man with their unholy images and 
horrifying consequences.  Murdoch toys with her readers by including scenes which 
belong much more to the previous century than her own:
72 
The fantastic thought came to him suddenly that is was someone the 
nuns themselves had murdered.  The scene was so unutterably sinister 
and uncanny that a suffocating fear came upon him and he pulled 
desperately at the neck of his pyjamas while trying in vain to utter a 
cry of alarm.  He turned and found himself still in bed.  The early 
morning light filled the room.  He sat up in bed, still wrenching at his 
throat, his heart pounding violently.  He had been dreaming; but so 
powerful was the experience that he sat there dazed for a minute, not 
sure if he was really awake, still overwhelmed by the horror of what he 
had seen.  (78) 
This clear Gothic trend is just one example of fantasy seeping into Murdoch’s 
narrative, but it must be seen than more than mere literary “play” or a way of 
“quoting” that genre.  Indeed, it points all the way back to Murdoch’s foundational 
approach to symbols which considers them valuable and dynamic if very often 
slippery and dangerous.   
                                                 
subsequently employs that word in every chapter which concerns his portion of the 
story, indicating that the narrator of these chapters is informed by his perspective and 
even his very vocabulary (44).  Another example would be the incident between Toby 
and Dora under the bell which Nick claims was love-making, Dora claims was 
innocent and Toby remains ambiguous about. 
72 A quality which was likely an intentional act of homage to that era.  Murdoch once 
said, “The most obvious difference between nineteenth-century novels and twentieth-
century novels is that the nineteenth century ones are better” (Existentialists 221).   229 
  That The Bell so closely resembles nineteenth century Gothic is itself a 
symbol, but with a catch.  Like all of Murdoch’s symbols, it is an ambiguous one.  
What exactly do these Gothic allusions portend for the narrative being played out?  
The reader cannot know what aspect of the genre is being summoned metaphorically 
or what it might foreshadow in terms of the plot.  At the point where he is made privy 
to Michael’s dream, it seems all too clear that the novel will somehow end in tragedy.  
But if this is true, how?  Are the nuns really up to something quite sinister hidden 
away in their cloister?  Who was the drowned body being drawn up from the pond?  
This is clearly the way Michael is set forth thinking about his own dream.  Further 
incidents seem to corroborate it.  For instance, the night that the lost bell is 
accidentally rung by Toby and Dora in the barn, Michael is awakened by it and told 
the next day by Paul that the old legend of the bell stated it still rung out sometimes 
from the bottom of the pond, always as an omen of death.  But who’s death? 
  The other possibility is that this is not at all the sort of Gothic which is being 
channelled.  What if, for instance, Murdoch is writing in the style of Anne Radcliffe 
and every uncanny event which was viewed with symbolic import was to be, in the 
end, disposed of with the light of reason?  Admittedly, seasoned readers of Murdoch 
might not consider this possibility or might otherwise dismiss it easily, but the 
question arises naturally and as early on in her novelistic career as The Bell appeared, 
Murdoch would have had to assume such a choice would have remain open and 
legitimate to her whole readership.  What if the use of Gothic as a symbol was in 
itself a bit of a Gothic trick, a literary illusion rather than allusion, to be dispelled in 
the end with a good laugh while the reader comforted himself in knowing once more 
that there are in fact no such things as ghosts, or, rather, symbols?   230 
  To say that the symbolic value of Murdoch’s use of the Gothic in The Bell has 
“a catch” is also to unashamedly digress and glory in the tasteless art of punning.  For 
it is not only a slight or drawback, it is a trap.  In fact, it is just the same sort of trap as 
was laid out by Milton in his depiction of Satan and MacDonald in his own use of 
Death, subtly turning the scope of criticism back onto the reader.  In each of these 
incarnations the trap has functioned differently.  Milton uses it puritanically to try and 
expose his readers to their own sin and weak spiritual character.  MacDonald uses it 
pastorally and rather evangelically to ask his readers how they would respond to the 
paradox of the cross.  Murdoch in her own turn uses the trap as a warning.  The 
warning relates back to her perspective on the symbolic, its power and its perils.    
  Murdoch held lofty ideals where it concerned the novel, or in wider scope art 
itself, and its abilities to convey truth and benefit humanity.   In fact, in an ironic 
twist, the novelist becomes for Murdoch not just a prophetic figure but a Messianic 
one.  She writes in characteristic bourgeois hyperbole: 
We are, apparently, entering an untheological time […] The writer has 
always been important, and is now essential, as a truth-teller and as a 
defender of words […] He is threatened today in both these roles.  But 
I do not think the will to fight is likely to be weakened by the 
vanishing of the theologies: perhaps on the contrary.  It may be in the 
end that the novelist will prove the saviour of the human race.  
(Existentialists 232) 
It is, of course, the kind of statement which could only be made as an academic, 
somewhat removed from the tediousness of ordinary life.  All the same, its basic 
thrust is a genuine one.  Art really has replaced religion for much of society as far as 
providing meaningful narratives, symbolic structures and moral exhortations.  
Novelists, filmmakers, poets and musicians have replaced priests, popes and sages as 
the moral authorities for large portions of the so-called post-Christian societies.  This 
doesn’t necessarily mean that theology is obsolete, it just makes what happens in art   231 
all that much more important.  It brings attention to what I have been calling the 
“fantastic” faculty of literature which encourages its readers to deeply consider, in 
many cases, the very theological content they would automatically reject if presented 
in its traditional, Scholastic form.  It means, in essence, that now more than ever is a 
time for theologians to look towards art in order to divine their own future.   
  It is not just theology’s future which lies with art and literature, but its past as 
well.  The early and medieval Church famously abandoned traditional Jewish 
strictures against art, especially art which depicted divine character and action, in 
order to produce a mass of theologically infused music, sculpture, painting, stained 
glass, tapestry, architecture and all other manner of artwork.  These artists, poets and 
musicians reached outside of the traditional boundaries of theology at that time to 
reach out to masses of people to whom theology had never been accessible.  Of 
course, even within the Judaic tradition there was no estrangement from the process 
of doing theology through artwork.  Indeed, the Jewish Bible is full of it, the Psalms 
being just one example.  In fact it would be much more difficult to find parts of the 
Jewish Bible that are not strewn with literary and other artistic forms than to single 
out the ones which are not.   
For Murdoch, though, the most important example comes from Classical 
Greece.  In her essay explaining the relation of Plato, who clearly influences her 
greatly, to art she relates the strained history of conflict between poets and 
philosophers for control of the way in which theology was done and discussed: 
[T]here are some fairly obvious answers to the question why Plato 
was so hostile to art.  He speaks in the Republic (607b) of ‘an old 
quarrel between philosophy and poetry’.  The poets had existed, as 
prophets and sages, long before the emergence of philosophers, and 
were the traditional purveyors of theological and cosmological 
information.  Herodotus (ii.53) tells us that the Greeks knew little 
about the gods before Homer and Hesiod taught them; and Heraclitus   232 
(fr.57) attacks Hesiod, whom he calls ‘the teacher of most men’, as a 
rival authority.  (Fire 1) 
Murdoch’s take on the era of godlessness is that it was a time in which artists (and of 
course, being a novelist, especially novelists) would rise to the forefront as 
“purveyors of theological and cosmological information.”   
In The Bell, protagonist Dora, consistently resistant but not incessantly hostile 
towards traditional religious expression, finds her way to worship at that great London 
cathedral, the National Galleries: 
Vaguely, consoled by the presence of something welcoming and 
responding in the place, her footsteps took her to various shrines at 
which she had worshipped often before […] Dora was always moved 
by the pictures.  Today she was moved but in a new way.  She 
marvelled, with a kind of gratitude, that they were all still here, and her 
heart was filled with love for the pictures, their authority, their 
marvellous generosity, their splendour.  It occurred to her that here at 
last was something real and something perfect. (196) 
The event serves as a parable for the way in which Murdoch sees the role of art 
recovering its former theological vocation.
73  Of course, it also betrays Murdoch’s 
own peculiar brand of intellectual double-speak.  She states in The Sovereignty of 
Good, “almost everything that consoles us is a fake” (59).  Of course art, as well as 
everything else Murdoch advocates like “the Good,”
74 are seemingly obvious 
                                                 
73 Murdoch supports this view elsewhere: “Good art, thought of as symbolic force 
rather than statement, provides a stirring image of a pure transcendent value, a steady 
visible enduring higher good, and perhaps provides for many people, in an unreligious 
age without prayer or sacraments, their clearest experience of something grasped as 
separate and precious and beneficial and held quietly and unpossessively in the 
attention.  Good art which we love can seem holy and attending to it can be like 
praying” (Fire 76-77). 
74 Murdoch argues for “the sovereignty of the Good” even though unable and 
unwilling to say what it actually is, but rejects the notion that this actually condemns 
her philosophy for such ambiguous—one might even dare say flimsy—reasons as 
“excellence has a kind of unity to it” and “facts about our condition from which lines 
converge in a definite direction” and that it is only mysterious because it is 
unsystematic and pointless, like Death and Chance, and that this is apparently in its 
favour.  She concludes by saying “We cannot then sum up human excellence for these   233 
exceptions to the rule for her.  In Murdoch, things are obvious when she asserts them 
but is unable or otherwise unwilling to defend them in any fashion.   
If one takes a comprehensive reading of Murdoch’s nonfiction, the thing 
which she calls fantasy takes quite a rhetorical beating.  Obviously, she uses the word 
in its most humble sense, that of the private, indulgent creation of the human mind 
which seeks to comfort or pleasure itself.  She warns that “Magic in its unregenerate 
form as the fantastic doctoring of the real for consumption by the private ego is the 
bane of art as it is of philosophy […]” (Fire 79).  Yet the fundamental disjunction of 
Murdoch’s moral philosophy exposes itself here: while the self is apparently too 
extensive to be discarded in order for her to define in even the most minimal sense 
what the Good is, one is meant to be able to somehow inherently judge his experience 
and sort the real from the fantastic.  Murdoch once famously told The Times, “We live 
in a fantasy world, a world of illusion.  The great task in life is to find reality” 
(Knowles 536).    
Murdoch reveals herself as a Platonic mystic, but an unordinary one with 
nothing to affix Platonic Forms to.  This is why she need also be a mystic, so that this 
difficulty can be tossed into the sea of the ineffable.  Yet, when she needs them, the 
Forms are brought back out and made obvious once again so that “The authority of 
morals is the authority of truth, that is of reality […] Here too we can see it as natural 
to the particular kind of creatures that we are that love should be inseparable from 
justice, and clear vision from respect for the real” (Existentialists 374).  It is difficult 
                                                 
reasons: the world is aimless, chancy and huge, and we are blinded by self” 
(Existentialists 381-382).  Even this seems to be a consolation for the inherent 
inexplicability of her argument and the necessary absurdity that goes along with it, the 
fact that the Good is ultimately as unknowable, indefinable and absent as the rejected 
God of Scholastic theism is resolved by the fact that it is pointless anyway.  Indeed, 
this is what, in a perfect paradox, makes it so special (even though one wonders how 
being pointless could make anything special in a world where everything is supposed 
to be pointless).    234 
to imagine how one could be anything but baffled by the proposition that the axiom 
“love should be inseparable from justice” is somehow obvious and intrinsic to human 
nature and that both of these are in fact indicative of “the real” and therefore also, 
again “obviously,” authoritative.  If anything it would appear that neither love nor 
justice are “natural to the particular kind of creatures we are” and that the character of 
the “aimless, chancy” world which Murdoch says we are in is much more pervasive 
and “natural” if natural could be defined as either the way in which humans normally 
act or the continuity of human and animal behaviour.  Thus it is also difficult to place 
too much credit on Murdoch’s declaration  concerning human identity: 
We are what we seem to be, transient mortal creatures subject to 
necessity and chance.  This is to say that there is, in my view, no God 
in the traditional sense of that term; and the traditional sense is perhaps 
the only sense […] Equally the various metaphysical substitutes for 
God—Reason, Science, History—are false deities.  Our destiny can be 
examined but it cannot be justified or totally explained.  We are simply 
here.  (Existentialists 365) 
Ultimately, Murdoch fails to resolve the contingent world with the immutable, 
coherent Good precisely because that Good is fixed, or one could also justly say lost, 
in the contingent rather than in the theological.  Nevertheless, because Murdoch uses 
the symbolic to traverse the fundamental gap between the coherent and contingent in 
her novels and especially The Bell, they still provide excellent spaces for the 
theological because they are so open to and, one could argue contra Murdoch, in need 
of it. 
  The fact that Murdoch’s moral philosophy is functionally problematic should 
not by this point come as a surprise.  Milton and MacDonald were also both adjudged 
heretics, their theologies did not “work” outside of their fictive creations in the same 
way that Murdoch’s does not.  Also, just like Milton and MacDonald, Murdoch’s own 
perspective works out more cogently in her art than in her essays.  This is as much   235 
because of her own particular view of the role of the novelist than anything in her 
philosophy.  Murdoch, in her essays, often writes about the destiny of man as teloj.  
She declares: 
That human life has no external point or teloj is a view as difficult to 
argue as its opposite,
75 and I shall simply assert it.  I can see no 
evidence that human life is not something self-contained.  There are 
properly many patterns and purposes within life, but there is no general 
and as it were externally guaranteed pattern or purpose of the kind for 
which philosophers and theologians used to search.  (Existentialists 
364)  
Yet, if there is no teloj, what is the Good?  Is that not the externally guaranteed 
pattern?  If not, then how can Murdoch say “Good is a transcendent reality” 
(Existentialists 377)?  The Good relates problematically to Murdoch’s concept of 
human teloj as philosophy, but their relationship in The Bell is much more fruitful. 
   
teloj and the Fantastic Hermeneutics of Experience 
Murdoch’s characters in The Bell suffer from the difficulties of interpreting 
the event s of their own lives within an implied scheme or metanarrative (what 
Murdoch would call teloj).  While in her philosophy such a teloj is always 
illusory, in The Bell the essentially fantastic nature of such a construction does not 
preclude its being real.  Rather, Murdoch simply makes clear the tenuous nature of the 
hermeneutics by which one would not only determine such a narrative, but also 
classify experience with reference to it.  This is how the fantastic functions in The 
Bell to destabilise the hermeneutical confidence and epistemological foundations of 
the reader and stymies his every attempt to rationalise and classify the symbolic 
content of the novel “on his own.”   
                                                 
75 This is a claim which would not likely be so easily conceded by most theologians 
or philosophers.   236 
The best example of such an interaction comes with the character of the 
thoughtful, compassionate, wise, discerning, but unquestionably reprobate leader of 
the Imber community, Michael Meade.  The reader is given an early clue as to the 
particular quandaries which Michael would later find himself in the relation of the 
story of how he came to found the lay community at Imber. 
It was an aspect of Michael’s belief in God, and one which although he 
knew it to be dangerous he could never altogether reject, that he 
expected the emergence in his life of patterns and signs.  He had 
always felt himself to be a man with a definite destiny, a man waiting 
for a call […] Michael knew the futility of his recent years, eaten by 
the ennui which he had tried to picture to himself as an insatiable thirst 
for the good.  But now the pattern was at last emerging, the call had 
come. (Bell 81). 
The key word in this passage is “dangerous”.  Danger is, of course, a concept which 
was approached in the previous chapter when considering the risk of literary belief.  
Danger functions in much the same way here.  It is a hermeneutical kind of danger 
rather than ontological or existential (although it could indeed become an emotional 
or spiritual danger or lead one into other areas of much more tangible dangers).  To 
interpret one’s own experience through the lens of an expected pattern or type is a 
hermeneutical endeavour.  Every way of interpreting experience is hermeneutical, 
even the ways that seem to escape it through words like ‘empirical’ or, like so much 
of Murdoch’s moral philosophy (and all other fundamentalisms) ‘obvious,’ or that 
which needs no interpretation. 
  Now, the fundamental danger of expecting one’s life to develop with pattern, 
purpose, type or teloj seems to be that such an expectation would in almost every 
case alter the subject’s behaviour as he tries to make himself fit within a great purpose 
or narrative.
76  As that behaviour changes, it could develop more than the usual 
                                                 
76 Where such belief does not alter behaviour, the danger remains solely 
psychological but present all the same.   237 
amount of unintended consequences if the interpretation itself is erroneous.  For 
instance, the ennui which Michael experiences before his “call” to lead the Imber 
community is the result of two factors, the first being his belief that he was meant for 
good and the second the experiences which seemed to communicate he was incapable 
of serving the Good.  Yet even the angst which resulted from these two forces in 
Michael’s life he interpreted Christologically, that he was in fact suffering for the 
Good and not because he had interpreted his experiences under a false schematic.  
This, then, is the magic of what literary fantasy can provide for theology.  Whereas 
Murdoch the philosopher would have been forced to categorically deny all such 
interpretative measures, being that she could not accept any sort of transcendent 
teloj, Murdoch as the novelist knew that “artists can produce what they cannot 
account for” such that what was in her philosophy impossible becomes in her novel 
nuanced into that which is “dangerous” (Fire 2). 
  This leads to a deep truth which Murdoch knew very well but only ever 
grudgingly admitted: that the symbolic was necessary for human agency in navigating 
between the contingent or chaotic and that which is coherent, immutable.  Murdoch 
claims from within her mystical Platonic framework that the world is illusion and the 
human task is to find reality.  Yet this is just the very action which is impossible 
without the symbolic and the incorporation of the symbolic into one’s life and 
identity.  Murdoch concedes that “Human beings need fantasies.  The novelist is 
potentially the greatest truth-teller of them all, but he is also an expert fantasy-
monger” (Existentialists 234).  Indeed, this is the very centre of all artwork and 
Murdoch knows it. “Art represents a sort of paradox in human communication.  In 
order to tell the truth about anything complicated, we need a conceptual apparatus 
which partly has the effect of concealing what it attempts to reveal” (221).  This is, in   238 
essence, the claim which has been made throughout this paper as the intrinsic claim of 
what I call fantasy literature, that fantasy is a unique and dynamic device for truth to 
the point where it must be recognised as much more than “mere” fantasy and indeed 
as something supremely real. 
  In The Bell, Michael Meade’s fantasy is that he was meant and made by God 
for a purpose, the purpose of being a priest-like figure to others.  Yet there was 
another type or pattern which Michael submitted to regularly, “Michael Meade at 
twenty-five had already known for some time that he was what the world called 
perverted” (99).  Several fantasies weave through Michael’s perception of his self in 
relation to his homosexual desires, the first of which has already been mentioned: 
Michael Meade is perverted.  That is, Michael was from a very young age subjected 
to the idea that there was something fundamentally wrong with his person.  
Regardless of whether that did him particular psychological trauma or even if it was 
to some degree true (for the idea that one is fundamentally sinful is not unique to 
homosexual Christians, but extends to all within the Augustinian tradition via Calvin 
of total depravity and original sin), the crucial consequence is that it founded a pattern 
of inevitability in Michael’s life where his sexuality was concerned.  The inevitability 
concerned more than just the idea of inevitable homosexual dalliances, but of 
something much worse.  Michael Meade had not, by the age of twenty-five, known 
that he was what the world calls a homosexual; he had known that he was what the 
world called perverted, a monster.  Of course this is what leads him to imagine that 
there is something paternal and even holy in his twisted sexual relationship with his 
teenage pupil, Nick Fawley.   
The whole account is filled with his fantasies, “Michael knew what he was 
doing.  He knew that he was playing with fire.  Yet it still seemed to him that he   239 
would escape unscathed” (Bell 103).  This of course is simply the basest of all 
fantasy, it is in fact pornography—Dionysian sex with no consequences.  The first 
fantasy was one tempting him to a false reality—“Eat the fruit and you will become 
like God.”  The second was one which concerned agency and causality, for at the very 
first point at which he is confronted by his temptation, Michael succumbs because he 
believes it is inevitable: 
He knew that he was lost, and in making the discovery knew that he 
had in fact been lost for a long time.  By a dialect well known to those 
who habitually succumb to temptation he passed in a second from the 
time when it was too early to struggle to the time when it was too late 
to struggle. (104) 
Clearly Michael’s actions with his student were not inevitable.  Yet one of the 
trademarks of what could be called “mere” fantasy or an inadequate hermeneutic of 
experience or interpretive folly is that it almost always destroys agency; it inhibits the 
symbolic from negotiating the contingent and the coherent.  The third fantasy, 
however, is a syncretic one, or a fantasy of false consolation, perhaps even a Hegelian 
fantasy.  It is a fantasy wherein a synthesis could be made between Michael’s faith 
and his desire.  Naturally, the fantasy was not after all a synthesis at all but a way in 
which to maintain the object of desire without abandoning the faith and thereby a de 
facto abandonment of the faith insofar as it made faith the subject of desire.  Now 
Michael could be priest, lover, teacher, father and brother to his student all at once—a 
fantasy so flimsy that it could hardly even last through the moment of its conception 
(106).  
Thus the main tension in Michael’s life is not even between one fantasy and 
reality, but between two fantasies: Michael Meade as being a monster and Michael 
Meade as becoming himself.  It is crucial to remember that throughout the works of 
Iris Murdoch it is the character who understands himself or is fully being as himself   240 
who is able to incorporate the symbolic.  What Michael realises in The Bell, years 
after his failure with Nick, is that the self is not that which is but that which God made 
one to be.  Therefore, being as oneself is becoming oneself, not remaining in whatever 
state one happens to be in.  This, then, is the centre of Michael’s own moral 
philosophy which he thusly expresses in sermon to the Imber community: 
So we too must learn to understand the mechanism of our spiritual 
energy, and find out where for us, are the hiding places of our strength.  
This is what I meant by saying that it is the positive thing that saves.  
We must work, from the inside outwards, through our strength, and by 
understanding and using exactly that energy which we have, acquire 
more.  This is the wisdom of the serpent.  This is the struggle, pleasing 
in the sight of God, to become more fully and deeply the person that 
we are; and by exploring and hallowing every corner of our being, to 
bring into existence that one and perfect individual which God in 
creating us entrusted to our care. (210-211)       
This is a very nice sermon and summary of sound moral advice.  It does, however, 
leave out one important thing which, from a theological perspective, is very troubling 
indeed: God.  The God of Michael’s moral philosophy is not much more than the God 
of the Deists, he has no involvement whatsoever with the people of his creation other 
than that he created them.  Orthodoxy would suggest that such a Stoic position, and 
that term is not employed lightly, gets the basics right but forces the subject into the 
troublesome state of the individualist. 
  The problem with this man, a Romantic, suffering, noble and isolated hero, is 
that he is bound for failure.  What is more, the narrative of his failure will not shed 
any false glory on his ultimate undoing.  It will leave nothing but ruins.  Relatively 
early on in the novel the reader is warned ominously, “Those who hope, by retiring 
from the world, to earn a holiday from human frailty, in themselves and others, are 
usually disappointed” (84).  Perhaps this is one of the ways in which Michael’s 
fantasy of himself as a monster and of his monstrosity in particular situations is part 
of what draws him to isolation, which turns slightly his vision of his own destiny from   241 
priesthood to a type of quasi monasticism.  One can see easily how the two are 
contiguous, but one should also be very precise in elucidating their difference.  A 
monastic vocation, in the style of the lay community at Imber, is outside of the world, 
or at least halfway so.  A priest, on the other hand, is imbedded in the world and its 
society.  So it is apparent that the two visions are actually quite different from one 
another and are symbolic of the disjunction which plagues Michael’s attempts to 
negotiate teloj and the Good.   
  As the novel closes, after the failures of Michael and several other members 
have brought about the dissolution of their community, after Nick first tries to betray 
the return of the bell to Imber Abbey and the induction of his twin sister, Catherine, 
and then, on seeing its disastrous consequences kills himself, the nuns go on in their 
spiritual purity
77 with their bell quietly instated and Michael returns to the world.  He 
returns a changed man.  His grief over the death of Nick, in a way, kills him and the 
last remnants of his old self.  In a way, it is his baptism.  He is reborn as something 
much different.  The former Michael was consumed, even in his piety, by profound 
egocentrism.  It is this vice which even more so than his sexual conduct prevented 
him from interpreting himself in his world as his self which was becoming.  By his 
unselfing, he goes further in becoming himself than ever before.  In the depths of his 
grief and despair, “absorbed in himself so utterly,” he comes to believe that “At the 
human level there was no pattern” and thinks, “There is a God, but I do not believe in 
him,” (320-321).  This is the absolute bottom for Michael’s spirituality, he died there 
                                                 
77 Throughout the novel, the nuns in every case prove to be exceptional spiritual 
characters, not unlike the saints of the hagiographies, speaking with truth, clarity and 
divine wisdom and acting always in charity and never in harsh judgement.  The 
Abbess is renowned for her strength, holiness and authority throughout.  The sisters 
treat Toby only with kindness when he sneaks into their enclosure.  Also, ultimately, 
it is a sister who strips to her underclothes to dive in the pond and rescue the penitent 
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and then.  Yet, in a more subtle type of euchatastrophe, grace finds him out, there 
where he had hidden himself in his own guilt, unbelief and self-loathing love picked 
him up and bathed him first with silence and then rebirth:
78 
Eventually a kind of quietness came over him, as of a hunted animal 
that crouches in hiding for a long while until it is lulled into a kind of 
peace.  The silent days passed like a dream […] Very slowly a sense of 
his own personality returned to him.  The annihilating sense of total 
guilt gave way to a more reflective and discriminating remembrance.  
It was indeed as if there was very little of him left now. (321) 
His self is renewed in unselfing, a concept much more familiar to theologians in their 
own terms as his kenosis.  What is the vehicle, the reagent, the very catalyst for this 
metamorphosis?  It is nothing other than the most potently symbolic object in the 
narrative, the abbey bell itself.   
Throughout the novel the reader is (mis)lead into thinking of the bell as a 
symbol of death and tragedy.  That is undoubtedly a large part of its function, but only 
because the characters themselves read its symbolic function as such.  But to focus 
solely on this aspect of the abbey bell misses the most fundamental role of a church 
bell which is to deliver a call to worship.  A church or abbey bell will undoubtedly 
share as a part of its functions occasional duties in announcing or mourning the dead, 
but the vast majority of its ringing will be to call in the worshipers.  The interesting 
facet of this particular aspect of the bell is that the devout, by the very definition, 
know when it is time to worship.  But the bell at Imber Abbey rings out for the whole 
town and surrounding countryside to hear, beckoning even those estranged from God 
to come and worship.   
It is the bell which both slays Michael and calls him back to life.  Nick, in his 
cynicism, ambushes the bell on its way into the abbey.  Catherine, not at all secure 
                                                 
78 Note how similar the account of Michael is to the account of Job as it was related in 
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with herself, misinterprets the event as God’s condemnation of her secret love of 
Michael.  She promptly goes insane and tries to drown herself in the pond.  When 
Nick learns what his actions have done, he kills himself and when Michael learns of 
Nick’s demise his own heart is shattered and drifts away into oblivion.  All the same, 
the bell is installed, and grace comes to restore Michael to his new self.  Even “next 
door, as it were, to total unbelief” a prayer returns to him.  Even though he deems it 
“egotistical” it is the best kind of egotism, that which recognises helplessness.  The 
refrain that comes to his mind comes from the 13
th century hymn Dies Irae: 
“Quaerens me, sedisti lassus/Redemisti Crucem passus/Tantus labor non sit cassus” 
(322).
79   
Ironically the hymn comes from the same ancient time as the fictional bell of 
Imber abbey.
80  It is as if the bell called to him, through all of his grief.  It seems 
meaningful then that the inscription on the original bell read, “Vox ego sum Amoris, 
Gabriel vocor.”  The bell is the voice of love, Gabriel, who in the gospels announced 
the advent of God’s love in the world.
81  Michael does not lose pattern, destiny, or 
divine vocation, he is found by them.  At greatest need, in the hour of his undoing and 
remaking, Michael receives the call to worship even though he is next door to total 
unbelief.  His selfishness has largely passed (what Murdoch identifies as virtue) and 
what remains are his new self and worship: 
No sharp sense of his own needs drove him to make supplication.  He 
looked about him with the calmness of the ruined man.  But what did, 
from his former life, remain to him was the Mass […] The Mass 
remained, not consoling, not uplifting, but in some way factual.  It 
contained for him no assurance that all would be made well that was 
                                                 
79 “Faint and weary, thou hast sought me/On the cross of suffering bought me/Shall 
such grace be vainly bought me?”  Translation by William Josiah Irons as printed in 
The English Missal (London: W. Knott & Son Ltd., 1912). 
80 Paul Greenfield relates the information that Imber Abbey was formed in the 12
th 
century and that the bell itself was lost sometime in the 14
th century (38). 
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not well.  It simply existed as a kind of pure reality separate from the 
weaving of his own thoughts. (321) 
It is the Mass which brings Michael back to reality, to existence.  Even in its very own 
liturgical fantasy, it is to Michael the thing most real.  It is the ultimate example of 
how, in Murdoch, as in the other literature which has been examined, as in all of the 
fantastic literature under study in this project, symbols bring the real to bear. 
  In this way Murdoch becomes a very appropriate author with whom to 
conclude the survey of fantasy literature.  In one way it is fitting because it 
demonstrates how fantasy literature as I have defined it outgrew its own genre and 
expanded in unexpected directions.  I doubt Murdoch herself would have been very 
much pleased to find her novels being spoken of as fantasy literature.  Indeed, the 
very fact that Murdoch as a philosopher would undoubtedly never have herself 
entered the sort of conversation I have placed her in serves as a testament and case in 
point for the argument that I set forth from the beginning: fantasy, by upsetting the 
epistemological hierarchies of the Enlightenment and its legacies, provides a space 
which allows and entices people who might be otherwise unwilling or unable to 
engage in theology through a type of literary or liturgical belief.  The work of Iris 
Murdoch is clear in this respect; as a philosopher she was dismissive of religion and 
theology, but as a novelist she engaged them deeply and meaningfully.   
   
Conclusions 
Murdoch is a powerful symbol of the fundamental lesson which fantasy 
teaches, that one can only see and understand that which he will believe in.
82  For 
instance, if a Protestant theologian wishes to understand and say something about the 
                                                 
82 To “make believe” is the literary equivalent of the obedience which MacDonald, 
then Lewis claim is necessary for spiritual development.   245 
Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist, he must first understand that doctrine from within 
the Catholic perspective.  He must adopt a belief, even if propositional, in order to 
even be able to consider the idea he is confronted with.  Likewise, if a Catholic 
theologian wishes to understand the Protestant conception of “the Church” he must 
first set aside his own perspective and even definition of the word “church” in order 
to, in a moment, believe and then understand his fellow.  The point is overwhelmingly 
simple, as it is in fantasy literature, even though the route to it has been complex.  
The problem is that when beliefs are seen as constitutive of the actual 
individual, all ideologies and academic disciplines suffer (only theology suffers to a 
greater degree insofar as its participants’ beliefs are all the more deeply held).  We 
refuse to proverbially “walk a mile in another’s shoes” because we fundamentally 
believe that if we take off our own shoes we shall die! It is not that this is an age 
without belief, even without irrational belief, it is just that belief itself is so much 
more heavily guarded.  The antipathy which exists towards theological discourse in so 
much of western society is not a problem of not enough belief, it is a problem of a 
kind of belief which is more like neurotic certainty.  
  The lesson is simple, but wide reaching.  This project has pointed itself 
specifically at theology simply because it has so much to gain or lose.  Yet one can 
see its wide ranging significance outside of theology and even the university.  It has 
consequences for all discourse.  Therefore it is also a lesson about politics (domestic 
and international), a lesson about interpersonal relationships, a lesson about 
hermeneutics and so forth.  The reason for examining this principle through the 
relationship between theology and fantasy literature is that this is a story of human 
thought and discourse in that it demonstrates the dynamic potential of the willing 
suspension of disbelief in conjunction with the adoption of literary belief (or in   246 
theological language kenosis and charity).  The potential here is not some moralising, 
utopian one.  Rather, it is about radical, constructive discourse and a renewed, robust 
way of speaking about theology. 
  Fantasy feeds on desire—both virtuous and unwholesome.  The fundamental 
desire is that reality might become something better than what it is.  It is a desire 
which lies beneath Milton, MacDonald and Murdoch alike.  Yet it does seem, though, 
that here at the very end it is not enough to simply motivate desire, because insecurity 
is in itself a power which operates over and above one’s desires.  For some, perhaps, 
that will be enough.  But for others there will need to be more than a motivation 
towards desire or beauty, there will need to be a drive towards courage.  In pursuit of 
courage, it is appropriate to turn at last again to theology and Paul Tillich and his 
seminal volume The Courage to Be.  Courage is the last resort for preserving the 
possibility of a theological future infused with and driven by the fantastic and is, 
indeed, the tonic for times which are troubled morally, economically, spiritually and 
politically.  Tillich’s seminal work nominates itself in this matter because since the 
time it was forged from a series of lectures and published in 1952, The Courage to Be 
has seen straight to the centre of the weak, egotistical, impotent and neurotic character 
of so much of modern discourse.   
Courage is the self-affirmation of being in spite of nonbeing.  It is the 
act of the individual self in taking the anxiety of nonbeing upon itself 
by affirming itself either as part of an embracing whole or in its 
individual selfhood.  Courage always includes a risk, it is always 
threatened by nonbeing, whether the risk of losing oneself and 
becoming a thing within the whole of things or of losing one’s world in 
an empty self-relatedness. (154) 
In a world that is full of risks—existential, spiritual and otherwise—Tillich boldly 
claims that courage is the only meaningful response.   247 
  The Courage to Be comes from the heart of Tillich’s ultra-masculine 
perception of reality, which is perhaps something well needed when so much theology 
is well and truly neutered.  Its message, the word which it speaks into the void of 
doubt and nonbeing, is humble and strong.  Tillich knows, intimately, the troubles of 
nonbeing and he looks this spectre in the face and banishes it through the courage to 
be.  It is the seemingly timeless Cartesian question which he responds to as well as 
Kant and his tradition and even the atheist existentialists.  Tillich claims “By 
affirming our being we participate in the self-affirmation of being-itself.  There are no 
valid arguments for the ‘existence’ of God, but there are acts of courage in which we 
affirm the power of being, whether we know it or not” (Courage 181).  Yet Tillich’s 
call to arms might not be as bullish or Byronic as it might seem.  In truth Tillich’s call 
for courage comes not from a position of strength but one of weakness:
83 
The courage which takes this threefold anxiety [fate/death, 
emptiness/meaninglessness, guilt/condemnation] into itself must be 
rooted in a power of being that is greater than the power of oneself and 
the power of one’s world.  Neither self-affirmation as a part nor self-
affirmation as oneself is beyond the manifold threat of nonbeing […] 
[E]very courage to be has an open or hidden religious root.  For 
religion is the state of being grasped by the power of being-itself. (154-
155) 
What makes Tillich’s courage unique and important is that it is courage for the weak.  
Naturally, this is also what makes it so intensely Christian.  In it one returns to St. 
Paul’s Christocentric definition of human weakness, “For when I am weak, then I am 
strong” (1 Co. 12:10).  The Kierkegaardian “leap” works but only as courage for the 
courageous, not for the weak.  The courageous do not need help being what they 
already are.  They simply need to be spurred into action.  But what about those for 
whom the leaping itself is the impossible? 
                                                 
83 Unlike so many of Michael Meade’s attempts in The Bell.   248 
  For Tillich this courage for the weak is not just intended for weak people, but 
is actually flowing from the heart of their doubt, or, like Murdoch’s Michael, next 
door to total unbelief.  This is what, for Tillich, puts the Reformation at the pinnacle 
of the whole history of the courage to be.  Tillich’s explanation on this point is worth 
quoting at length: 
In the courage of the Reformers the courage to be as oneself is both 
affirmed and transcended.  In comparison with the mystical form of 
courageous self-affirmation the Protestant courage of confidence 
affirms the individual self as an individual self in its encounter with 
God as a person.  This radically distinguishes the personalism of the 
Reformation from all the later forms of individualism and 
Existentialism.  The courage of the Reformers is not the courage to be 
oneself—as it is not the courage to be as a part.  It transcends and 
unites both of them.  For the courage of confidence is not rooted in 
confidence about oneself.  The Reformation pronounces the opposite: 
one can become confident about one’s existence only after ceasing to 
base one’s confidence on oneself.  On the other hand the courage of 
confidence is in no way based on anything finite besides oneself, not 
even on the Church.  It is based on God and solely on God, who is 
experienced in a unique and personal encounter. (Courage 163) 
Tillich’s courage for the weak derives strength from the unity of communities and 
from the transcendence of being-itself, that is, God.  That the solution to human 
insecurity, doubt, anxiety and weakness should, for a theologian, rest in God himself 
should not be surprising.  Tillich does not offer a great amount of hope of a fully-
fledged courage to be for those who reject God as such, but what he does is to give 
help in this respect by helping people to understand that being-itself is God.  
Therefore by affirming being, one affirms being-itself (in a Platonic way) and is on 
the doorstep of experiencing a God which, Tillich says, is above the God of theism. 
  While the God above theism might be good news to those who never really 
got on well with the God of theism, it is potentially more challenging for believers.  
For it is not only those who disbelieve in a proposition who need to change 
perspective in order to properly consider it, but just as much and perhaps even more   249 
so those already accept it.  For theologians, this means at least in part following in the 
footsteps of Meister Eckhart who abandoned “God,” for God’s own sake.
84  The good 
news, from Tillich’s very Protestant perspective, is that the God above the God of 
theism has been around the whole time: 
The God above the God of theism is present, although hidden, in every 
divine-human encounter.  Biblical religion as well as Protestant 
theology are aware of the paradoxical character of this encounter.  
They are aware that if God encounters man God is neither object nor 
subject and is therefore above the scheme into which theism has forced 
him […] They are aware of the paradoxical character of every prayer, 
of speaking to somebody to whom you cannot speak because he is not 
‘somebody,’ of asking somebody of whom you cannot ask anything 
because he gives or gives not before you ask, of saying ‘thou’ to 
somebody who is nearer to the I than the I is to itself.  (Courage 187) 
The point here is that fantasy talks about reality in much the same way that theology 
must talk about God.  In the words of Murdoch, it “represents a sort of paradox in 
human communication.  In order to tell the truth about anything complicated, we need 
a conceptual apparatus which partly has the effect of concealing what it attempts to 
reveal” (Existentialists 221).  Fantasy is a way of relating to a reality which is much 
larger than the human capacity to analyse it rationally.  In the same way, theology 
must find a way of speaking the unspeakable and believing the unbelievable.  Yet, in 
doing this, it does not depart from its tradition or its truth claims, but rather seeks 
them out and finds them closer to their root.  Christian theology was born in fantasy, 
the fantasy which goes beyond fantasy.  It was a theology beyond reason, because it 
believed in a God who was beyond reason, “For the foolishness of God is wiser than 
man’s wisdom, and the weakness of God is stronger than man’s strength” (1 Co. 
1:25). 
                                                 
84 Eckhart is not encouraging wholesale abandonment of God in his “Qui audit me” 
but rather encouraging the abandonment of preconceived notions and assumptions 
about who and what God is.  For more on this see Cupitt’s Taking Leave of God 
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  We have seen how through the history of British literature, from Milton to the 
present, fantasy has been the place which time and again great thinkers and writers 
come to in order to be bathed with the liturgical, to experience and contemplate the 
unreasonable God, the “God above the God of theism.”  The relationship between 
theology and the fantastic, between the literary and the liturgical is still one which is 
being worked out.  There is no fairytale ending to this story.  For what is required in 
order to renew and revive fantastic theology is something much more than “faith and 
trust and a little bit of pixie dust”—what is required is the Kierkegaardian leap into 
objective uncertainty, which itself can only be mastered with something like the 
Tillichian courage to be.  Still, the fantastic provides an avenue back to theological 
inquiry which exists beyond reason and a liturgical hermeneutics capable of 
navigating the chasm between this and other worlds. 
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